

The Efficacy of Business Continuity Planning: Stories from a Natural Disaster

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Masters of Business Studies (Research)

Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is wholly my own work except where I have made explicit reference to the work of others.

I have uploaded the entire dissertation as one file to Turnitin®, examined my 'Originality Report' by viewing the detail behind the overall 'Similarity Index', and have addressed any matches that exceed 3% when quotations and bibliography are excluded. Any unaddressed matches in excess of 3% are explained by way of additional note submitted separately with the dissertation. I have made every effort to minimise my overall 'Similarity Index' score and the number of matches occurring.

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Sharon Doyle". The signature is written in a cursive style.

Kells, Meath, Ireland
2013



Figure 1 Haitian Street Art

Dedicated to my life partner Tom, my parents and my
grandparents Tom & Lily

Abstract

There has been considerable academic effort on how organisations should prepare for an unforeseen disaster. Business continuity planning (BCP) has been advocated as a method of working out how to stay in business in the event of a disaster. Despite many calls for organisations to engage in BCP (Lindstedt, 2008), there are no studies of the efficacy of such processes, and little by way of empirical research on the topic. In this empirical study we examine the efficacy of BCP using the recent earthquake in Haiti as a context.

It is obvious why such a study has not been done before, disasters and crisis are difficult topics to study, and it is also problematic to generate a causal link between planning and outcomes. Our study overcomes these research challenges using the novel method of storytelling (to produce a social truth), and deconstruction (to unpack the latent, unsaid issues within the stories) to consider the efficacy of BCP. By deconstructing stories from within organisations whose survival was threatened by the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, we study organisational responses and recovery from a natural disaster. The earthquake was a globally significant crisis, one that resulted in an estimated 230,000 deaths and 1 million people made homeless and was estimated to cost the country 15% of its GDP (World Bank, 2010). Furthermore Haiti has been subject to many natural as well as man-made disasters, which would lead one to expect a high state of readiness within organisations operating there. As a result it represents an appropriate context to research BCP.

Storytelling interviews were conducted with 15 managers who had direct experience of their organisations planning and managing through the crisis, and each interview captures their personal story of before, during and after the crisis. This data set has been deconstructed (in the mould of Morningstar, 1993; and Culler, 2007) to unpack the unsaid and latent gaps and inferences in these stories; which ultimately speaks to the issue of BCP efficacy.

We found that BCP greatly enhanced organisations resilience to the earthquake; even though the implementation of plans was often partial at best. Given the scale of the crisis and its unique pattern of destruction it is hard to conceive of BCP representing an operational plan for a crisis. Its main benefits proved to be as a training system and as a technical system that defined organisational redundancies. In this way, we are able to find that BCP is like Mintzberg's broader reflection on the limits of planning- "Planning is like jogging- it's not a very good way of getting anywhere, nor is it intended to be" (Mintzberg, 1994).

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Figure 2
Sharon Doyle & Carine Jones being evacuated from Port au Prince on 15 January 2010

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Sharon
Doyle

Chapter 1: Introduction



Figure 3 Improved housing in Haiti– The Guardian

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.0 Introduction

The purpose of this research is to examine the efficacy of the Business Continuity Planning (BCP) approach as a means to prepare for an unforeseen crisis. BCP is both a process and an approach that is prescribed to organisations so that they can continue to operate in the event of a crisis. As a preparatory system, one with significant costs and activities associated with it, the usefulness of BCP has not been sufficiently examined. This study examines the efficacy of BCP in organisations that were directly impacted by the 2010 Haitian earthquake. By collecting stories from fifteen managers about how they coped with the earthquake and its aftermath, this study examines the value that continuity planning had to them, as they attempted to respond to the crisis. Each organisation had a different approach to crisis planning and a different experience of the crisis. Each interview captures the manager's personal story of before, during and after the crisis. By linking the organisations approach with the managers sensemaking around how they managed through the crisis (which in turn also surfaced the relevance of the preparatory activities they relied on), this study reveals the mode of action of continuity activities during a crisis.

Emerging from this study is the curious finding on how BCP works. Continuity planning was found to have greatly enhanced organisations resilience during the earthquake; even though the implementation of plans was often partial at best. Given the scale of the crisis and its unique pattern of destruction it is hard to conceive of BCP representing an operational plan for a crisis. Its main benefits proved to be as a training system and as a technical system that defined organisational redundancies. In this way, we are able to find that BCP is like Mintzberg's broader reflection on the limits of planning- "Planning is like jogging- it's not a very good way of getting anywhere, nor is it intended to be" (Mintzberg, 1994). A further finding is that BCP worked best for the initial crisis, the earthquake; but that its ability to offer continuity was materially impacted by the scale of the crisis and more importantly by the scale of consequential crises such as food and water security, disease, crime and political instability.

1.1 Rationale for the Study

This work is novel in that the efficacy of BCP during a crisis has not been studied before. Naturally disasters are difficult topics to study, and it is also problematic to generate a causal link between planning and outcomes.

1.2 About the Research and Researcher

All research undertaken incorporates a set of limitations and bias, and the best a researcher can do is to acknowledge them as best they can. This study arose from a set of chance encounters- The researcher was transferred to Haiti from Ireland shortly before the earthquake to take up a new job and she wished to undertake postgraduate research in a business school for career and personal motivations. Over the course of this three year research process she has returned to Ireland, leaving Haiti behind and moved to work in the administration of NGOs.

1.3 Structure of this Dissertation

The thesis is organised as follows. It starts by introducing the literature on organisation crisis in chapter two. The literature firstly defines what constitutes an organisational crisis before examining the significant literature on the anatomy of a crisis including discussions on the fog of war, miasma and sensemaking. The literature on preparation for crisis, organisational resilience, BCP and its criticisms concludes the chapter. This sets the scene for the issue driving this research - how useful is BCP, and what is the nature of its use in a crisis.

Chapter three offers a brief discussion of methodology and a detailed explanation of methods used in the study. The method is the Biographic Narrative Interpretive Method of storytelling the results of which were then deconstructed. The data introduced in chapter four is based on 15 interviews undertaken in Haitian organisations in the months after the earthquake. A brief description of the data is presented, with full transcripts offered in appendices.

Chapter five introduces the analysis of the data; drawing out the central themes of the study which were introduced in the review of literature. This sets the

scene for chapter six, a discussion of the efficacy of the BCP one that recognises the limitations of the study.

The final chapter of the dissertation summarises the conclusions of the study, offers recommendations for further research and details to the contribution of the study.

Chapter 2: Literary Review



Figure 4 Image from the Crisis – The Guardian

Chapter 2: Literary Review

2.0 Introduction

The literature is examined in this chapter. Since the 1980's academic research from a range of perspectives has been increasingly attracted to the issue of how companies survive crises. Interesting, yet emergent work has developed better understandings of constitutes an organisational crisis, largely by way of case examples; and so this chapter starts by attempting to capture the scope of definitions of crisis by those writing on the phenomenon.

Drawing on the difficult aspects of defining a crisis, and thus issues of the emergent recognition of crisis; the second section of this literature review considers the anatomy of a crisis. Crisis represents a cognitive challenge to individuals and organisations and so the section draws together the inchoate literature on how organisations identify and attempt to both respond and manage crisis. This, purposely broad consideration sets the scene for a more specific treatment of the object of this study- BCP theory.

BCP fits into the broad, largely practitioner orientated work on preparing for crisis. With a tendency to focus on natural disasters such as hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes; this literature has developed a set of managerial prescriptions on how organisation should prepare. It is a particularly unreflective, practitioner orientated literature, so in seeking to consider its limits a critique of planning in general is introduced.

In this way this literature review addresses the academic literature that surrounds this research, specifically it allows for the identification of a crisis, positions BCP within a broader literature on crisis before allowing for the identification of the use of BCP in a set of organisations and the efficacy of BCP activities in a crisis. Thus this chapter sets the scene for the data presented in chapter four, after a consideration of method and methodological issues in chapter three.

2.1 On Organisational Crisis

In advance of considering BCP it is important to define what constitutes a crisis. For the purpose of this study, an organisational crisis is an event that poses an existential threat to the organisation. Many studies of organisational crisis do not attempt a definition, taking it as axiomatic or implied from the examples and data raised. Although the word "crisis" is clearly derived from Greek; "krisis" meaning "decision" (Morin, 1993) or "turning point" (Reber et. al., 2001) its origins fail to capture the inference of danger and jeopardy (Sellnow et. Al., 2002; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000) that the word holds in its current use. With a series of synonyms, Reilly (1993) defines crisis as a "disaster," "catastrophe," "jolt," "problem," "threat," and "turning point" (p. 116) placing the organisation in a situation that is "novel, unstructured...outside the organization's typical operating frameworks" (p. 118). Shrivastava (1993) adds that "damaging disruptions, upheaval and restructuring" are "hallmarks to crises" (p. 24). Pearson and Clair (1998) provide a comprehensive "array of organizational crises" that includes such trigger events as "hostile takeover," "plant explosion," "security breach," and "terrorist attack" (p. 60). Despite these definitions richness, they fail to capture the urgency that arises from crisis events. Perhaps the definition that is most in sympathy with this understanding of crisis is that of Sellnow, Seeger and Ulmer (2002) who describe organisational crisis as "...a specific, unexpected, and nonroutine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threaten or are perceived to threaten an organization's high-priority goals;" (p. 7). Almost all who come to the academic discourse on organisational crisis use examples to define what they mean by crisis, and so it is useful to list their definitions which provide a comprehensive boundary to the territory under examination.

Table 1 List of Organisational Crises (with significant academic consideration in highly cited/>50 journal articles)

Year	Academic Consideration	Crisis	Organisation	Detail
1982	Fink, 1986	Specific product liability	Johnson & Johnson	Product contaminated during manufacturing, public health issue.
1989	Shrivastava, 1993	Oil spill/shipping accident	Exxon	Oil spill from damaged tanker, significant pollution, human error.
2001	Matwitz, et.	Factory	Atofina Fertilizer	An explosion in a

	al. 2008	accident/ explosion	Plant	fertiliser plant in Toulouse, France. Health and safety issue.
2001	McClellan & Elkind, 2004	Accounting Fraud/Bankr uptcy	Enron Corporation	Enron's recorded profits and assets were inflated or fraudulent and non- existent. Debts and losses were not included in financial statements.
2001	Sidak, 2003	Accounting Fraud/Bankr uptcy	WorldCom	Inflating revenue and booking costs as capital instead of expenses.
2002	Toffler & Reingold, 2004	Firm engaged in criminal activity	Arthur Andersen	Found guilty of criminal charges relating to the handling of the audit for Enron Corporation.
1999	Johnson & Peppas, 2003	Specific product liability	Coca Cola	Coca Cola products were recalled in Belgium due to an irregular taste and smell, health and safety issue.
2008	Harrington, 2009	Insolvency from mispricing risk	AIG	Accepted a Federal Reserve bailout rescue package and secured credit facility due to liquidity problems.
2007	Crotty, 2009	Insolvency from mispricing risk	Merrill Lynch	Made billion dollar write downs and losses due to the National Housing Crisis and Subprime Mortgage Crisis.
2008	Kapil & Kapil, 2009	Insolvency from mispricing risk	Citigroup	The bank was forced into major restructuring due to Subprime Mortgage Crisis.
1999	Taylor & Perry, 2005	Antitrust and competition issues	Microsoft	The EU brought antitrust legal action against the company citing its abuse of dominance with Microsoft OS.
2005	Hopkins, 2008	Factory accident/ Fire and Explosion	BP Texas City	A fire and explosion killed 15 workers and injured 150, health and safety issue.
2000	Parker, 2002	Failure to recall defective product	Mitsubishi Motors	Thousands of customer complaints regarding defects were found hidden and not dealt with.
1984	Mitroff,	Factory	Union Carbide	Killed 3,000 people and

	Shrivastava & Udwadia, 1987	accident leading to gas leak		injuring 300,000, also caused environmental damage.
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This table provides a useful device in an attempt to understand what is meant by organisational crisis. There is a full list of organisational crises in Appendix 2. Despite the seriousness of each of these events, clearly not all meet the standard established for this study of an existential crisis. In a similar vein, not all of these led to decisive change, or were a turning point for the organisation in question. Indeed the unifying thread is that the organisation perceived them to be a crisis, and that they arose from a particular unplanned event. In many ways, a crisis represents a liminal event (Turner, 1974) for the organisation, one where the normal is suspended, the organisations very identity and existence is under threat and through the rituals of crisis it may rejoin the normal and mundane. Such a definition captures much of what others have described and identified both in the abstract and by way of examples. Beyond defining what constitutes a crisis, it is important to consider how they are recognised and management within organisations.

2.2 The Anatomy of a Crisis

If the definition of a crisis as a liminal event for the organisation is accepted, then crisis has an identifiable structure, one that can be examined and thus revealed. Indeed a number of researchers have attempted to break apart the term by identifying stages or parts of a crisis so that they can better understand the nature of a crisis. For example Fink (1967) defines a crisis as a “turning point for better or worse”, and describes four distinct stages of crisis- prodromal/onset, acute, chronic and finally resolution. Although this is little more than a chronological sequencing of before the event, the event and sorting after the event, it maps neatly onto the liminal stages of rituals described by Turner (working on ideas by van Gennep, 1909). If we take the crises as threshold events characterised by the dislocation of established structures, the reversal of hierarchies, and the uncertainty regarding the continuity of tradition and future outcomes (Horvath et. al, 2009).

Usefully, van Gennep (1909) parsed liminal events into three phases which map neatly onto Fink's structure of a crisis; but also adds richness to our understanding of these threshold events. In the first phases, what van Gennep (1909) calls preliminal rites- the status quo is ruptured instigating the change, forcing a break with previous practice and routines. This reflects the moment of crisis and realisation of its import. What follows are liminal rites, or transition rites which clear the old order away. Van Gennep (1909) identifies the centrality of a master of ceremonies figure, who emerges in the phase to lead the change, bringing order to the process of transformation.

This subtlety is reflected in the broader discourse on crisis which emphasises the role of leaders and the importance of their symbolic leadership in crisis (Dutton, 1986). This phase involves the creation of a tabula rasa by the clearing away of previous formalities and processes, structures and taken-for-granted limits. The final phases in van Gennep's schema is postliminal rites or incorporation wherein the new form, new status quo, the new entity is reincorporated into society; leading to a new settledness (Turner, 1974). Whilst work on producing an overall schema for the anatomy or structure of a crisis, and work on understanding thresholds/liminal phases adds greatly to our understanding- others have focuses on particular phases of a crisis. The following section introduces three of these- the fog of war/miasma that emerges at the onset of a premodial (in Fink's scheme) and preliminal rites; and the sensemaking that emerges during a crisis and finally leadership in a crisis

2.2.1 The Fog of War - The Miasma of Crisis

In the military, where crisis is often the normal, they talk of the fog of war. Indeed in Dick Cheney's recent autobiography he describes the first hours after 9/11 as 'living in the fog of war' where contradictory and very limited information was swirling around the room and where big decisions in a 'new world' were being made. Similarly Robert McNamara used the term to describe his decision making during the Vietnam War and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1996). Indeed the term is defined in the Joint Service Command and Staff College Handbook (2001) as meaning the uncertainty in situation awareness experienced by participants in military operations. The term is attributed to Clausewitz's seminal text 'On War' "the great uncertainty of all data in war is a

peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planning in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently – like the effect of a fog or moonlight – gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance” (1873).

Indeed modern crises are increasingly complex (Boin & Hart, 2003) because they are rarely spatially separate events (Rosenthal & Hart, 1998). As a result of globalisation, deregulation and information and communication technology, the world is a closely-knit intricate structure, where modest mishaps can send shockwaves across vulnerable, dependent systems, and crises can escalate in unforeseen ways (Perrow, 1989). Heightening this problem is that bad news often faces obstacles on its way to senior managers in organisations (Wilensky, 1967) where no one wishes to unduly alarm senior managers. Captured in this rich phrase of the fog of war is the challenge for quick thinking, quick sensemaking (Weick, 1967) and leadership when a crisis is already well underway. When such a response does not emerge, the organisation may not make it out of the premodial/preliminal phase and might become bogged down in a miasma.

The metaphor of miasma (as introduced by Gabriel, 2005) captures the paralysis of resistance, experience of pollution, un-cleanliness, feelings of worthlessness and corruption that can emerge in times of crisis. Drawing on more psychological-minded researchers, Gabriel maps theories of mourning and depression to destructive and paralysing forms of critical and self-critical attitude that can emerge in organisations. In Gabriel’s ways of thinking, organisations are undoubtedly systematic generators of anxiety, with employees often working with people they do not like, doing things that they do not enjoy, being treated impersonally. Organisations in a miasmatic state, tend not to be able to resolve even the most modest of crisis, because their crisis fighting mechanisms have been disabled- either their leadership has become contaminated, or their fighting spirit has abandoned them. The Tavistock researchers show how in large bureaucratic organisations workers often set up psychological boundaries, which distort organisational rationality and enforce (and reinforce) a malaise. Silence, inaction and passivity are the frequent response to miasma and in the event of a crisis no authentic leader emerges to lead the organisation. In a similar line of thinking Stein (2001) introduces the idea of organisational darkness- suggesting

that the emotional savagery, brutality and psychological forms of violence (intimidation, degradation and dehumanisation) are commonplace in organisations. In these types of organisation, lack of loyalty, identification and meaning with work- mean that crises escalate, perhaps even becoming the silent killer of the organisation.

2.2.2 Making Sense of Crisis

Whilst ideas of miasma and fog richly describe the early phase of a crisis-sensemaking provides understanding to the liminal/transition/acute and chronic phases. Sensemaking, a concept closely identified with Weick (1979) involves turning circumstances into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard too. Sensemaking fills the important gaps in organisational theory being an issue of language, talk and communication. When the current state of the world is perceived to be different from the expected state of the world efforts in sensemaking is fully expressed. Organisational sensemaking is about: How does something come to be an event for organisational members? Our understanding of crisis is largely drawing from rich case examination, (which in turn are derived from academic theorisations of the intensive technical examinations that tend to occur after a noteworthy crisis); such as Mann Gulch (Weick, 1993), Andes plane crash (Smith, 1983) and the NASA Challenger disaster (James, 2007). Emerging from these studies are key characteristics such as chaos, labelling, presumption, and taking action are some of the distinguishing features of sensemaking.

Weick, in introducing the concept of sensemaking (1993) discusses the Mann Gulch fire disaster in the Helena National Forest in Montana. 16 smokejumpers were dispatched to fight the fire and 13 of them died. Sensemaking in organisations is that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs. The fire-fighters believed that the fire was a 10.00 fire which could be surrounded by 10am the next morning which was not the case. There was deficient sensemaking as the fire-fighters did not face the pressing questions but faced their old labels which were no longer working and did not develop some sense of the issues. Disorganisation was due to people in unfamiliar roles, key roles being unfilled, the task being more ambiguous, discrediting the role system and a

monstrous event. Sources of resilience are improvisation and bricolage, virtual role systems, the attitude of wisdom and respectful interaction. There was a solution to the fire inside the group with the lighting of an escape fire to create an area where people can escape. If each person had taken on all of the roles and then become the group. The more we learn the greater the number of uncertainties and questions there are about a particular topic, the better solutions we can provide. 450 men fought for five more days to get the fire, which had spread to 18km, under control.

In a similar vein, Smith (1983) reanalysed the many groups that formed among the 16 members of the Uruguayan soccer team who survived for 10 weeks in an inaccessible region of the Chilean Andes Mountains after their aircraft, carrying 43 people, crashed. These individuals were multiple groups which emerged and were related to one another. These multiple groups demands included caring for the wounded, acquiring food and water and selecting and equipping an expeditionary group to look for help. The team captain articulated that they would have to consume the flesh of the dead to survive and they would have to explain and rationalise this once they were rescued. The team had ten weeks with threats of bleeding, hygiene, starvation, avalanche, expedition and rescue. Smith argued that individual behaviours and acts of leadership are influenced by the intergroup processes.

James (2007) when studying the NASA Columbia tragedy and the approach to sensemaking and organisational crisis, found that the results showed that there were a number of influencing factors such as competition between NASA's teams especially for funding. Part of the culture was routine making change difficult, different teams focused on different scenarios in terms of crisis planning which suggests a problem with the way teams share information intraorganisationally. There are other issues regarding risk versus safety (contradiction), transparency and structural problems.

2.2.3 Leadership in a Crisis

Central to our thinking on organisation crisis is leadership (Boin & Hart, 2003), and naturally in times of distress people look for leadership. The nature of crises is that they are hard to control and manage. A crisis is a window for leadership, an urgent situation requiring action by true leaders. We can look to leaders such

as President Bush and New York Mayor, Rudolph Giuliani in the days following September 11, 2001 when both saw their support and reputations soar in the midst of threat and uncertainty. There is a challenge to restore normality which is accompanied by a sense of opportunity of a crisis. A crisis generates an opportunity to reform organisations and their policies and structures. Leaders can avoid being tainted by crises and exploit their dynamic potential. The requirements of crisis management (prevention, preparedness, response and reconstruction) are incompatible with the requisites for effective reform of an organisation.

2.2.4 Concluding Thoughts on the Anatomy of a Crisis

This section discussed the literature on how managers work through a crisis once it has started- from recognition to attempts to lead and manage through. In the absence of a natural pre-existing structure of a well-worn academic path, this literature review was assembled from a number of different, largely unrelated sources. This contrasts with the literature on preparing for crisis which is well developed. Whilst it might be counter intuitive to organise the literature review with the anatomy of a crisis in advance of research on preparedness- it reflects the broad view that managers are adverse to crisis contingency planning (Mitroff et. Al., 1992), and usually interest in preparation comes from the bitter experience of crisis (Ephraim & Kam 2004, Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).

2.3 Academic Discourse on Preparing for a Crisis

2.3.1 Preparing for Crisis

There is a large and largely prescriptive literature, often emerging from professional bodies such as accounting or engineering, on how to prepare for a crisis. Broadly this literature recommends a risk assessment to identify the warning signs and detection measures (for example American Institute of Chemical Engineers (2005) recommend monitoring workplace violence, riots protests, product contamination, terrorism, natural disasters (hurricanes, blizzards, floods, wild-fires etc.). A written plan with procedures to be followed when an internal and external disaster occurs should address the emergency

situations where there is extreme danger to life, property and the environment (Harbord/ACCA, 2003). In this line of thinking each site in the organisation should have an emergency response plan that is compatible with the corporate plan, along with a notification procedure for contacting internal and external resources in an emergency. A crisis management team should be established which may be assisted by internal support teams. This team should include resources for a Team Leader, Health & Safety Co-ordinator, Public Relations Officer, Human Resources, Legal Counsel, Security Advisor, Administrative Resources, Corporate Services, Engineering, Finance, IT, Medical, and Supply Chain. A crisis command centre should be established and also an alternate command centre which should be equipped for any contingency. The equipment should include phones (an additional line), cell phone, satellite phone, teleconferencing equipment, dedicated computer with internet and intranet access, laptop connections, printer, video conferencing, fax machine, photocopier, TV with satellite connection, key office supplies, LED projector, status board, clock with multiple time zones, sign in sign out boards and hardcopy backups (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2005)

In managing a crisis, the initial response to the crisis as soon as major emergency has been declared or identified, is rapid communications which is critical to mitigate the incident. A comprehensive checklist could be used to ensure that nothing has been overlooked in the response to the incident scene. The answers to the checklist will allow the team leader to assess the degree of involvement of the team and then provide information to the team to develop an action plan. In the midst of an emergency it is difficult to get all the facts especially with a rapidly changing incident when managing the response. Plans are developed such as press releases or government information requests. Other outside agencies such as government agencies and NGOs etc. will become involved and communications must be established with them. Each incident will require its own set of response procedures including assembling the core team and discussing each person's plan of action and raising questions. One or more team members should maintain the chronology of the event. In severe crises the team may be unable to provide effective coordination and communication for a period of time due to infrastructure damage. A communication plan should be developed providing a detailed situation update and responsiveness to all

parties. The assessment and business recovery begins as soon as the emergency is stabilised. Communications will need to be revised and kept up to date. The long term effects will become more obvious and the facts will emerge. The crisis team should be educated about their responsibilities and duties. Training should include testing and practice. A plan is only effective if it is current and practiced. Access to information is also important, as is access to team information on an intranet website and should be available from a remote location. (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2005). So whilst the literature on preparing for crisis is dominated by prescriptive technical actions, where discourse is focused on identifying the best set of technical actions and their relative merits; an important stream of literature has emerged on organisational resilience- which is the output of these technical solutions.

2.3.2 Organisational Resilience

The development of organisational resilience is key to preparing for and managing a crisis. As defined by Pidgeon and O'Leary (2000) organisational resilience is the man-made disasters model and proposes that the build-up of latent error and events, at odds with the culturally taken for granted, is accompanied by the collective failure of organisational cognition and 'intelligence', as the developing system vulnerability to failure remains concealed by social processes which attenuate evaluations of risk. Resilient organisations should have flexible staff, adaptable supply chains, a satisfying product range for customers and agile organisational structures. Organisations which do not adapt will collapse to be replaced later by new and efficient organisations which are better suited to the new environment (Torrens Resilience Institute, 2009). The concept of organisation resilience has changed its focus as organisations have been redefined by the extent and scope of the threats facing them. If not properly managed a disruptive event can escalate into an emergency, a crisis, or a disaster. It can taint an organisation's image, reputation or brand resulting in significant physical or environmental damage, injury or loss of life. For example the oil spill from the Exxon Valdez into Prince William Sound in Alaska in 1989 spilled nearly 11 million gallons (267,000 barrels) of crude oil into the ocean, with consequential damage to marine life and coastal environment. The company underestimated the seriousness of the spill. Despite promises to clean up the spill quickly and effectively, after one month less than 7% of the spilled

oil had been recovered and less than one mile of the 300 miles of polluted beaches had been cleaned up. On the public image front, Exxon fared no better, despite the large size of the company it had maintained a low public profile and it continued to be cautious and guarded with the media and the public. It did not make proactive attempts to satisfy the information needs of its stakeholders. Exxon came under criticism from the media, the federal government, the state of Alaska and public interest groups for allowing incompetent people to run the ship and its handling of the crisis. What happened at Exxon can happen at any organisation, an organisation can be hit by a crisis spurred by industrial accidents, environmental pollution incidents, occupational health issues, hostile takeovers, terrorism or harm caused by a product. Organisations in crisis face adverse scrutiny and criticism; this can destroy the morale of employees, cause the stock price to plummet and prompt liability suits. (Shrivastava & Siomkos, 1989)

The airline industry was affected more than any other industry by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Some airlines emerged successful and demonstrated resilience while others failed. Organisations are better able to cope with a crisis when they maintain strong relational and financial reserves and when they have business models that fit the needs of the existing competitive environment. Drawing on 15 years of data from the airline industry prior to the crisis (Gittell, Cameron, Lim & Rivas, 2006), a viable business model is itself a function of positive employee relationships. Although layoffs are a short term approach to crisis, they risk damaging the relationships that are needed for long term recovery. The study investigates the dramatic difference in resiliency and recovery in US airline companies after 911 based on stock price recovery on all major airlines at the time of the crisis and various other criteria. A viable business model and long term positive employee relations plus adequate financial reserves enabled Southwest Airlines to return quickly to business as usual. US Airways who relied on layoffs as a strategy of recovery filed for bankruptcy for a short period and then received government assistance. Financial instability, climate change, population growth are some of the emerging trends which are long term challenges for organisations. It is important to note the difference between resilience and robustness. Robustness is the ability of a system to maintain its functions and characteristics in the face

of disruptive events. A robust organisation should be able to withstand all external shocks with little or no impact to its organisational structure, people, physical assets, and IT systems and be able to meet its operational targets as well as achieve its strategic objectives.

In achieving organisational resilience, BCP is the widely accepted managerial solution.

2.3.3 Business Continuity Planning

The roots of BCP lie in disaster recovery which in turn was developed from war gaming and scenario planning. In early manifestations of war gaming, the ability to turn bad situations to your advantage is the reward of good planning (Garrett, 2012).

Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) wrote 'The Art of War' a great influence on strategic thinking and developing the first war game and scenario based planning. Scenario planning emerged out of war gaming identifying trends and uncertainties and look at the outcome of future events (Oriesek & Schwarz, 2008). They also warn about the limitations of scenario planning as it is fundamentally biased by those who developed the scenario and their imagination. Wack (1985) suggested that by realising the future was unstable; organisations should prepare strategies to address instability.

With initial contributions from Mitroff and Pearson (1993) and Fink (1967), researchers have formulated increasingly sophisticated views on BCP; which are introduced in this section. BCP is defined as the business specific plans and actions that enable an organisation to respond to a crisis event in a manner such that business functions, sub-functions and processes are recovered and resumed according to a predetermined plan, prioritised by their criticality to the economic viability of the business (Shaw & Harrald, 2004). As an activity it is planning that identifies the organisation's exposure to internal and external threats and synthesises hard and soft assets to provide effective prevention and recovery for the organisation, whilst maintaining competitive advantage and value system integrity (Elliot, Swartz & Herbane, 1999). Early researchers of BCP focused on improving the *continuity of operations* in the event of a crisis (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993), on the basis that if an organisation continued to operate through a crisis its survival was more assured. Consequently managerial prescriptions were

aimed at operational resilience- a fire plan, a data back-up plan, and evacuation plan. Many organisations have incorporated this type of planning into their organisational life- often spurred on by health and safety regulations and accounting audits. Elliott, Swartz and Herbane (1999) have questioned whether these types of issues are truly strategic, and they go on to argue that BCP should be broader, focusing on preserving long term competitive advantage.

Researchers on BCP strongly advocate BCP in companies as a means of surviving and continuing operations during and after a crisis (Mitroff, 1993; Fink, 1967; Burnett, 1999; Littlejohn, 1983). Beyond this elemental rationale for BCP, others have pointed out the importance of faster and most cost-effective recovery of critical business processes following a disaster (Penrose, 2000). Despite subtle differences which we examine later in this section, academics who advocate BCP recommend largely the same broad process. All recommend nominating senior managers within the organisation to lead BCP and to be responsible for the organisation during and after a crisis. They also recommend allocating roles and redundant roles throughout the organisation. Once this is done, most BCP models recommend a formal process of anticipating and preventing of critical situations, testing weaknesses and developing contingency arrangements. In this way, BCP organises organisations to survive natural disasters such as geological, meteorological, biological; human crisis (accident, famine, war, earthquake, floods, fire, pandemic illness) and technological events (Y2K, insolvency, loss of computer network) or combinations of these. A number of researchers have suggested different processes for developing BCP.

Table 2 List of Researchers processes for developing BCP

Author	Definition of Crisis	When (necessary)	Process
Mitroff (1993)	A disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its basic assumptions, its subjective sense of self, its existential core.	No company can prepare for every crisis scenario, but may be able to group crises according to structural similarities.	The organisation should prepare for the worst scenario in each group considering the best preventative actions preparing for one crisis scenario and providing exposure to several other similar scenarios.
Fink (1967)	If crises have taught the world anything, it is that a crisis in business with little	A comprehensive situation audit is suggested.	Scenarios are developed to determine what causes a crisis in different areas. Action plans should

	or no warning, anywhere, anytime. It can happen to any company, large or small, public or private. The safest assumption is that a crisis looms on the horizon.		include crisis situation descriptions and a statement of desired and acceptable outcomes. 'What if' questions should be used to develop strategic or tactical options.
Hayes-James & Perry-Wooten (2005)	Business crises are defined as situations that invite negative stakeholder reaction and threaten the wellbeing of the firm.	They describe and distinguish a crisis manager from a crisis leader. Different types of crisis each of which require different methods of management. Defining a crisis situation provides insight into the general applications of crisis leadership criteria.	Crisis leadership takes a holistic approach by addressing damage done and the implications for the corporations present and future conditions as well as opportunities for improvement.
Institute of Crisis Management (2009)	Two types of crisis. Sudden which comes without warning and beyond control such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks and sabotage. Smouldering crisis begin as minor internal issues and develop due to negligence into a crisis.	Smouldering crisis account for nearly three quarters of all business crises.	There are five phases of crises signal detection, preparation and prevention, containment and damage control, business recovery and learning.
Burnett (1999)	Crisis management has become a natural part of corporate culture and must be viewed on a continuum.	Crisis situations can be classified into a sixteen cell matrix based on threat level, response options, time pressure and degree of control.	The preparation and analysis of the matrix by the crisis management team is an invaluable exercise in problem awareness. It improves decision making and prioritises a list of all potential crisis situations and allows for proper allocation of resources.
Penrose (2000)	In every crisis lies both a threat and an opportunity.	80% of companies without a comprehensive crisis plan vanish within two years of suffering a disaster.	Perception of a crisis as an opportunity or threat may have significant implications. Opportunities may exist in any crisis situation. Proactive planning may include mechanisms for determining possible crises.
Littlejohn (1983)	Identifying potential areas of risk.	This model is a framework that provides basis crisis management development.	The first step is to design a crisis management organisational structure and then the selection of the crisis team. Team development

			occurs by training and simulations. The next step is to design and conduct a crisis situation audit. Then a contingency plan should be drafted. The final step of this model is to manage the crisis.
Pearson & Clair (1998)	Crises have dual meaning as well as dual outcomes.	The key aspects of planned responses will influence the degree of crisis management success. The person responsible for crises varies from a crisis team to the CEO.	An integrated model of crisis management which points to the need for collaboration and collective intra and inter-organisational action for effective crisis management with attention to be paid to organisational culture, risk perceptions, crisis preparations, individual and shared assumptions, establishment of crisis management teams and building of alliances and co-ordination of crisis management plans through candid information sharing with critical external stakeholders.

The literature on BCP is remarkably settled on the need for BCP, its benefits, and systematic approach to undertaking BCP. As a result of their collective efforts, BCP is now seen as strategically significant to organisations (Penrose, 2000). Despite this assertion, and calls for all organisations to engage in BCP (Lindstedt, 2008) there is little in the way of empirical research on the topic research that examines the resilience of organisations during a crisis. In the absence of empirical work on the usefulness or otherwise of BCP, this considerable academic effort is little more a speculative bet that prescriptive planning processes work. It is obvious why empirical studies have not been done before, disasters and crisis are difficult topics to study (Noy & Vu, 2010), and it is also problematic to generate a causal link between planning and outcomes (Mintzberg, 1994).

Nevertheless, this research sets out to examine the efficacy of BCP using the recent earthquake in Haiti. Undoubtedly a crisis, the 7.0 magnitude Haitian earthquake with an epicentre 25km west of Port au Prince, had a catastrophic impact on this very poor country- with an official death toll of 230,000 and 1.5 million people made homeless (Bilham, 2010). In an area prone to earthquakes,

other natural disasters and man-made calamities too, Haiti unfortunately represents an excellent location to study organisational preparations for foreseen (but unpredictable) disaster.

2.3.4 Criticism of BCP and Planning

In and of itself BCP has not been well critiqued. Indeed within the various theorisations provided in the previous sections there is no apparent contestation for meaning or significant positions taken. This may well be because BCP is consultancy driven, practice orientated set of managerial prescriptions, rather than being widely considered by an academy. Furthermore, BCP has emerged from a consideration of cases of crisis (such as Mann Gulch, Exxon Valdez, and various plane crashes) without having the efficacy of the prescriptions tested in further research cycles. As such it is a discipline with little in the way of theory testing, or dispute amongst those working on building BCP theory. To better understand the latently held positions embedded in the BCP approach, which might suggest the limits and risks of BCP, it is worth looking at the broader and well established critiques of strategic planning. Mintzberg offers a broad critique of planning which is of use to this discussion when considering BCP as a subset of broader strategic planning in organisations. He argued that the label strategic planning should be dropped because strategic planning impeded strategic thinking. Mintzberg is concerned that a bureaucratic, analytical planning process that deceives managers into thinking that they are planning strategically and hence improving future organisational performance. Mintzberg asks what is the relationship between planning and strategy? Is strategy making simply a process of planning, as the proponents of planning have so vigorously insisted? In other words, should strategy always be planned, never be planned, or sometimes be planned? Or should it relate to planning in some other way? After criticising other definitions of planning, Mintzberg (1993) concluded planning is a formalised procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of decisions. What to us captures the notion of planning above all -- most clearly distinguishes its literature and differentiates its practice from other processes is its emphasis on formalization, the systemisation of the phenomenon to which planning is meant to apply. This narrow definition is set

up as the target for additional criticism of the entire idea of planning. Mintzberg argues an emphasis on formal rationality permeates the literature of planning. Along with rationality and decomposition, articulation is the third key component of formalisation. The product of planning, the plans themselves, after being carefully decomposed into strategies and sub-strategies, programmes, budgets, and objectives, must be clearly and explicitly labelled by words and, preferably, numbers on sheets of paper. An organisation can plan (consider its future) without engaging in planning (formal procedure) even if it produces plans (explicit intentions); alternately, an organisation can engage in planning (formalised procedure) yet not plan (consider its future); and planners may do all or some of these things, sometimes none of them, yet, as we shall see in conclusion, still serve the organisation. He encourages an "anti-planning" attitude when what his attacks suggest is that we need a more sophisticated approach to planning.

Indeed in reflecting on BCP we arrive at a very similar place that Mintzberg arrived to in his consideration of strategic planning-"Planning is like jogging- it's not a very good way of getting anywhere, nor is it intended to be" (Mintzberg, 1994).

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter addresses the academic literature firstly defining the scope of what constitutes an organisational crisis and examining the literature on how this definitional issues is treated. Second it examines the anatomy of a crisis, using the broad literature on crisis management to consider the movement from recognition to management and leadership by drawing widely from an eclectic set of sources including the fog of war, miasma, sensemaking and leadership in a crisis. This allows for the positioning of BCP, within a broader discourse. The final section of this chapter, and perhaps the most relevant, introduces and examines the literature on BCP, which is the dominant managerial prescription on how to prepare for a crisis. As BCP is largely un-criticised or reflected upon in the core crisis management literature, a critique drawn from the generic criticism of planning is used to point up potential limits of a BCP approach.

This chapter sets the scene for the overall study- a consideration of the efficacy of BCP by introducing and examining extant work on how organisations should prepare for crisis.

Chapter 3: Method & Methodology



Figure 5 Denis O'Brien walking through the Iron Market in Port au Prince – The Guardian

Chapter 3: Method & Methodology

3.0 Introduction

Chapter two introduced the literature on crisis planning. Starting by defining what a crisis is and how it manifests itself in an organisation, the chapter then detailed extant research on planning for a crisis. So while there is considerable normative advice for companies; it is not altogether clear whether this prescription works. As a result this research poses the question on the efficacy or otherwise of BCP. By collecting and analysing stories from a recent natural disaster, this work attempts to answer that question. This chapter introduces the methodology and methods used to address the issue

First this chapter starts by presenting the approach to the study, the methodology which includes the ontological and epistemological choices made. After the introduction to the research design, the chapter discusses the choice of case, interviewees and the research process. Methodological concerns and limitations are discussed as they arise.

3.1 Methodology

The research methodology chosen for this dissertation is in part a reflection of the researcher's ontological and epistemological perspective and the phenomenon under investigation. This study is motivated to examine the use and usefulness of BCP in a significant natural disaster. As a result the study can be best described as theory testing, examining how practitioners use or disregard management theory in a practical setting. As the issues are difficult to access using other methodological stances- a qualitative, biographical method was adopted for practical reasons. Many managers are aware of theory and when surveyed tend to reproduce their abstract knowledge of that theory. To get behind that form of rationalisation, the biographical narrative interview method (BNIM) was adopted. The ambition is that this method would reveal the real story of what happened, and in this way the research could examine the use or not of prescriptive theory. The next section positions the method philosophically.

3.2 Research Philosophy

The starting point for defining the philosophical approach of this study was the topic being addressed. How best does one establish the efficacy of BCP? A consideration on fundamental and theoretical perspectives on research, was made before committing to a research approach first; both qualitative and quantitative approaches were considered (Creswell and Miller, 2000; Silverman, 2011). Indeed traditionally theory testing tends to be approached from a quantitative approach, establishing a contribution by developing an instrument such as a questionnaire to test propositions. BCP is still relatively ill-defined theoretically and so an approach to measuring a set of BCP variables is still some way off. Furthermore, crises tend to be contextually constituted events and so an approach that captures the richness of the story is suitable. Certainly to capture the lifecycle of BCP activities from planning to an emergent crisis to post crisis requires a very involved approach to data collection one that follows the unique organisation story rather than imposing categorisations until it. So this very practical approach to allowing space for elaboration of a difficult to cognitively assess experience drove the research choice. This has natural consequences for the ontological positioning of the work (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).

As a consequence, this work is ontologically subjective; suggesting that reality exists only in the mind, that objective truths about social phenomena are not ever fully possible. So, the preceding chapter starts by probing the definition of a crisis, not taking a crisis as an objective truth, but rather considering it as a socially recognised occurrence- one with the possibility of multiple perspectives. Thus this work is innately interpretivist (as opposed to positivist) and so it attempts to "to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning of what is observed, not the frequency of occurrences" (Van Maanen et al, 1982) and is thoroughly qualitative in taking the subjective nature of reality into account (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).

Again, for purely practical reasons BNIM was selected. As this is a research masters, primarily considered a research training programme adopting a rigorous and fully thought-out approach to collecting narrative data was considered important. A consideration of alternative narrative methods was

considered (c.f. Boje, 2000; Czarniawksa, 1993 and Gabriel, 2000, 2004), but these tend to lack detail of the practicalities of operationalising the method.

3.2 Research Design

Using biographical narrative interviews at the site of a single significant natural disaster that presented a huge existential risk to organisations subjected to it, it was chosen as the best approach to address the research issue established in chapter two, the literature review section of this work. The crisis can be considered to be a single case (Yin, 1981), one that allows for a robust testing of the efficacy of management literatures prescriptions for preparing for a crisis. Such an approach, using an extreme single case to test management theory has precedent (Silverman, 2011). BNIM (Wengraf, 2001) is a research method for exploring how the relation and interaction between individuals, processes and the roles of organisations are experienced. This method describes lived experiences of practicing. These lived experiences come to expression in the narratives the interviewees tell about themselves. A narrative is a specific method of giving a historicising account, a sequence of events following one another. Studies that use BNIM as a research method explore how professionals intervene with people in difficult situations and how the policies of managers have developed (Wengraf & Trevithick, 2008). Understanding the interviewee is critical and where they are situated historically and socially while responding to the research issue. As with all storytelling forms of data collection, a social or perspective based subjective account is given, rather than an objectively true one (Gabriel, 2000)

3.2.1 Data Collection

The BNIM is a specific approach to structure data collection. First it is exclusive as to who can be interviewed- only those with direct experience, experience central to the story and experience that they are capable of narrating, can be interviewed. Wengraf suggests an ideal structure for an interview, consisting of three sub-sessions with a total time of 90 to 120 minutes for the total interview. In the first sub-session the research question is introduced to the interviewee by the interviewer. This question is called SQUIN (the single question aimed at inducing narrative) is designed to start the interviewee telling their story (Wengraf & Trevithick, 2008). The interviewer should not interfere with the

interview and let the interviewee speak freely in an open narrative. In the first session the interviewer only takes notes and lets the interviewee tell the 'Whole Story'. In sub-session two the interviewer reviews the phrases mentioned in the first sub-session including the first item of the interview and the last one and a selection in between. Particular Incident Narratives (PIN) is pushed for, which is a close-up story of something that happened in a particular time and place. Interviewers are encouraged not to say 'tell me about' but instead to ask for stories induced by the formula above. The method encourages copious note taking in the interviews, debriefing notes immediately after the interview that also capture detail of the setting and that all these should be supplemented by a tape recording for later analysis. The third sub-session, considered optional, can take the form of a semi-structured interview that seeks clarification of positions within the narrative.

With an intention to follow the BNIM as faithfully as possible, an interview plan was designed to address the research issue. As introduced in chapter one, the case of the Haitian earthquake and consequential social, economic and health problems was selected as an exemplar crisis suitable for investigating the efficacy of BCP. Interviews were conducted 9 to 12 months after the initial earthquake- considered an ideal gap to allow a complete cycle of sensemaking after the crisis, but still close enough for detail to remain fresh. All interviews were conducted in person (with the exception of Deanna Durban; discussed in the transcript), in the interviewees work environment as is best practice in ethnographic type research, and encouraged in the BNIM approach.

Fifteen interviews were conducted; this was considered a sufficient number to produce a requisite variety from multiple voices and perspectives to adequately test the BCP theories in action. Interviewees were selected on the basis of them having direct personal experiences of organisations that were of sufficient scale that they were likely to have undertaken BCP activities before the earthquake. Interviewees were drawn from a selection of some of the most significant organisations operating in Haiti, and so the choice of organisation focus can be described as a stratum convenience approach. As an interpretivist study, it is not appropriate to describe this as a sample as this points at representation; rather the selection of interviews is nothing more than an attempt to capture narrative data from good exemplars of a range of approaches to crisis planning and BCP.

Over the course of the interview process, Digicel proved to have the most elaborate BCP activities and so a series of five interviews in various departments were undertaken. Digicel proved to be one of the most resilient organisations in the crisis; and was engaged with BCP theory; and so offered the potential to fully understand the efficacy of BCP practices in action. In this way, the core objective of examining the efficacy of BCP was approached.

Table 3 List of Interviewees

No.	Name	Job Title	Organisation	Interview date	Time
1	Evelyn Theard	Head of Facilities	Digicel Haiti	17/11/2010	15.13
2	Greg Van Koughnett	Head of Legal & Regulatory Affairs	Digicel Haiti	16/11/2010	20.44
3	Patrice Jean Jacques	Manager	Sogebank Delma	21/11/2010	28.48
4	Mark Field	Voice & Data Group	CITS-ITU Minustah	27/11/2010	29.03
5	Irvell Latortue	Operations Manager	UN Habitat	04/12/2010	34.37
6	Deanna Durban	Partner	Cabinet Pasquet	17/12/2010	14.32
7	Anne Hastings	CEO	Fokonze	18/01/2011	29.49
8	Dave Sharpe	Head of Products	Digicel Haiti	20/01/2011	29.25
9	Mario Andersol	Director General	National Police	24/01/2011	20.16
10	Eddy Bijoux	Manager	Socojeb SA	30/01/2011	14.44
11	Anne Maguire	CEO	Haven	05/02/2011	13.03
12	Maarten Boute	CEO	Digicel Haiti	11/02/2011	10.54
13	Josefa Gauthier	Chairman	Digicel Foundation	15/02/2011	14.20
14	Regine Vital	Customer Care Director	Digicel Haiti	21/02/2011	17.43
15	Youri Latortue	Senator	Public Representative	25/03/2011	25.18

Each respondent met the two requirements suggested for a BNIM interviewee- they had a good enough memory of their personal direct experience of the phenomena to be able to tell stories and were able to express themselves in an identity narrative.

Each interviewee was prompted to tell the story of their organisations planning processes for crisis before the earthquake, the unfolding of the crisis and the aftermath of the crisis using single questions aimed at inducing narrative. As each phase emerged in the narrative, particular incident narratives were pushed for, to attempt to access richer detail at each point. Once through this cycle, the interviews took on the character of a more traditional semi-structured interview; albeit with the prior narrative as a backdrop. Probing questions about BCP were addressed.

With explicit permission, the data was collected using a voice recorder which was subsequently transcribed; and the copious notes taken during interviews and immediately after interviews were put together to form the data set.

3.1.2 Analysis

The data set was analysed using the deconstruction method suggested by Culler (1982), which in turn is an extrapolation of Derrida's original description of the method (1981). In this regard, Morningstar's very usefully introductory text (1993) proved very useful, as was David Boje's (2001) text *Narrative Methods for Organizational & Communication Research*. BNIM is well articulated as a form of data collection, but is not associated with any particular form of analysis. Content analysis was attempted using Nvivo software, but this proved inadequate at providing insight into the efficacy of BCP processes; and so was abandoned. Instead having committed to a tightly conceived approach to data collection a more fully interpretivist approach was required for analysis. Deconstruction is particularly suited to the study of managers, especially managers professional trained in theory (Boje, 2001). Most participants of the study had a strong understanding of BCP, many had taken specific training and so this represented a strong theoretical frame (after Lakoff and Johnson, 2008). To get behind this dominating way of thinking (Boje, 2001), deconstruction allows deep assumptions to be considered.

The mode of analysis was as follows. The stories generated in the BNIM interviews were considered to be the text (as described by Boje, 2001). The text was interrogated by a series of closing readings; readings that surfaced a set of ideas that had described or inferred meanings, hierarchies and oppositions. For each significant idea, the implications of its multiple alternatives was considered; in this way producing a new reading of the text. As a result the superficial or surface reading of the original text is contrasted with a distinctive or derived reading that questions the assumptions, biases and implications of its original. The insight gained is presented in Chapter 5 in the form of a list of specific observations about the data; which form the basis for a discussion (Chapter 6) about the literature presented early in this thesis.

3.2 Conclusion

This chapter set out the methodology and method choices made in this research. Detailing the practical as well as the theoretical choices made, it forms the introduction to the next chapter- the data chapter. Chapter 4 introduces the data that emerged from the application of the methods described in this chapter; it details the 15 interviews before presenting their deconstruction.

Chapter 4: Data



Figure 6 Image from the Crisis - The Guardian

Chapter 4: Data


4.0 Introduction

Chapter three describes the method of the research; explaining the decisions behind the 15 interviews introduced here. One of the challenges of narrative data is how to present it in a digestible format. Researchers have the choice of editing interviews down into manageable précis, and thus introducing the researchers voice into the interviews whilst losing the richness of the original encounter; or selecting a sample of interviews to include in full, but introducing selection bias. In this chapter neither strategies are adopted, a short introduction to the interview is presented and this links to the full transcript provided in the appendices.

4.1 Brief Description of the Interviews

This section provides a short summary of each interview; detailed transcriptions are included in Appendix 1.

4.1.1 Evelyn Theard



Working in Digicel as Head of Facilities. Digicel engaged in detailed BCP planning without a specific emphasis on earthquakes. She spoke about the seminars she attended where engineers had informed the government that there would be a major earthquake and that Port au Prince should have been evacuated since 2007/2008. She also mentioned the failure to enforce the building codes. Evelyn described the process of evacuating the Digicel building during the earthquake and of her pride that her plans sustained the building during the crisis. She also discussed how the consequential crises were not planned for and made the crisis management difficult.

4.1.2 Greg Van Koughnett

Working in Digicel as Head of Legal and Regulatory Affairs. Digicel has a detailed crisis planning document. Greg described the effect of the earthquake on Digicel's business and the various initiatives undertaken. He described how Cholera was similarly not included in the crisis planning. He said having a strong enough team with clear roles and responsibilities and having the ability to think outside the box were important.



4.1.3 Irvette Latortue



Working as Operations Manager for UN Habitat. At the time of the earthquake she worked for UNFPA, the UN population fund. They were not prepared for what happened; they saw business continuity in terms of what they should do in terms of operations. They had their data at the bank and once the bank collapsed they were left floundering. The essential staff had to leave the country.

4.1.4 Mark Field

Works at Voice and Data Group, CITS – ITU Minustah. They had planning in place and carried out evacuation exercises to the Dominican Republic based on scenarios. Disaster recovery is high on the agenda. The headquarters collapsed during the earthquake but due to the business continuity preparation they were able to respond very well and had no data loss or downtime.



4.1.5 Patrice Jean Jacques



Patrice is Manager at Sogebank, Port au Prince. Patrice discussed the changes in the banking system after the earthquake; he described the evacuation and losses to the bank during the earthquake. With the advent of mobile banking and other security improvements there is a plan to upgrade the economy. The bank engaged in BCP and was able to mitigate losses as a result of the crisis.

4.1.6 Anne Hastings

Anne is CEO of Fokonze, Haiti's largest microfinance institution. They undertook BCP before the crisis and they reacted differently but appropriately to the crisis. The organisation improvised and innovated through the crisis; including developing new products.



4.1.7 Anne Maguire



Anne Maguire is the CEO of Haven who had no emergency or disaster experience. They had experience in providing long term development in shelter housing. She discussed the hygiene and sanitation project that they set up in the camps. Their focus is based on community development. She said it was difficult to plan for an event of this scale.

4.1.8 Dave Sharpe

Dave Sharpe is Head of Products for Digicel Haiti. Dave was aware of BCP within the organisation, but was more focused on his other more expected plans. He spoke about the emerging response to the crisis and how plans can be marginalised if considered irrelevant.



4.1.9 Deanna Durban



Deanna is a partner with the legal firm Cabinet Pasquet. She said she would like to prepare and would record it herself. She spoke about the positive business environment in Haiti before the earthquake and found it too painful to discuss the crisis. She talked about how other organisations made it through the crisis by being flexible and responsive.

4.1.10 Eddy Bijoux

Eddy is a Stock and Import Manager for Socojeb SA which is a pharmaceutical family owned company. He described the devastation and destruction of the earthquake. Socojeb did not engage in BCP, but had a lot of experience in Haiti and was thus ready for anything. So business changed, but that was business as usual. Having established that the firm did not plan for the event he also suggested that planning was important as a form of education.



4.1.11 Josefa Gauthier



Josefa is Chairman of the Digicel Foundation whose primary interest is education. She described the crisis and the chaos of the immediate aftermath. Digicel Foundation tried to partner with NGOs. She said none of the schools that they built collapsed as they had been built to withstand a multitude of crisis. They engaged in BCP regarding this.

4.1.12 Maarten Boute

Maarten is CEO for Digicel Haiti. He discussed the unpredictable and unexpected nature of life in Haiti. He said he was very calm for what was the most unexpected event of his life. He spoke about getting the network back up and running. The BCP Digicel had been not for a crisis as specific and significant, but that it prepared the firm in practical and emotional ways with the tools to respond to all crises.



4.1.13 Mario Andersol



Mario is Director General of the PNH, National Police. The Police had engaged in significant planning exercises including scenario planning, but the unique pathway of the crisis always presents challenges and the Police always have the role of doing what was not prepared for- for example the collapse of a prison. He strongly articulated the inability of preparing for everything, but the importance of trying to.

4.1.14 Regine Vital

Regine is Customer Care Director for Digicel. She described the event and the aftermath and that her house was destroyed. She spoke about the SWOT team that they had in place for emergencies and how the planning worked well. She said it was the people who made the difference in responding to the crisis.



4.1.15 Youri Latortue



Youri is a Senator and owns a security company. He spoke about the importance of taking control of a crisis and not just waiting for help- that leadership is critical. He spoke about the political environment in the run up to the election and the international aid required to rebuild the country.

Chapter 5: Analysis



Figure 7 The Presidential Palace after the earthquake - The Guardian

Chapter 5: Analysis

In Chapter 3 the method of analysis was discussed; one that refused to take the data at face value, but interrogated it for positions, hierarchy and oppositions (after Morningstar, 1993). This chapter presents a consideration of the themes that emerged, and in doing so aspires to contribute to the discourse on BCP; and the efficacy of efforts to plan for crisis.

5.1 The predictability of crisis

The earthquake in Haiti had long been predicted. Indeed the devastating earthquakes in 1770 and 1842 are memorialised; one storyteller discussed a Creole saying which translates 'the earth shakes in Haiti'. Despite this the earthquake when it eventually happened was a dramatic human tragedy because little by way of preparation was undertaken, and building design, in so far as such a bricolage mode of building can be considered design; did not take into account the predicted threat. So for example, Evelyn Theard, Head of Facilities, Digicel Haiti discussed attending public seminars in 2007 (3 years before the earthquake) to explain evacuations plans for Port au Prince in the event of a major earthquake. Previous earthquakes of similar magnitude in well-developed countries, have had comparatively modest impact in terms of death and destruction. Perhaps every crisis has its Cassandra, but there is no ignoring the fact that Haiti is in a region predisposed to earthquakes and its preparations in so far as there were any proved to be totally inadequate.

5.2 The anatomy of crisis

Within the stories two of the ten organisations (Digicel and Minustah) stood out for engaging in rigorous crisis planning. Nonetheless, the crisis planning only brought them so far through the unpredictable episodes of the crisis. Neither could have prepared for the unpreparedness of others, the scale of destruction outside of their organisations and the cascade of further crises- the collapse of food security and general security, homelessness, the failure of the water system and consequential cholera outbreak nine months after the quake. These consequences ultimately led to political unrest, which in turn reshaped Haitian

society. Thus sensemaking only emerged as a challenge in the aftermath of the crisis, often at some remove.

Clearly every crisis has its own pathology. In this instance the crisis was distributed across society- no organisation remained untouched directly, and even prepared organisations were indirectly devastated by issues outside their control. As a result prepared organisations suffered from the general unpreparedness of Haitian society and enterprise to sustain themselves through a crisis. No organisation had plans that fully prepared it for the cascade of events- for example none planned for Cholera or water security.

5.3 BCP in action- allocating roles and training people

The earthquake was a foreseeable event, in the sense that Haiti is in a region that is particularly susceptible as evidenced by Haitian building codes incorporating best practices design for earthquakes since the 1940s. Four out of the nine organisations studied engaged in BCP activities to some extent- Digicel, Sogebank, the UN and the Police. Digicel in particular adopted a rigorous, thorough, and theoretically informed approach to BCP. As a result Digicel was the object of five interviews so that a more fulsome consideration of BCP's efficacy in a crisis could be undertaken. Digicel planned specifically for the earthquake, and unlike other organisations its building was designed to the building code, which evidentially existed more on paper than in practice. They engaged in scenario planning for various worst-case crisis (as recommended by Mitroff, 1993) considering a holistic approach to the organisation (Hayes-James & Perry-Wooten, 2005) with consideration for its impacts on different areas (Fink, 1967, Burnett, 1999) and allocated responsibilities to different team members (Littlejohn (1983). Indeed in the interviews, many Digicel employees referenced the significant thinking around which BCP approaches to adopt. So for example they chose not to specifically plan for opportunities that might arise in a crisis (Penrose, 2000) as this was felt to be exploitative and also unlikely to be as predictable and thus useful as other forms of planning. So they specifically focused on detailed technical plans to support their network during an earthquake. The UN with its long experience of crisis management also undertook regular training exercises so that they would be operationally ready

for an earthquake; and again this was theoretically informed by the BCP school of thought.

Despite this evidence of BCP activity around a predicted earthquake; most plans did not swing into action. Within the organisations who contributed to this study; plans were only ever partially consulted and operationalised during the crisis. Interviewees gave a range of rationalisations, perhaps post-hoc rationalisation for why this was the case- variously suggesting that the plans were inadequate for the scale of the crisis, the plans were destroyed, the plans were not useful or germane to managing the situation or simply that no one needed to be told what needed to be done- it was obvious. On safe ground, this suggests little evidence that the specific and detailed scenario planning as advocated by Mitroff (1993), Fink (1967) worked in as it was supposed to. Perhaps more adventurously, it could be that the generic limits of planning (as described by Mintzberg) emerge when a crisis strikes. So whilst there is scant evidence of BCP instrumentally operating (i.e. the plans being followed as intended), BCP may emotionally and practically prepare those involved in advance BCP activities. Thus BCP may not work instrumentally, but may be better understood as preparatory or training work. In this line of thinking each respondent suggested that the core aspect of planning that was successful was role designation (akin to crisis leadership as described by Hayes-James & Perry-Wooten, 2005 and crisis management organisational structure of Littlejohn, 1983). Individuals with designated roles took on responsibility to work through the crisis, whereas people without such designated roles did not know what to do. This produced an organisation orientation to work the crisis rather than to passively allow it to happen. Organisations with designated roles produce a rapid esprit-de-corps around working the crisis. Aiding this organisational reformation, were simple aspects of preparedness- people knew where to be, how to contact other people, what activities to prioritise- all from memory or basic documentation. Nonetheless interviewees highlighted the importance of good planning whilst also suggesting in their personal narratives of the crisis that the planning they undertook was both relevant and substantially ignored in the heat of the crisis. This points to an interesting observation what their narrativisation strategy might be- post-hoc-rationalisation.

5.4 Activating a post-hoc rationalisation strategy

Interestingly, all managers narrated their personal role in the crisis as one of leadership. In organisations that did little or no planning, managers rationalised their under-preparedness as being a non-issue because of the scale of the crisis. Anne Maguire (Haven) questioned being able to prepare for a disaster on this scale “But I mean in Port au Prince, I mean actually to be honest I don’t, who can prepare for a disaster of this scale, you know really who could prepare for it? Like even with an underdeveloped country like, there is no way Ireland could cope with it you know, if something like that happened”. Irvelle Latortue (UN Habitat) described how unprepared they were for a crisis on this scale “We were not prepared and we had to react and react quickly, we are doing it little by little we are putting in place now to know exactly what we are doing, we don’t have to guess or improvise because the office did not have anything so are all files were intact so we had information on people but it had collapsed what would we do? We would not have anything”.

Perhaps less justifiably because of the complete unexpectedness of the crisis. By way of example, Mark Field (Minustah) discussed ‘a lot of people are lax about putting effort into disaster recovery because they think it will never happen’.

In a similar vein some of the storytellers narrated the earthquake as a learning opportunity, suggesting how they had a new found interest in BCP processes, and would be ready next time. Irvelle Latortue (UN Habitat) described the approach now in the UN “What we do now is to organise each essential file in PDF and we can have them whenever we need them because we were not prepared”. Mario Andersol (National Police) described the inherent weaknesses in Haiti due to its predisposition for the natural disasters “Because I think it took the earthquake to realise that our weakness in the situation we realised for the citizens. And also we did not have the means and the resources to face and all the other stuff. We need to organise our self and we need to respond to that kind of situation for all the country if they have hurricanes, floods or an earthquake”.

5.5 A changed approach to help and helping

During and immediately after the crisis, norms of behaviour within all organisations were suspended. Most strikingly, all organisations took on a greater sense of responsibility to the wider community than they normally would; and also they were willing to appeal internationally for help themselves, often to help others. Thus, they suspended their normal mission (e.g. to make profits) to undertake works motivated by the common good. It is not typically for BCP to define the organisations responsibilities so broadly, and usually they are tactically orientated around bringing the business back to its normal level of functioning. But in this instance, the managers individually and collectively felt their own organisational practices could be put to use to ameliorate the impact of the crisis- sourcing and providing food, water, temporary shelters, aid packages, communication and medicine. In this way the organisations all quickly reassembled themselves, the aims and ambitions as well as their modes of action. This was independent of BCP processes which tend to focus on how the organisation will save its own skin. In many instances, external, non-commercial motivations were prioritised over the company's normal job; as a result the impetus of BCP was ignored. This effort was often discussed as helping family and friends, or being a conduit from international individuals and organisations looking to provide immediate help; but also included broader humanitarian efforts. Greg Van Koughnett described Digicel's commitment to rebuild the Iron Market "One of the things that Digicel did that I personally think was a really wonderful and farsighted idea was to undertake to rebuild the Iron Market which was put up as a symbol of the strength of the Haitian State in the 19th century". Digicel also gave phone credit to each of their customers as Greg outlines "We lost some customers one of the things we did was to give \$5 US to every customer that's \$10m US that was just pumped out in order to get people calling again".

5.6 Crisis as opportunity

The scale of devastation produced long-term consequences that have reshaped Haitian social, political and economic life. Naturally after the initial moment of crisis had passed, normal business practices returned in part. The organisations

we studied examined how to alter their business practices to take advantage of the new Haitian economy.

NGOs found significant traction with the crisis, and so have greatly expanded their field of activities in Haiti even after the crisis passed. So whilst this is an obvious response, all the organisation studied were changed by the crisis. A central tenet of BCP is to return to normal, but this normal is illusive. So for example- the leadership that Digicel showed has created a long-term connection between the firm and its customers- going beyond a superficial commercial relationship. New lines of products have been launched by many of the organisations- so for example disaster insurance is now commonplace. In some organisations the scale of the destruction allowed for organisational transformation- so Sogebank moved to an electronic banking platform soon after the crisis passed. The earthquake thus represented a large communal event that reshaped the commercial setting, so plans to reinstate businesses would appear to be inadequate against this environmental backdrop.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter considered the themes that emerged from a deconstruction of the data, and forms the basis for the next chapter which will discuss the efficacy of BCP.

There is a series of inherent contradictions within the data. On the one hand the earthquake was widely predicted and most organisations had some form of planning done for a notional crisis, including specific BCPs; but on the other hand all organisations were underprepared for the unfolding crisis, with each turn of events their preparation became less useful. Most relied on the common understanding of earthquakes as unpredictable cataclysmic events to defend what they perceived as the relative inadequacy of preparations. This produces a clear stress across much of the data where interviewees have simply not formed a settled view on how to narrate the usefulness of their preparations during the crisis. So almost all advocated BCP practices, their narratives suggested even when they engaged in BCP beforehand- the plans were not implemented.

A second contradiction is that organisations and their managers wished to appear to be thoroughly prepared and able to lead their organisation through the

crisis; but at the same time they questioned the ability to prepare or lead through the scale of the devastation. In this line, many narrated the earthquake as a learning opportunity around crisis planning and getting it better next time. As leaders, many interviewees constructed identities in which their personal agency was central to the organisation sustaining itself through crisis, and this emerged from the roles within general planning and BCP processes. Against this view many emphasised the responsibility of the other to solve problems—particularly pointing to government or the international community to provide humanitarian assistance. In this way managers sustain their identity of themselves as heroic leaders against the backdrop of an unimaginable catastrophe. Beyond the crisis many managers emphasised their ability to adapt to the changed Haiti, and tentatively discussed taking advantage of the new opportunities that emerged.

These two central contradictions that emerge from the data introduced in chapter four form the basis for a discussion on the efficacy of planning in the next chapter.

Chapter 6: Discussion




Figure 8 The Guardian front page Thursday 14 January 2010

Chapter 6: Discussion

The data introduced in Chapter four has been deconstructed (Morningstar, 1993) and the themes emerging in the deconstruction were presented in the previous chapter. This chapter considers these themes in light of the prior literature; and in this way speaks to the efficacy of BCP.

6.1 Discussion

In chapter two the literature on how to understand, manage and prepare for crisis was introduced.

6.1.1 The crisis and its anatomy

The earthquake in Haiti was clearly an organisational crisis, a predicable one. So it was a turning point for all the organisations studied (Fink, 1967), one of existential importance (James, Gilliland & James, 2001) for the organisations. It led decisive change in all organisations (including those who prepared using BCP) and represented a liminal event (Turner, 1974) where the organisations existence and identity came under threat. To a certain extent it also followed the liminal structure proposed by van Gennep (1909) that there are three phases of a crisis, preliminal rites, liminal rites and postliminal rites. In the preliminal rites stage there is a forced break with previous practices and routines reflecting the moment of crisis. Each organisation experienced a breakdown of the traditional norms of behaviour. And might suggest why the carefully developed continuity plans were not adhered to. In the normal course of events individuals working in organisations follow their plans but in this case BCPs were only ever partially consulted and a range of reasons were given with interviewees variously suggesting that the plans were inadequate, useless, destroyed, or not needed. Such an abandonment of norms is consistent with the start of a liminal transformation. In a similar vein, many organisations stopped behaving commercially and gave away resources for humanitarian ends; such acts were not possible before the crisis. In van Gennep's schema, in liminal rites a leader emerges to guide the process of transformation; and many of the managers positioned themselves into this role. A strong element of the analysis was the focus on leadership and the designation of leaders (variously described in the BCP literature as crisis leadership (Hayes-James & Perry-Wooten, 2005) or and

crisis management organisational structure (Littlejohn, 1983)) during the crisis where people emerged from across the organisations to manage the situation. So again, the early stage of the crisis strongly conforms to the liminal schema.

Where the liminal model does not match up is in the postliminal rites, where the organisation returns to normal. As with critiques of Lewin's change model (unfreeze-change-freeze), the final stage does not really emerge. Change is now considered to be a constant; we live in perpetual liminality (Irving & Young, 2004). The crisis of the earthquake did not pass, and indeed it was not a separate crisis- but is part of a long cascade of multiple crises that Haiti suffers. Indeed it is hard not to agree with Jean Claude Baby-Doc Duvalier's tragic reflection that "It is the destiny of the people of Haiti to suffer". So in this sense the organisation preparation and enactment in crisis is an on-going dialogue. From the stance of the simple study of the earthquake; most organisations were underprepared for the consequential crises that emerged (water shortages, food shortages, crime, riots and security, cholera and disease and political instability). As a result the study confirms work that suggests crises are complex (Boin & Hart, 2003) and are rarely spatially or temporally separate events (Rosenthal & Hart, 1998). The academic discourse on the stages and anatomy of crisis increase the understanding of crises. The following section on fog of war/miasma emerges during preliminal rites, sensemaking and leadership in crisis.

6.1.2 Making sense of crisis and its difficulties

Whilst the stories were replete with superficial evidence of a classic and instant fog of war (Clauswitz, 1873) and a miasma (Gabriel, 2005) form of cognition; but this quickly cleared to allow clearer sensemaking to emerge. All interviewees provided information about the minutia at the start of the earthquake and discussed the collapse of sense. But all narratives followed a similar arch in which after the immediate devastation and inability to make sense of events; the silence, inaction and passivity quickly gave way to authentic leadership. Different types of crises might be difficult to perceive in the early stages; but an objective and public happening like an earthquake has a prior cognitive frame that allows for quick sensemaking.

The difficulty in sensemaking did not emerge at the start of the crisis, but rather in the aftermath.

6.1.3 On leadership in a crisis

Central to how organisational participants understood the crisis and how they dealt with the problems that arose was their desire to lead- to ameliorate the crisis in its early stages and to lead a restoration of normality. In the extreme, managers sensed an opportunity to improve their organisations and that this crisis could provoke a positive change in Haiti. This goes beyond Ephraim and Kam's (2004) and Turner and Pidgeon's (1997) assertions that preparation comes from the bitter experience of crisis- instead suggesting that it is an illocutionary trope of managers to suggest that they will be better prepared next time.

Managers were very aware of the symbolism of their actions that they had to remain calm, in control, positive and productive; to provide inspirational guidance to others. In this way they intuitively reflect the principles of leadership as outlined by Tom Peters (Eight pillars of wise leadership (Peters, 1995) / Lawrence of Arabia (T.E. Lawrence, 1922/1997) which positions effective leaders as very conscious of the how their actions will be interpreted.

As a result of the emphasis on leadership during a crisis; the role of planning was played down, perhaps this is as Mitroff, Pearson and Pauchant (1992) suggest because managers are adverse to discussing and engaging in crisis planning. Certainly there was little evidence from the stories of the instrumental use of plans- they were not taken down, opened and implemented. Instead emphasis was placed on how leaders had thought through these issues during planning processes; they knew they were in charge and were responsible for taking action. As a result, plans were most discussed as training, with the key issue of designated roles emerging as central to plans that have value during a crisis.

6.1.4 Academic Discourse on Preparing for a Crisis, BCP, Resilience

Plans did not work as intended in the crisis but they had unintended positives. Certainly the more instrumental, prescriptive recommendations were not

discussed or suggested as being important in the data. So reflections around signage and emergency response plan documentation did not emerge; although they may well have been important. In this domain, much discussed in the data was the non-operation of regulations about building to earthquake proof specifications and the absence of building control in Haiti. In that observation, is the real issue about attempts at prescriptive planning processes- what can realistically be planned for?, what will managers give attention to and dismiss as too-much of a long-shot; too unlikely to happen and thus is not incorporated into their plans?

As a result, work on resilience- which focuses more on an organisations latent ability to absorb a crisis is more intuitively useful. The ability to adapt, remain agile and make do were all critical to how organisations narrated their successful navigation through the cascade of crises. The maintenance of adequate financial reserves enables the preservation of relational reserves and vice versa, contributing to organisational resilience in times of crisis. (Gittell, Cameron, Lim & Rivas, 2006). Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the airline industry was affected more than any other industry. Certain airlines emerged successful and demonstrated remarkable resilience. The layoffs after the crisis were strongly correlated with lack of financial reserves and lack of a viable business model prior to the crisis. Having a viable business model depended on the development and preservation of relational reserves over time.

BCP is defined as the business specific plans that enable an organisation to respond to a crisis event in a manner that business functions and processes are recovered and resumed in accordance with a predetermined plan (Shaw & Harrald, 2004). Many of the organisations did not have a predetermined plan and the ones that did, did not include earthquakes.

The plans that were in place were aimed at operational resilience, having a data backup plan and evacuation plan for example. It has been argued that BCP should be broader, focusing on preserving long term competitive advantage (Elliott, Swartz & Herbane, 1999).

All researchers who advocate BCP, despite subtle differences recommend the same broad process. All recommend nominating managers to lead the crisis. They recommend the allocating of roles which worked very well during the crisis.

BCP models recommend a formal process for preventing crises and developing contingency arrangements to survive all types of crisis.

BCP is now of strategic significance to organisations (Penrose, 2000). But little research has been done on the resilience of organisations during a crisis and to link the causal link between planning and outcomes (Mintzberg, 1994). The research on the earthquake in Haiti shows the limits and unintended efficacy of BCP which reflects on the planning process and what can and realistically will be planned for. There is an impossibility of authentic planning for a specific crisis with its own pathology. The earthquake was widely predicted, organisations should have been better prepared. The building codes were not followed and the suggested gingerbread style of building was not put into practice. The consequences of what happened during and following the earthquake could not have been planned for.

Organisations need to review how much resources they should spend on preparing for a very unlikely event and how seriously the participants in those planning processes take it. The organisations responses are to the dramatic context rather than seeing use in the plan.

Preparatory work, having designated roles and communicating the responsibility of managers to lead were of utmost important in this crisis. Managers are also adept at narrating why their response to the event was lacklustre due to the scale of the crisis and rationalised their unpreparedness. The expectedness of the crisis was also less justifiably used to rationalise this. There was also a new found interest in BCP and a learning opportunity was embraced to be better prepared next time.

There were two surprising findings in this study. Firstly, that during a crisis, the organisation's mission is often suspended to undertake a greater mission in society. Some of the organisations appealed for international help and undertook humanitarian acts. Secondly, for some organisations the crisis changed their long-term business opportunities and the structure of their competitive market, and as a result the crisis necessitated change in how the business pursued growth and survival. By way of example both Digicel and Sogebank evolved their businesses to take advantage of new opportunities that arose after the earthquake.

6.2 Conclusion

This chapter considered the themes arising from the data in light of prior literature. The anatomy of a crisis defines a crisis and its structure and phases. There was an instant fog of war and miasma followed by sensemaking emerging. Leaders emerged in the crisis and there was a great emphasis on leadership. Plans did not work as intended but they had unintended positives. There is an issue around what can be planned for and what cannot. Organisational resilience focuses on organisations latent ability to absorb a crisis. All researchers who advocate BCP despite subtle differences recommend the same broad process. Role allocation is one of the recommendations. BCP is of strategic significance to organisations. The crisis was predicted and organisations should have been more prepared. Resources need to be reviewed to see what organisations spend on planning for crises. Managers narrated their response to the crisis which in some cases was lacklustre. The two unique discoveries of the study were organisations undertaking a greater mission in society and changing the way they did business and taking advantage of new opportunities.

6.3 Limitations

It is important to recognise the limitations of the study.

First in trying to examine the efficacy of BCP this study uses a single case crisis that impacted on many organisations. The definition of a crisis incorporates a wide and extensive variety of traumas. The earthquake in Haiti and the consequential crisis had its own specific pathology and so observations made around this crisis may not be generalisable to another crisis. In selecting the earthquake in Haiti this study sought out an objectively demonstrable crisis, one that posed an existential risk to organisations, but an earthquake is firstly a systemic natural crisis before being an organisational crisis. Arguably Haiti before the earthquake was in perpetual crisis and it is impossible to disaggregate one crisis from the other. Haiti, as an underdeveloped and troubled part of the world is a unique backdrop to a crisis and so insight developed in there might not be useful to crises that occur in the developed world.

Secondly, this study interviewed 15 managers of organisations, a reasonable number for the scale of the research project. Data saturation was quickly reached in this project, where the final few interviews offered little new insight. Nonetheless, this sample represents a convenience sample one that offers clear biases. The most significant limitation of this study is that it only considered organisations that survived the crisis. Furthermore only managers who were willing to talk about the crisis were interviewed and they only discussed what they were willing to talk about. As a result the silences in this study are the organisations that did not survive the crisis, managers that were too traumatised, or were unwilling to share details about the crisis and those who were interviewed but did not address the crisis directly.

Chapter 7: Conclusion



Figure 9 Image from the Crisis - The Guardian

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The purpose of this research is to examine the efficacy of the BCP approach in preparing for an unforeseen crisis. This work is novel in that the efficacy of BCP during a crisis has not been studied before. By collecting stories from fifteen managers about how they coped with the earthquake and its aftermath, this study examines the value continuity planning had to them, as they attempted to respond to the crisis.

7.1 Conclusions from the study

What emerges is some interesting reflections on how BCP works. Continuity planning was found to greatly enhance organisations resilience during the earthquake. That said, plans did not work as intended in the crisis but they had unintended positives. Certainly no plan became an operational plan for a crisis, despite the earthquake being a very predictable form of crisis for any organisation operating in Haiti. Certainly the more instrumental, prescriptive recommendations were not discussed or suggested as being important in the data. Planning can only be as good as foresight and so whilst the earthquake could and should have been planned for; the consequential crisis could not have been reasonably foreseen. Planning is also only as good as the willingness of organisations to consider the crisis as a realistic proposition and commit time, energy and resources to preparing.

The primary value in planning was the allocation of roles during a crisis; and it emerged strongly in the data that this gave managers an identity and responsibility to act during the crisis. In this sense continuity planning is more a training system than an operational plan for a crisis.

A further finding is that BCP worked best for the initial crisis, the earthquake; but that its ability to offer continuity was materially impacted by the scale of the crisis and more importantly by the scale of consequential crises such as food and water security, disease, crime and political instability. Continuity planning, with a focus on getting things back to normal, did little to prepare the organisations for the permanent structural changes in the markets that they operated.

A final insight from the study was that organisations mission may change or be suspended during a crisis; with many organisations taking on missions of greater importance during and after a crisis.

7.2 Contribution

Two contributions emerge from this work.

The primary contribution is to our understanding of the surprising worth of BCP; aspects of its vaunted benefits were unrealised in the crisis studied here, where other unrecognised benefits emerged. This points to a reconceptualisation of BCP as a looser managerial practice around organisational resilience and persistence.

A second contribution, of a more minor nature is to the definition of crisis. Researchers in crisis management have tended to avoid offering a comprehensive definition what constitutes a crisis, and this has had implications for the discourse- where thinking on handling minor crisis is conflated with thinking on major, existential crisis.

7.3 Further study

The most obvious opportunity for further research is to further test the efficacy of BCP over other forms of crises. Certainly it would be attractive to develop a statistical measurement tool and questionnaire to undertake a comprehensive study. Such a study might validate the findings of this study and in turn allow for a more nuanced approach to BCP; one that includes elements that demonstrably work and excludes elements of planning that do not improve outcomes in a crisis.

A similar study to this one, in a different socio-economic environment, a different form of crisis and different organisational settings would also prove interesting. Such a study would allow for a comparison of findings that could contribute to theory building around BCP efficacy.

A potentially interesting avenue to further develop core BCP theory is to distinguish the case and scope of crisis. The Haitian earthquake was a country level natural disaster, in which there was utter destruction of entire systems within the country (notably water, waste water and electricity) which points an

interesting space for research between the state and the organisational level of BCP activity.

A handwritten signature in black ink on a light-colored background. The signature reads "Sharon Doyle" in a cursive, flowing script. The first name "Sharon" is on the top line and the last name "Doyle" is on the bottom line.

Feb, 2013

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Figure 10 Image from the Crisis - The Guardian

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Appendices



Figure 11 Image from the Crisis - The Guardian

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interviews

1. Interview with Evelyn Theard - Head of Facilities, Digicel



Evelyn Theard (F) (Haitian) is Head of Facilities at Digicel Haiti. Digicel are the largest telecommunications operator in Haiti that launched in May 2006. Digicel operates a GSM network with more than 2.5m customers and more than 65% of the market share. She is on the board of Digicel Haiti Foundation and was previously a project and operations manager at Digicel. The interview took place at her office at the Digicel building, Turgeau, Port au Prince.

Evelyn: Jan 12th my point view, it was the end of the day and people were getting ready to go home but my day had somewhat just started. I was headed towards Jean Marc's office as I had a meeting with him and he wasn't in his office but I stopped at one of the desks to chat for a bit and all of a sudden it started to shake. I immediately knew what was happening, the rumbles, the shake and the vibrations having been to several seminars and discussing with the engineers were we risk free or were we protected enough to sustain a major earthquake and this question was raised quite a bit often with the engineer in charge and I had a guarantee that yes we were safe in this building that helped me not to panic. Everything went dark for a moment and I heard explosions, I prayed that they were maybe bombing a certain area in the country. I knew it was earthquake and the way the building was shaking, the mad man shaking cha cha. That's how it felt; I was tossed around a bit over two metres from this office to the next office. For that moment I did pray that if anything collapsed

and I had any broken limbs and I'd not want to stay alive through the whole thing but thank God.

So I immediately got up trying to get up to get control of the employees and it wouldn't stop shaking tried to get up again. Took a look around and immediately asked the employees to evacuate. The alarm was already going off asking people to evacuate the building. People were panicking they did not have any concept of a major earthquake. We evacuated the building and we did that in less than five minutes. I was one of the last to leave the building as I was checking in the bathrooms on floors that people weren't stuck and then I left the building.

It was like a horror movie, it somewhat didn't seem real as you are wondering is it really happening but you know you have to get the hell out but I did not want to run, take my time. When I got to the fourth level, I stopped going around and decided I had to get out because it might start to shake. I got down to the parking and one the drivers was dead a block of cement over him, a bodyguard came and rushed me out in case anything else fell. The first person I saw was the HR director Bryan Gonzales, first after Badger who had got me out and said everything is going be alright. Most of the employees respected our gathering point and they had started to move up as it was exploding the gas station. I told people not to look at the glass because the megastore glass was swelling up every time it shook. I asked everyone to stay away from the electrical poles just in case another tremor came and they fell down. That was the immediate aftermath.

Sharon: What were some of things that happened in the aftermath?

Evelyn: Some employees were panicking, we helped some employees get home and we tried to get people into groups. It came to a point where it was getting dark; it gets dark early in January. So a group of six of us went to my house, there were over sixty people outside my house. Luckily my house was standing the mad man wasn't inside. The first thing I did was put water out but people would need it. I would run in and out of the house between tremors getting my passport and meds, the basics. We stayed awake there was no communication and finally I summoned enough courage to go back inside to get a mattress.

There was a lot of damage in my neighbourhood including my neighbours' houses and my house as a result.

The first thing was to try to locate family members and when that wasn't proving fruitful I came to work so I came here the next day and took a tour of the building lower floors and when I was coming out there was a tremor so we decided to leave the area. I came back to work the next day and I slept in the parking lot for about a month.

On Jan 14th we tried to locate as many employees as possible were their houses damaged, where were they staying, we found out about other employees who died outside the building. We made sure we had enough water so we got water and we put kits together to distribute to employees. We had an action plan for employees to come back to work on Jan 25th on lower levels of the building. I contacted to get vaccines for tetanus, we tried to get typhoid in but it wasn't yet necessary so ministry declined, the ministry of health helped us. We put together a therapy seminar for employees with psychologist.

It took a while for employees to get used to coming back to work, every time there was a tremor we evacuated the building in less than two minutes especially the upper floors by March we were on the upper floors, 7, 8, 9, 10. Employees were going through a crisis and quit when they couldn't take the tremors or their living conditions were not proper. We tried to help employees as much as possible, we gave out tents and tried to relocate all expats in the security house or some other secure location while trying to find a new location as quickly as possible.

The seminars that I attended the engineer did inform the government that they would have to take measures to protect the people and they did ask for them to evacuate Port au Prince since 2007/2008 because there was going to be a major earthquake. It's because of the geological evidence. With the tremors that we've had that told them that things were moving that they had to change and takes measures. In the two years the constructions that went on in those years they could have surrendered some many lives if that had stopped the building going on. Up in the mountains the way they would construct, is that mayors and their delegates would go on and say I am blocking this construction, why?, You don't have permit. All they wanted was to be paid off and that's all they cared about.

Whatever they do they never do with regard to human life. We had all the proper building codes before back in the 40s and 50s, the engineer who built this building knew them and he had studied here and abroad. We had the last earthquake in Haiti in 1842. I can't recall what part of the country it affected the most. My grandmother said "I don't they know why in Haiti they don't build in concrete'. She said in Creole 'the earth shakes in Haiti". There has been earthquakes before, Port au Prince was destroyed in 1789. We used to build in bricks before and the King of France said no more brick building in Haiti and so developed the gingerbread style. When we had the Duvalier regime and uneducated people come into power and that was the start of it, ignoring some of the values and codes that we had. I secondly hold responsible the government of the country and the government of the past twenty years, there was no control or infrastructure put in place all they did was to destroy what was there.

2. Interview with Greg van Koughnett - Director of Legal & Regulatory Affairs, Digicel

Greg Van Koughnett (M) (Canadian) is Head of Legal and Regulatory – Eastern Caribbean at Digicel. Prior to this he was Associate General Counsel for CRTC for twelve years. The interview took place in his office at the Digicel building, Turgeau, Port au Prince.

Greg: The crisis from a business point of view initially would be that the central switch at Turgeau which is our main point of disseminating signals had a concrete bunker crash down on it which did not affect the switch but killed the air conditioning. What this meant was that the switch could only operate until such time as its automatic cut off associated with high temperatures shut it down which is 43 degrees. Generators were available and deployed to put in a bunch of fans to get the switch going but you only had four hours, turn it on and then after four hours in a building without air conditioning it would shut down and then it would cool down for four hours and then the first step to get air conditioners for the generators to get the network up.

Quite a number of antennae sites in addition fell down because Digicel had put some up on buildings rather than firm towers because its network grew so fast,

it originally intended to have a network of 300,000 people over five years to build out starting in May 2006 but it took one month. The Digicel network was configured so quickly that not all antennas were put on towers some were put on buildings. The ones on towers stood up, the ones on buildings depended on the structural strength of the buildings which you have no control over and 70% of the buildings in town were damaged so quite a number of the antennas were no longer operational. So rather than put them back on buildings they were put up on towers which means getting the land which is not that easy in metropolitan Port au Prince. To get the network up was first priority.

There was a whole bunch HR things though that maybe wouldn't be so obvious, the towers would have been obvious to any subscriber, the HR things were more subtle. Digicel always liked to think of itself as a very compassionate employer and suddenly we had deaths in the family and how do you address that and the fact that so many people did not have homes. So we put in place immediately retrospectively a life assurance policy in order to provide some compensation to the families of the victims of the earthquake. In addition we put in place a loan system where Digicel has lent for two years at 0% interest a multiple of the annual salary of the employee and they know that there will be some defaults, some people will walk away but that is part of Digicel's social responsibility. There will be administrative costs and some people will default but that is part of the cost.

One of the things that Digicel did that I personally think was a really wonderful and farsighted idea was to undertake to rebuild the Iron Market which was put up as a symbol of the strength of the Haitian State in the 19th century. It was originally intended to be a railway station in Cairo, built in Paris and when the railway station Cairo contract died somehow Port au Prince ended up as the beneficiary. It ended being the central market area for goods and foods in the west and east side effectively. When that died even there has been commerce on the other side of it as I'm sure you've seen, not having that building there as an important dimension of social pride, I was quite clueless about the importance of this when I first came down to Port au Prince, I do realise that the National Palace and the Iron Market are two big symbols so Digicel and Denis O'Brien and the shareholders undertook to rebuild the Iron Market as an exact replica on a first world schedule in order to show you can build to a first world

schedule in Haiti to show others that it is worth investing in Haiti and it is intended that this be up in less than one year, I think we have a tentative date of the 20th December but before 12th January at 4.53pm. That's quite optimistic even for a first world country so all that was important.

One of the things a lot of people don't know is that Digicel shared data with researchers in a University in Sweden in Stockholm about the migration patterns. This model has been picked up around the world and the US state department is very interested in trying to employ this concept elsewhere if soft diplomacy can be used. To identify how many people left Port au Prince and returned to Port au Prince is using the information about where those telephone numbers were. Not everybody is a subscriber but a large percentage of the population are and you can extrapolate and say this use this as a proxy for all human beings without migration and in migration otherwise there is no tracking device available and Digicel was only in the world to ever share that data with anyone as it is so sensitive in terms commercially usefulness to other telephone companies in the market in question. This particular research team produced an interim report and final report on migration patterns up until August 31st; I don't know if they are going to do another one after August 31st. So that's kind of a spinoff.

One of Digicel's big pushes now is how the republic developed in 2010 is a big push on regionalisation trying to get some high profile stores/shops, mobile point of presence nice trucks and a lot more towers almost 50% more towers outside metropolitan Port au Prince, 65% of our subscribers are in metropolitan Port au Prince and the notion to try to build out into the provinces to provide some phone technology there. This I think counts not only as a business opportunity as there is fewer dollars to be made on subscribers outside Port au Prince but it's possible for the benefits of phone technology to be deployed in the provinces to allow commerce to get going, allow people to be closer to their friends and family, to minimise transportation on really bad roads so it actually is a social development initiative.

Sharon: Do you think was this as a direct result of the earthquake or would it have happened anyway?

Greg: One of the key factors, I agree with you it was not solely driven by the earthquake but partially driven by the earthquake. It was an attempt to give some economic viability to the government's push to try to get the people out of Port au Prince but the government was trying to keep the people who left Port au Prince out, 500,000 people left as a result of the earthquake but without economic drivers in the provinces they drifted back in so the notion if it possible for commerce to have one of the key enablers, roads is another one which I admit we're not doing but one of the key enablers to allow the decentralisation of the government to actually happen. It was partly the earthquake and partly not the earthquake.

Sharon: What do you think then in terms of what was planned for before the earthquake or for that type of an event, what would your reflections be in terms of that?

Greg: The building stood up although the Hexagon which is where Digicel used to be was damaged, the ground floor data centre was not hurt at all. Similarly at Turgeau the 11 story building was only damaged cosmetically and was to function admittedly without lifts or air conditioning at the beginning but was able to function properly. Given what a monstrous earthquake that it was, I'm not sure if that suggests we should have built the building more firmly. 70% of buildings were damaged so this must have been in the low portion, now we probably should have done a better job on the parking garage because it collapsed and two people were killed and I suppose we should have ensured we had steel instead of concrete holding up the parking garage and the bunkers that the switch was in so that the air conditioners wouldn't have died. I don't actually know the engineering but the engineers would have said it was such an eventuality that it wouldn't have been planned because 95% are only planned for not 100%.

Sharon: In terms of from a business perspective, did you think the planning was effective?

Greg: We lost some customers, one of the things we did was to give \$5 US to every customer, that's \$10m US that was just pumped out in order to get people calling again. Admittedly subscribers died but it didn't really hurt the cell phone network as much as you might think but a lot of people were calling, calling their

loved ones to commiserate, to make sure they were fine, people calling the provinces and provinces calling in. Then the NGOs arrived and they all wanted sophisticated blackberry plans so actually the cruel truth is mobile phone companies were not harmed as much as you would think because of 250,000 people dying. There has been a redeployment associated with the new demographic of having so many NGO and extra United Nations and extra Minustah people coming in so there has been more of an emphasis on closed user group plans where a group like Reconnaissance takes a plan, one of the things we can offer is free calls for the people who work for Reconnaissance in a closed user group, they have been reconfigured in order to make them more attractive to NGOs so that's a part of the changing demographic of the country.

One interesting consequence of looking back before the crisis and after, we have given sales agents who otherwise would have had cars, have been given motorbikes, a Yamaha 125 because the best way to get around in the traffic now because the traffic patterns have changed and a narrow subset of the city from Turgeau up to Petionville is where the traffic is so the traffic is heavier now and otherwise these people would have been given four wheel transportation, that's one interesting change.

Some of our ads are in English now because of the NGO constituency, feeling more comfortable in English and you see a lot more English as a result, commercial considerations driving to English, I think that will be a short term or medium term issue not a long term issue.

If it's fair to say that 70% of the buildings in metropolitan Port au Prince were hurt, it's also fair that 70% of social fabric of a really vibrant and interesting city were also torn. The result of that has been the prisoners' escaping from the maximum security prison, almost all of them. It's not trivial and some have been recaptured but not all but the rule of law has left as a whole than it did before January 12th and that has meant tighter restrictions on expats. We've a whole bunch more of armoured cars that are about to roll in any day. The business has moved and evolved with the times. You have to keep up with the times no matter what happens, so an increase in security is not irrational at this time, it does increase our costs.

We make sure everything we build now for new installations as we move out into the provinces and get new installations we have to not only have an antennae but have generators because we can't be sure we have electricity and that's not a criticism of Haiti because we're out really in places where there would not be electricity anywhere in the world so far from a populated centre in order to find a nice hilltop to put an antennae on. But that does mean generators, it does mean security as you know and all our buildings are bullet proof now. That's a bit of a shift, that's all good stuff.

We have a crisis planning document and it's managed by human resources and it's big and it's fat. But I don't know that it can organise everything and one of the things I find most attractive about Digicel is its ability to think outside the box so no matter what's in that document when an emergency arises, Cholera is a really good example. We didn't have Cholera in our planning document and it's like a monster document and you can still find people leap into gear and say what can we do and what can we do today. I don't mean planning is not a good thing but sometimes the best planning doesn't really pick up on what happened, Cholera being a good example. Leaping into gear is a good thing too and I think Digicel is really good at that. Airlifting us, you and me out on January 15th was not a trivial exercise and you couldn't really have put what Digicel did into a manual properly as you had to roll with the punches as the air traffic controllers weren't leaving people and they were letting in CNN and not emergency supplies and all of that stuff they had to work on. Your emergency planning procedures have to be living breathing tree and have to constantly be so flexible so malleable that they can take account of changing circumstances which means having really good people in there.

Sharon: What do you think good planning is?

Greg: Any major disaster like earthquake or Cholera you probably can't set up a document that can capture it all rather you have to have a strong enough team with clear roles and responsibilities and with those having the ability to think outside the box.

3. Interview with Ivelle Latortue – National Security SA and UN Habitat

Ivelle Latortue (F) (Haitian) is Operations Manager with UNHABITAT. She also with her husband Senator Youri Latortue owns National Security SA, a security company based in Port au Prince. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT, is the United Nations agency for human settlements. It is mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all. The interview took place at the Kairbe Hotel in Petionville, Port au Prince.

Ivelle: The thing about the world situation is that everything came out of nowhere and we were planning because I work for the UN. We have every contingency and we were not prepared for what happened, we saw business continuity in terms of what we should do in terms of operations. For us we had our data at the bank and the bank collapsed and we lost everything. So it is after that we see that our planning and preparation was so small that we did not envision the scope of what happened and there was little preparation for that.

We had another satellite office and regional offices that were not affected. We had human resources and material resources coming to help us so we could operate within days of the earthquake; if it was only for us as the people were emotionally not ready to go back to work even eleven months on. The emotional toll was so big, a lot of people were separated from their families as children had to leave Port au Prince to go to school somewhere else and we were not prepared for that. We had someone come from our head office preparing an alternative for everyone and I was the operations manager. We call it a mirror for critical positions to takeover; they had a pool of people. After that personally I see organisations in another way, I have operation management myself but I never think of it that way and it takes experience to know those kind of situations and how you will act, you have to be prepared for any kind of situation especially when you are dealing with those kind of organisations even for my job we are doing humanitarian work we cannot say we are closed even the security also this is the time when you need security.

For two days Youri who does not manage the company himself because he got so many things to do for those two days he was himself calling in bodyguards and calling in agents because the operating officer, his wife died and with children, we had so many problems. We were not prepared and we had to react and react quickly, we are doing it, little by little we are putting in place now to know exactly what we are doing, we don't have to guess or improvise because the office did not have anything so all files were intact so we had information on people but it had collapsed what would we do. We would not have anything.

Sharon: What organisation do you work for?

Irvelle: At the time of the earthquake I worked for UNFPA, the UN population fund. They focus on getting data so people can plan on that, they also do a presentation of national mortality. They try to work lessening barriers for handicapped people vulnerable people with any kind of deficiency and preventing stigmatisation. After the earthquake, how many people were displaced, how many were touched and how many houses were destroyed? there was no data. We had to gather data quickly so we could assess the magnitude of the problem and it was also good for us to be there because the people who would need their medicine and handicapped, those were not the ones who were able to get it by themselves so we had to be there quickly and we were there to help get the help they needed.

Now I work for UNHABITAT, the main priority for us is to make people returning to their homes, people just left their houses and go to live in camps. People believe they will do some kind of reconnaissance of the people living in the camps so they can get land or housing so there is a lot of confusion and makes people leave their habitat. They were not so much damaged but they get to the camp because of the advantages or the other things they thought they will get. So we are now working on returning the people to their place of origin, we do an assessment of the places and try to encourage them to go back there. I am the head of administration and finance and I look at their budget and their recruitment and stuff like that. Most of the services are not back yet at the level it used to be and operationally it is so difficult. Human resources, to recruit the cost of people who come to Haiti is a lot more there is a premium for expats because they think they are coming to a country which is risky. A lot of qualified

people left Haiti now it is very difficult to get the human resource. Sometimes you have to go through three rounds to find a suitable candidate, you will find a lot of CVs because there is a lot of people not working but the suitable candidates are becoming very difficult to find. Sometimes people depend on that resource to make things go smooth and you cannot deliver because you cannot do the thing you used to. From a business point of view, we are planning a pool of CVs who are qualified, we keep our data on the Internet and anywhere we go we can find our data and this is very crucial for business continuity you have to be able to be to find out what you were doing before, what you need to change what you to need to continue doing because I might not be there and those who come after me need to be able pick up from somewhere and if that information does not exist it makes it very hard for some kind of co-operation to follow through on that so we are improving on this.

The difficulties now to have the right resources we see because of the humanitarian crisis many resources are devoted to this problem and the aspect of co-operation has been a little neglected we understand it because of the focus on humanitarian work we see a lot of people leave the country because there was so much free healthcare given to people so the doctors could not keep their office running and people are saying all that all the people who came to help will have to leave some day, we will see that the healthcare system in Haiti collapse, it has already collapsed but you don't feel it now as you have the clinic of Minustah etc. but after all these people leave the people will not have anywhere to go. The clinic of CDTI was supposed to be a big hospital; it is closed due to lack of resources. It was not good before and it is worse after because we as a country were not prepared for this and I don't think at the highest level there was a plan for this because everyone comes to help but then when they leave and then when you leave the country without healthcare system and anything that is important for a country to rely on to advance. So you should find some solution to that, if people can retire slowly from the system because otherwise if there is another crisis all those other people will go to that other place and we will be left with nothing. I think we have to be prepared for that, a lot people went to Pakistan with the flood but there will be a time when everyone will be leaving and the country will not be ready to assume what we will need to take care of after that.

Now we have a lot of resources coming from outside but they will not be here long enough after because people come with their materials even they give the materials they don't have enough money to maintain them and don't receive the benefit and if the people are not educated and did not receive training they will not be able to pick up where they left off. When you have the helpers like doctors etc. after they leave you will have more cholera more malaria more of everything as no one will be ready to take care of that. In terms of continuity many of the people come from other offices to help but we have to make sure we have the plan; we have a formal plan to make sure the business stays after the people leave. Obviously they were from other offices and could not stay forever so they have to be replaced and to make sure the office is operating. I think we have, are at good level, we still have some difficulties finding the right staff but we do training to get people to the level we need them to be and for the office to begin the mechanism of operating capability.

Sharon: What about your plan from before?

Irvelle: We plan all kinds of things, in terms of the people who were supposed to be the essential staff, one of my essential staff had a son who was ten years old who was a Canadian citizen, and she was on the first flight to go to Canada on the Friday after the earthquake. The other person had a medical evacuation. I did the payroll then I had to go to place my kids in Florida. The plan was not appropriate to that kind of situation as you have no control because you have to give to the people who were there to recuperate; they all had compelling reasons not to be there and could not be there.

We had our data saved in a bank and the bank collapsed. Thankfully our building was severely damaged but it was not collapsed and we found someone who was willing to go in the building to recover our computers, our servers, our computer but it was three weeks after. We had to have an assessment of who could go in as it was severely damaged. We had the files, they came in a pile and they were not organised; it took so much time to organise. What we do now is to organise each essential file in PDF and we can have them whenever we need them because we were not prepared.

I think for now people are working closely with other people it's like you have a mirroring of the role so the other person will be able to pick up to do the role and continue it.

4. Interview with Mark Field – Voice & Data Group, CITS – ITU, Minustah

Mark Field (M) (Australian) is with the Voice & Data Group, CITS – ITU, Minustah. The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti is a United Nations peacekeeping mission that has been in operation since 2004. In the earthquake the mission's chief, his deputy and the acting police commissioner were killed. This interview took place in a restaurant in Petionville, Port au Prince.

Mark: We have a DRBC policy that was implemented, firstly it was implemented mission by mission starting whoever was the mission chief has the idea what to do, so it came back to the IT procedures, the international run IT guidelines from headquarters so they were implemented as a standardisation project, you could go from one mission to the next and you would have a similar platform.

We have had a couple of exercises previously, an evacuation exercise for the IT component we would have a van including telephones, VAPS, switch, routers, wireless network and servers with applications running and we would tow behind us a 3.7m satellite dish. We have practiced that on an evacuation to Barahona in the Dominican Republic with actual clients as in our personnel unit, our travel unit, our finance unit. In the event of a full evacuation we could access those applications via the van.

We then replicated our databases every night to a unit in Santo Domingo, we have rented a place there with another UN organisation and we have set up a server farm there and we do replication nightly so we still have the data there. We have extended that since the earthquake very much, we were building scenarios, for example we lost the Christopher, our headquarters which collapsed completely and a couple of buildings around it. We had scenarios on PowerPoint presentations where Christopher would go black and then it shows our backup links, we have redundant links from the Christopher to our log base at the airport where we now have the headquarters and had two waves, one from upper Boutilliers on the mountain and one going the other way via a

different route so if there was a disruption it would switch over and via a third route also like a triangle.

The scenario we were looking at, at the time was more to do with fire in the server room where all our communications equipment was or a total loss of power, it wasn't what happened. We had pretty much no outage to our log base after the earthquake, we lost internet for a little while but all our applications, our voice, our radio were intact. We didn't expect it but we did plan for it very very well.

We have a new headquarters now near the American Embassy, that's called Delta camp; we've got a new combination camp for people that lost their homes that's a 250 person camp. I think we were pretty lucky that we took it so seriously and had tested and done everything, we just never expected that we would have to implement the whole thing, we didn't have to implement anything really, the log bases were duplicated in the Christopher the headquarters so straight away all the data was there everything, even though we lost everything we had our core systems but we had them duplicated as I said.

After the earthquake we were able to provide wireless telephony again with the van and satellite and radios for all the agencies that came in. We duplicated that probably strengthened us more, we now have a connection between our log base here at delta camp which is the second highest camp now it's all built on flat land based in the event of another earthquake. The night of the earthquake, the morning after we were told to look after ourselves and to function well we had to look after ourselves, there were many agencies and rescue missions coming in who we could assist. We provided guest internet access for journalists and NGOs/agencies, we provided an area for the press with internet and for a time we went against our security policy and allowed outside people to go through our firewall, still safe but not 100%, at the time we had no choice.

Now a lot of our section has been moved across to a place in Santo Domingo near the airport, it's a network access point where all the cabling, wiring, air conditioning was already there. We rented space, 90% of our personnel staff were there, our travel unit were there, there is two people left here. I'm in CITS, we have a CITS team over there and we have increased bandwidth across to Boutilliers, across to what we call cybernetic path Santo Domingo across the

industrial path specifically built not by us, we just rented the place and the place where we have our equipment. I think we have around 200 staff now but we have redundancy between here, Port au Prince log base via Brindisi in Italy back from Brindisi to the cybernetic path, from the cybernetic path back to Port au Prince.

We have also back up redundancy via another UN organisation. So our redundancy, it is already seriously more than we ever expected but no one expected the earthquake, we never expected such a large stage. It proves that we have done fairly well, we thought it would never have to be used but the importance of it now, will one specialist be enough? We are doing exercises all the time, we will be doing major exercises again like the Barahona exercise we will evacuate. We are putting a lot of staff out into the outer regions, larger regions and we will be duplicating out in the regions too so we are not putting all our eggs in one basket. If anything happens to any compound anymore it will minimise not just the human side but minimise the power outage completely.

The internet which was external to us was the only thing that we lost and we have it back up via the Brindisi link which was slower as a satellite.

Sharon: How long did it take?

Mark: It is was pretty much straight away within an hour, for the Brindisi link it was ten minutes but that was through the UN off the satellite link, the other was one of the local internet providers here. We had that back up by the next morning, twelve hours at the most. We had a lot of realignment. Then we were providing and everyone was coming in and we were trying to find our own people as well. We have a Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity team or we have one member who is the leader and he says this is what I want and we provide him with the hardware, software or human resources. We work with him. We are now organising another of the big exercises that we will do simulating loss.

It may sound strange but a lot of our stuff now is looking at the conditions of fire, we are not putting all our resources into earthquake. We have the log bases backed up a kilometre away inside the compound so fire power anything we're looking at those things. It would be straight away start up but a tsunami would

be the only thing but we're not banking on that. We made this more resilient since the earthquake, we have the constant backing up of data going across and we back up data to another place near the US embassy and we also back it up to overnight to Santo Domingo so I don't think we're going to lose the whole island.

Luckily a lot of work had gone in before; there was a need for it.

Disaster Recovery Business Continuity is very high on the agenda. Headquarters called it this. We had to abide by it when we were preparing procedures as a minimum requirement it went out to all missions. Minustah was one of highest because of its youth, its only here five or six years. I came here about eight months after the start we implemented the procedures. The only missions that were more successful were in Lebanon and we have overtaken them and the Congo the same the Congo is actually behind us.

But a lot of people came here sort of like the youthful mission young mission we set things up the way we wanted and then the standardisation program came, we didn't have to change a great deal that included security, included naming conventions for routing equipment/switching equipment, working alongside our network control centre in Brindisi, putting in place standard configurations, SOPs. We're not ISO9000 compliant but we might as well be.

Sharon: What do you think makes good planning?

Mark: Generally a lot of people work and are lax about putting effort into disaster recovery because they think it will never happen. What kept us going is our proximity to New York as New York likes to come here as other missions are further away. We take it very seriously as we have auditors who come over and a lot of our chiefs and we had a lot of support from above. My chief at the moment took it very seriously so we put resources and time into disaster recovery. I took it seriously because we were doing exercises, security right from top, going across the border and getting organised we took it very seriously. We had problems with the satellite dish on our first exercise into the Dominican but we were able to get everything else working and when we got it working it was ok. I consider the satellite not working a good thing because if we hadn't tested it, we wouldn't know and if everything had gone right and we can say next time this. So you look back on the exercise but we had a lot of support

from above. None of us wanted to fail because we were scared we'd be the only ones to fail. That's how we took it; we didn't want to be the ones with the problem. Even when the satellite problem happened we worked with the satellite guy to work that out, it turned out it was a minor glitch. There is pressure but there is also support.

5. Interview with Patrice Jean Jacques - Manager Sogebank Delma 48

Patrice Jean Jacques (M) (Haitian) is the manager of Sogebank in Delma 48, Port au Prince. Sogebank formerly known as Societe Generale Haitienne de Banque SA is one of Haiti's two largest private commercial banks. It has 42 branches located throughout the country. The interview took place at the Kairbe Hotel in Petionville, Port au Prince.

Patrice: 12th January changed many things in the bank system. Before the bank system in Haiti was a small area of dealing because unlike the other banks in foreign countries we didn't do every transaction or every dealing that they do, we are not in the market, we are not placing money in anything, and we just stay in small business things like withdrawal, deposit and some loans.

The other thing that banks in Haiti does not reach their goals and do what they have to do, in Haiti it is very different style of life and reality. To make a loan you have to know where you can find that client and in Haiti we don't have trustable information. If someone tells you that they live in Canapé Vert or Petionville, you could find a mountain with many small houses and you could not find those people. In Haitian tradition you have a name in Port au Prince and if you come from Gonaives you have another name in your country and there is also a Haitian nickname. So there isn't any trustable information or to make comfortable to make a loan so that's why banks in Haiti do withdrawals, deposits, loan and even credit cards because you have to ask for reserve. We would like to do like other banks, to have opportunities for businessmen, we would like to do this but we have no structure, no trustable system to enforce in those things because we are dealing with the money of other people and we are going to place them, we cannot assure that everything is going to be good that's why it's just a small portion of the business.

After 12th January, things are changing and will continue to change, because of the influx of foreign countries in our system. Like right now we are dealing with BID who are placing the money involved with mortgages or doctors who would like to make a plan for a project we will provide money on those projects but we still backup the BID because the people say in Haiti only say twenty one families have money. That's why you see the people who are the partners in Sogebank, Capital Bank and Unibank they are the same people who are family and married. They have many interests together that's why when one bank going to make a rule or change a rate then they should consult the other one because it is a small portion of people and that same portion of people who have all the market in the industry and everything, all the economy in their hand. A different point of view, if it was like the USA if you are working, you can find many credit cards from many banks but in Haiti you should fight to have a credit card as you not a trustable person.

Sharon: Are you saying nobody is a trustable person?

Patrice: Nobody is a trustable person as the system does not have trustable information on anyone, I can have many IDs it's possible, I can tell you I am living at Petionville I give you an address and you can never find me there. How can I give someone like that money?

Sharon: So fraud is very prevalent?

Patrice: Exactly, we have political situations that are not giving the opportunity to invest in Haiti. Every time there are political things or overview, you will not find a situation that will encourage people to invest in the country. The business you could see before the earthquake, they burned businesses and lost everything and they still have loans to pay, those things don't encourage people to do business that's why many young people from university choose to work in banks. Some have accounting qualifications and they are still working for 1,200 Haitian dollars. That's nothing because there is no structure to help those people, there are many good ideas and good plans but the investment is not coming. We cannot be feeling bad with other people's money; everything is not as it should be point by point getting investment.

Sharon: That's the business since 12th January how it has changed, what about practically in terms of keeping business going?

Patrice: We were afraid about the loss we could have to endure because most of the loans were based on houses and cars. In the earthquake many houses fell down, many people lost their houses but they still have the loan. We were afraid that we cannot get those monies back but things are better than what we thought because we are not really in a loss situation, we are still accountable to the client and those houses that were lost they still have their place and guarantees and most of them still have all the business etc. in the same family they have many other guarantees that makes us comfortable. We cannot get those monies back in ten years but between ten and fifteen and twenty years, we will get those loans and monies back.

Those who have loans for cars, most of the time when we are giving loans we ask for 25% of the money that we are going to give in the account as guarantee. So if this portion is paying the loan then the small portion that we lost is not really important. That's why we are very comfortable about our financial situation.

Sharon: When the earthquake happened you were at the bank, can you talk about what happened?

Patrice: It's the first time I saw an earthquake, I watched many movies, I was so calm but I was afraid. I asked my employees to get out and stay in the parking. I took all cheques on my desk and put them in a box and took it to the vault. I felt vibrations and went outside. I came back in after five minutes and I called all the tellers one by one to put money in the vault and I closed the vault. After that there was the big vibration, earthquake and after that I went to an employee's house. I went to the bank the next day to see if an official would come but they didn't.

We lost four branches completely, such as Turgeau and they didn't have a chance to close the vault and people got inside the bank on 12th January and took money, PCs, laptops and everything that they could get. We lost money, many banks lost money as the vault was open and tellers had money also. Some markets too, there was looting on 12th January.

Sharon: What happening to get the bank back open and when it opened?

Patrice: When the bank was open there was a very difficult situation because we lost so many branches, we consulted clients from Turgeau and Sogebank headquarters, and there were a lot of people outside the bank and inside. They would not stay in the line; all these people want to get in at the same time so at that time we made arrangement for some security. You cannot put everyone inside as with every little shake there is panic, they break windows and pull other people down. So for security reasons we take twenty five people inside when every five people finish we take another ten inside in order to have security control. We have to watch everyone also there is gangs who come to the bank who pretend to be clients and want to steal money from clients so we have to watch everything.

There are people who lost their cheque book or bank book, we were trying to see if it was a real cheque and came from the owner of the cheque book and sometimes it was embarrassing.

Sharon: Looking back at the planning that was in place for an event of this kind, looking back now what is your reflection on that in the aftermath?

Patrice: We are in the situation to follow the step of every international bank so we have a small portion of every country in this country, so we should provide an international service that means we are going to deal with other credit cards from other foreign countries and other investments and other kind of conditions that we are not used to in Haiti, we have to follow the times right now. We don't do that alone, we are trying to upgrade our system, upgrade our point of view of our system to reach the level of any other bank in any other country because right now we have every country in Haiti.

Thankfully we have other partners, in US we have Bank of America and in Switzerland we have USB Bank, those banks are working with us. Before they were representing us but right now we have experts from these banks coming to work with us to try to put us at the level for every investment that comes to Haiti from other foreign countries that we could deal with them. BID are going to give a fund to put into a small business system and then to finance loans for

those persons, life goes on we cannot stay that way. Our opportunity to upgrade ourselves, we are going to take.

Sharon: What about what the plan was and did that work, did you have a crisis plan?

Patrice: Yes there are many plans. We should encourage the economy which should come for the family before the society. Now we are investing in plastic cards, that's the way for us to have much information on the way the person is dealing with their money to make us comfortable to give the money to the business. But the thing is we cannot decide completely before the election because that's the point that's going to give us an idea what is going to happen because we should follow our social plan. The government should have an economic plan and the bank should follow it because we are able to upgrade our plan and we can upgrade our system because if you go to Sogebank it's like any other bank, the computer system, the way we are dealing, everything is there, plans of economy what to encourage, where to put the money and internal investment to involve national projects, we have all that plan, we have money to invest in those things but don't forget the government is the one who is going to lead you. We are a private bank, we have our plan but we should follow the economic plan because we cannot move alone we must follow the country.

Sharon: What do you think makes good planning for crisis situations?

Patrice: Get the economic system more simple, we are dealing with a population who are not so informed so we have to reach their level of understanding so they can understand what we want to do.

We are working on mobile banking so people can send money to others based on their phone credit. That's a new thing. We can transform transactions to numeric data, a minute will become money. We are working on that with Voila and have spoken to Digicel. That's one way to make things easier; there will not have to be so many people in the bank anymore. We are placing many ATM machines and will not give savings books but plastic cards. The bank will come to the person not the person to the bank and we are going to reach every level of society.

Sharon: Do you think your reaction to the earthquake is to improve facilities and security?

Patrice: When you go through a bad time you should get a lesson from it to go beyond to go higher and for example for the earthquake, a foreign country comes to us we don't have any structure for helping people we should upgrade that country and take a lesson from 12th January. We upgrade that country and the economy and give a symbol of light to every people to feel more secure, to do what they want to do and to invest in what they want to and to rebuild the economy of the country.

We were the first country to sell sugar, coffee and many other things but we choose to buy those things from outside for easy life. We even choose to buy flowers from Dominican Republic.



6. Interview: Anne Hastings, CEO Fonkoze

Anne Hastings (F) (US) is CEO of Fonkoze. Fonkoze is "Haiti's Alternative Bank for the Organised Poor" It is the largest microfinance institution in Haiti serving 45,000 women borrowers and more than 200,000 savers. It has 41 branches covering every region of Haiti. Their comprehensive approach to poverty includes micro-credit, business development loans, saving products, currency exchange, money transfer, education for borrowers, social impact monitoring, micro insurance, prepaid VISA card and housing rebuilding and repair following the earthquake. She is a member of the Clinton Global Initiative's Haiti Action Network. The interview took place in her office in Pacot, Port au Prince.

Anne: Hello, my name is Anne Hastings and I'm the chief executive officer of Fonkoze Financial Services which is Haiti's largest micro finance institution. I have been living in the country since 1996 and when I got here our institution

was just 2 volunteer employees and today we have about 815 employees. We have 43 branch offices all over the country. We have about 220,000 people who save money with us and then we also have about 50,000 people who have loans in their hands. And then we also have a lot of people who come to our branches to pick up their money transfers. So we're very much in the cash business because Haiti is still mostly a cash society although we're moving to mobile money. So on the day of the earthquake I was in our headquarters building on the top floor which is the third floor. And I was actually with a group of students from a university who were here to talk about innovative products and that kind of thing. And suddenly I heard, I think that what impressed me most was, I heard what sounded like a bomb almost. And by that I mean it was just a huge noise. Some people had suggested to me that perhaps it was buildings falling but it was before the shaking really started which I found it was, to my estimation it was really the power of what was coming up from

Sharon: I felt the same

Anne:....oh good, and then it started shaking and I had no idea what it was. I really wasn't thinking earthquake at all. But anyway we got out relatively safely. The building was damaged and it can't be used anymore. But there was really not too many people who were very seriously affected. A couple of people had cut themselves when they put their hands through a window or something to try and get out. Cos all the doors kind of locked shut when we were in there. But one person, a very close friend of mine who was here from our Fonkoze USA branch, she was in a room where the doors really locked and she couldn't get out and she saw a hole opening up in the wall and she thought that she could lower herself down through that hole. She was on the second floor. But as soon as she put her first leg through the hole, the whole wall fell and so she broke her back and it was pretty serious and she was in a cast for a long time and everything. She had a lot of other kinds of ribs broken and that kind of thing. So it took her a long time to heal. In any case, after the initial shock, right away, we've had a lot of disasters in Haiti so nobody was especially panicked. I had to get through the process of getting those university students out. They all came and slept at

my house that night and they all slept outside and I slept inside on my bed because I don't want to sleep outside. But the next day we got them to the US Embassy and they were evacuated along with my friend. And the next day after that, so that would have been on the 14th, I really got in touch with the other leadership of the organisation and we started doing a survey of our branches out on the provinces and more than half of them were still open. I mean they opened on the day after the earthquake and they never stopped. So, yeah they were very busy.

Sharon: Were you busier than ever?

Anne: Yes because everybody came in to take their savings out of their savings account or to pick up transfers. And what happened is that the, there were huge numbers of people in the United States who were trying to get all of their money, I mean get remittances down to their family members in Haiti and it got blocked. So, because none of the banks were open and none of the transfer companies or most of them were not open. So Fonkoze was one of the few institutions that was open. So right away some of our partners, especially the inter-American development banks started calling us and saying what can we do to try and help you? And I said that well our biggest problem was going to be that our branches in the countryside were going to run out of cash, actual liquid cash. And although we had plenty of money in the banks we couldn't get to that money. We had actually called the central bank of Haiti to see if they would get us some money but they refused. They were in trouble with the central banks being damaged as well. So we continued talking to the inter-American development bank and finally this all took about 4 days but finally the IBB called the treasury who called the state department and we finally got things going so that we took 2 million dollars out of our bank in New Jersey. The CEO of our bank who was also Haitian born, he worked with JP Morgan Chase in Miami to find a branch in Miami that had 2 million dollars in cash and we asked them to put that 2 million dollars divided up into small boxes and then a number of the small boxes put together into bigger boxes that were not marked. So we put them in like office depot boxes. We had a very special formula to figure out how

much cash of the 2 million, how much we wanted to go to each one of our branches. And then a, you know one of those, the armoured vehicles came to JP Morgan Chase and picked it up and took it to Homes air force base and that night at about 10 at night I got a call from the Pentagon and I had all these generals on the line and all these bigwigs from the various segments from the US military and they told me that they were going to fly the money down that night and it would get here at 3am and we needed to be ready and the whole thing was quite exciting. And so the chief financial officer and I got out to the airport and we waited until 3 in the morning and this big cargo plane carrying huge pieces of equipment flew into the airport and inside of there they had 10 boxes of cash. And then when we looked I had to go onto the plane and verify that that is what we had requested. So then they called the Pentagon to say that the mission had been successful. And then we had to sit in the camp where all the army people were during the rest of the night until 6.30 in the morning and then these helicopters came and two helicopters, one helicopter had all the cash in it and the other helicopter was flying behind it just to make sure it was safe. And one of our partners got on the helicopter and we actually had the money dropped in 10 different locations around the country and we had spent the whole night calling all of our staff and our staff they don't even have guns, they don't even have cars. They just came on motorcycles and picked up these boxes. And the whole thing just worked so smoothly. So that after that Pentagon guy had called me at 10 o'clock at night by one o'clock the next day the money had been delivered to all 40 of our branches at the time. And so it was only a day or so later that the banks began to open. So that was our first problem, is how to stay open on behalf of our clients knowing how much they really, really, really need to have access to this cash. And people really appreciated that we went to so many lengths to try to make sure that they could get it. Then the next problem was that in the earthquake we had lost 5 of our employees, none of them had been in our building, they had all been at home. And that was hard especially because 3 of them were in the transfer service department and there were only a total of 5 employees in that department and now our transfers were just coming on a mile a minute, you know money transfers coming into the country. So we had to scale up that department as fast as we could even when the employees were really, really sad. And the other thing is that we lost eleven of our buildings so we had to figure out how were we going to get all of those

buildings reopened. And so we opened our building in our branch in Port au Prince. We opened it outside in the lock pool. I mean the thing is we just called all our employees through word of mouth. Most of them were not living in their houses; they were out in the street sleeping. And somehow almost all of our headquarters employees, about 70 people got there within a few days of the earthquake and started coming to work so that doing whatever they could to help us. We tried to get as much stuff out of the buildings as we could. And you know, so we got the Port au Prince branch opened and then we had long, long lines of people waiting to pick up their money. And it really worked so beautifully and then we, another problem we hadn't envisioned. So everything was a logistical nightmare. How to get the things open. But Fonkoze because of its mission and because of how strongly people feel about our mission and because we know our clients depends so very much on us we, everybody just did everything they could to get us back in business. I imagine it's the same at Digicel because everybody needed that, communication. So there was a lot of camaraderie being built. I think we're a stronger family today than we were before the earthquake even though I think we were very strong before the earthquake. But then....

Sharon: It changed?

Anne: It changed everybody, yeah. We had given them their cheques for that month in advance. And then we gave everybody who didn't have a home, we gave them a chunk of money so that they could find a way to live and stuff. But right away we knew that our clients who were very poor women for the most part were really going to be in big trouble. So we had to decide how to deal with the huge number of international NGO's coming into the country. All of whom wanted to help but didn't really know anything about the country and didn't know how to be in touch with the people. What that meant for us is that it was pretty easy to raise way more money than we had ever raised before. Because organisations like the American Red Cross wanted to get cash into people's hands. And so we made a decision early on, we're not going to go out there and do things, try new products or do things we don't know how to do. What we're

going to do is scale up what we really know how to do the best. And so we really worked hard, we have, I have an excellent top leadership team and the 5 or 6 of us were in constant contact to get ourselves, we found a, we had moved 3 times since the earthquake to get to a building. This isn't the permanent one either but... So we were working really well as a team and so the American Red Cross, right before the earthquake we had wanted to implement a catastrophe micro insurance programme. We already have life in credit; we've had that since 2007. And we wanted our clients ever since the 2008 hurricanes we had been planning to introduce this new product. We were about 6 weeks away from being able to introduce it. So immediately we said rather than going back to what we did for our clients after the 2008 hurricanes why don't we instead really try to implement the insurance that we had planned to implement. So we talked to our partners Mercy Core, American Red Cross, all kind of partners and said would you be willing to let us test this. And most of them did with some constraints. So basically what we did is everybody who had a loan on the 12th of December that was in the, I think it was 14 branches that were in the hardest hit zone. They had their dept. eliminated, they didn't have to repay their loans and they received 5,000 Gourde as a money to help them get food and shelter in those early months. So we just deposited that money into their savings account that they all had with us. And then we had a problem with the area outside of the hardest hit zones because there are many, many people that were hit really hard because they happened to be in Port au Prince that day even if they lived in Quanamithe or in some other place that wasn't hit so hard or they were, had their merchandise in a depot here and that was destroyed or whatever. So we had to put in place bit plans for how we were going to identify the victims outside of the hardest hit areas so that we can make sure that they get the same benefits. So we successfully implemented that in 18, over 18,000 people had their dept. eliminated, got a 5,000 Gourde cash advance and they were, we were able to give them a new loan as soon as they were very much ready for that. Then we also had been the people who had been working with the CHF prior to earthquake on cash for work programmes. We were the ones that went out and handed the people their pay, paid cash, their cash every 2 weeks for the work that they had done. And often those cash for work programmes were in Citi Soleil or anywhere in the bad neighbourhoods. So prior to the earthquake we were paying maybe 3,000 people every 2 weeks. After the earthquake the

number jumped to about 80,000 people. So we had, because there were so many cash for work programmes going on and so we had a staff of only 5 guys and we had to scale up to 30 and we had to train everybody really quickly. Once again the problem was keeping the cash flowing, keeping the liquidity. Cos we didn't use cheques for those people we always just handed them cash. Sometimes the Central Bank couldn't provide us with the money that we needed even though we had the money. But they couldn't give us the liquidity. In addition, our transfer services tripled almost overnight. So this year we paid out over 95 million dollars in our branches around the country. And that's money being sent from Haitians or other friends of Haiti living abroad who send their money through money gram or CAM or unit transfer or whatever. And that was double what we had ever done in the past. So we had to scale that programme up. We have a programme for the very, very, very poorest people where, I won't go into the details around it but Master Card Foundation agreed, we had never had more than 300 families in that programme. Master Card Foundation gave us the funding to allow us to scale up to 1,000 families. And we just finished the selection process in December so we have 1,500 families now approximately. So everything we do had to do with getting money out the door. We gave out cash grants to host families. People who were living in the provinces who had 5 people living in their little house and now suddenly they had 10 more people from Port au Prince who came out there because they were relatives and they didn't have anywhere to live in Port au Prince. So we handed out cash grants to them. So we became a much, much larger institution in terms of the amount of money that we were handling and how fast it was going through. The volume was just extraordinary. And it put a lot of pressure on our staff to do things really, really well and really, really effectively. But it also has been really good for Fonkoze because our reputation, of course you always have some people who are not happy with one thing or another but people within the country now really, really know who we are. Prior to the earthquake it was more people who were outside of the country, international NGO's and Governments and stuff who knew who we were. So it's helped our reputation quite a lot. So about, now you asked what sort of planning did we do before and after? I think we responded really, really effectively and quickly and we did it not because we had some fancy contingency plan in place but we just knew what was important to get done first and second and third and everybody really worked hard to get that

done. The only thing the we realised, there were 2 things that really concerned us about not having a better plan, one was that we were, our whole company plan was with Digicel and Digicel had some troubles getting back up and Voila would be working. So now we have gone back and made sure that we have both Digicel and Voila in on company plans so that every branch, so if one goes down completely we know we have another one. That was one issue, was just communications in those early days after the earthquake. And then the second problem that we had was the IT systems. We had an incredible director of IT at the time who just was sort of managed to get the servers to out and took them up somewhere up in the mountains and got us set up so that we could communicate with our branches so that we could use our normal banking software and make sure we were capturing all the transactions and everything. But now we feel that we really need to have a back-up site where you can flip over to another, in other words the servers you have here in Port au Prince that you have a duplicate server somewhere else in a protected area so that if it goes down in one place it would be. And unfortunately that hasn't been accomplished this year. It was one of our things that we set as an objective and it didn't get accomplished before the end of the year. So we're still looking for ways to make that happen. It's just really expensive to try to manage that. In some ways I have decided that the best thing might be for us to outsource it. We have a lot of our work outsourced already in the United States. But the servers are here, I'm thinking about outsourcing it so that the servers aren't even maintained here.

After the earthquake, one thing that was clear though, when we do a strategic business plan in the past it would take, you know if you were really going to do it right and really involve the whole institution in it and make sure all the boards and board members were involved and all that and do all the financial work that's required it normally would take 4 or 5 months to do a strategic plan. So we had completed a strategic plan in August of 2008 that had taken literally 6 months to get it finalised so it was really publishable and ready to go out. And between September of 2007 or August 2007 and August 2008, that is when the food prices went crazy. And then we had 3 hurricanes, one right after another and September of 2008 was the global financial crisis. So overnight or within a

matter of a few weeks this business plan that we had worked months on was no longer relevant because the whole world had changed. So after the earthquake, then that was 2008, then we worked on a hurricane 2009, we said OK so now we have to go back and revise that plan that we had in 2008. And we finally have the draft ready to go to the board of directors in December of 2009 and the earthquake came 12 days later. So that plan was no good. So we started searching for alternative planning mechanisms and we came upon a Harvard Business School article that has really changed the way that we think about our planning now and I think we're a stronger institution because we don't try to do 7 year plans, 5 year plans. We're more focused on trying to do 6 month plans and really have in place a layer that is constantly searching for new opportunities because there have been so many new opportunities that have come up in Haiti since the earthquake. And you have to have your radar open and always being looking for them and being able to analyse quickly is that an opportunity you want to take advantage of or is it too risky or whatever, you know, that you want to put it aside for now. So like, mobile banking is an example of it, is a very good example of how rushed everybody was to get on board with that. But there are many examples like that. So that's one level of the new planning exercise and the other is just to recognise that living in Haiti that you are going to have continual crises like the one we are in right now because of the election. So it's a shift in our thinking about how do we do planning. We make sure we really know what our mission is, what the principles are under that mission and then we do a 6 months planning. Of course we still have financial projections out for 3 years or something but we don't worry so much about taking months and months to do them. We focus more on lets set some 6 month objective, let's be looking at the opportunities that are going to be available to us and lets be ready to learn from whatever happens. And so, we have always thought of ourselves as a continuous learning organisation but we put more emphasis on it now. And we don't get upset when we see that things have to change. We just assume that we are going to have to adjust. And what we have to know is when is the point in which we need to make that adjustment so I think that has been the biggest shift that we have had from a leadership perspective. We are trying much more to continue, I mean I could go into more depth but it is probably not necessary. But in any case that's the main shift in the way that we are managing the organisation, is just trying to take advantage

of opportunities when they arrive and trying to always to be prepared and not upset when there is another crisis because there is always going to be one here. And we get, we have our security in place, we feel pretty good about that although it is absolutely, totally different from Digicel security. You know, I drive my own car. I have, a guy that lives in my neighbourhood who wouldn't know what to do with a gun if someone handed him one but he drives with me which is mainly to carry my stuff around and make sure if I have a flat tyre that he can change the tyre. But I don't have security with me all the time. Different environment, different mentality, we don't have a lot of expats. We have fewer than 5 expats on staff now. We do have interns coming in and stuff like that. But anyway, that's, I don't know if there is anything else in particular that you need to know?

Sharon: No I think you have covered the crisis.

Anne: One thing I am really proud of is we are now, we've made a huge partnership with one of the largest insurance companies in the world, with Caribbean risk managers, with IBB to offer now that catastrophe insurance, micro insurance but we are going to offer it to the entire micro finance sector. We have created a new entity that is going to be the facility for offering it. And I am really, really excited because we did all that work to test it, to pilot test whether it would work and it really worked well and the clients really, really loved it. So now they really want it. So as of today we have started enrolling everybody who is getting a new loan, a renewal or a brand new loan. We have started enrolling them in that new micro insurance plan. So that has been one of our greatest achievements for the year. So I think that's all!



7. Interview: Anne Maguire, CEO Haven

Anne Maguire (F) (Irish) is CEO for Haven. Anne has a background in development work for many years with Goal. Haven is an Irish non-governmental, non-political, non-religious organisation working to build sustainable communities, through the provision of housing and emergency relief and by implementing community development programmes in Haiti. The interview took place at the Kairbe Hotel in Petionville, Port au Prince.

Anne: Anne Maguire from Haven and we arrived after the earthquake. Like Haven had been here for a year prior to that but we had been very much up North in a place called Quanminthe. So when the earthquake happened we had a lot of development experience, like long-term development in sheltering housing. There was no experience in emergency or disaster. So a few of us came in a few days after the earthquake and started assessing the situation, you know what needed to be done. The first thing we did was we went to the UN and met with them, trying to get some coordination going about who's doing what where. It was just such a shock to the system for me and my colleagues arriving here it was absolute and utter chaos everywhere. I can't imagine the trauma these people were experiencing and yet some of them within a week had markets going again and their Haitian art up. That was really impressive to see. From Haiti's perspective we just wanted to get in, to do what was needed. And when we met with the UN and met with the different clusters as they are called, that the UN divides itself into, such as shelter, water, sanitation. It depends what sector that you are going to be working in, which meetings you're going to. We found that the real need was for utilities and sanitation. All the people that had lost their home and you know it went from 1 million people had started to form informal settlements, campsites all around Port au Prince. I would say there are about a thousand of these all over the place, anything ranging from a hundred to 20 thousand people. At the start I even started to visit a few of these camps

with people from the UN and some other aid agencies. And looking around, for me a need for looking and how we were going to help these people. So what we did initially was, we had, we were fortunate to have some really good local staff here, we had some very strong community department people and engineers and architects who had constructed our homes and monuments. So they all came down to Port au Prince and started assisting with the cleaning. We met with the beneficiaries, we met with the community and each camp that we went into it was amazing that a committee was already formed. The natural leaders of the camp formed a committee and they were supporting the beneficiaries. We had to be really careful with the committee because you wanted to make sure that they were democratically elected and they weren't like just old men. It's very important for Haven and I know for other NGOs to find a gender balance and that women would be heard as well because they are the people who, it's most risk for them going to latrines because of sexual violence and they often have to walk a bit. It's all of them who are doing the work who are cleaning the latrines. So for us they are a really, really important group that you are communicating with in our design and our plan of our programme. So that was what we did do. We liaised very much with the woman in the camp as well you know the committee. But we tried to get as many women on the committee as possible. It worked really well for, and it still works well to a certain degree. Haven for the first few months we were putting up latrines, we build about 1,200 latrines. Also we started a hygiene and sanitation programme because there was no point in putting up the structure if you're not educating the people about how to use them, the importance of washing their hands, the importance of food preparation, the importance of storing water and it is a really important part of the programme. We continued that and after a few months Haven also provided temporary shelter as part of its IOM. We provided all the plastic sheeting and some tents to the camps we were working in but that was obviously a very temporary and emergency solution and we've got to quickly provide more semi-permanent solutions which was exactly what we did. We then went to a transitional shelter programme. We built, a lot of the shelters that you see around are timber frame with plastic sheeting and we were working with our partners which were Plan International and they have been in Haiti for the last 20 years. I know the community really, really well while we were working in Croix de Bouquet and they were suggesting that we should do all timber and

plywood to make it much more durable because they felt that we build a temporary shelter it would last a year, 2 years. 5 years later they'd still be in that and they'd be in tatters. And that was kind of our reasoning for going as executor of, yes it was more expensive, yes it would take longer but we felt that in the long run it would be the better solution for the people. Again with all our programmes at Haven Build it's not about shelter, I always say the easy part is building the house and the most difficult part is the community side and the community development side. And what I mean in terms of that is making sure that they have the community facilities that if you are moving them that they have water, they have sanitation, that they have livelihood. You know, they have lost their house, they have moved to a camp and now they could be moved again. And as much as possible we try to bring them back to their community. If that's not possible we have to move them to another space. And it is very difficult for them because they have to integrate in a new community, they have to find new livelihoods we have taken them from their livelihood and placed, you know it's a lot of challenges. And also the most important thing is that we have to stop creating that sense of dependency. So it's a very fine balance. You want to help them and facilitate them but make it very, very clear that after the trouble is finished they are the people who have to if they have issues they're to find the solution. So that is really important from the start of that programme that the beneficiaries are the people that find the solutions to the problems. Otherwise you don't stand a chance. You know you can make so many mistakes by just giving and giving and that's really interesting. And I worked in the sector for like 10 years so that you think that by going into a community or bringing people out of absolute extreme poverty and giving them a hand that you are helping them and that's the biggest mistake that anybody can make. Because if you just do that and give them stuff they will be like hang you took me here you did not provide me water you did not provide me the livelihood, that's how quickly it changes the balance. So you have to be really, really careful with that. And it's understandable too but I think people make the mistake because they think they are doing really, really good. On hand they are doing great, you do more harm than good. I might be digressing now a little bit?

Sharon: No, keep going, that's great.

Anne: So that for me is really important as I say it all the time it's the community development that's absolutely essential and most important what Haven needs to do and to continue to do is to realise that we don't know how to do it. The only people who know how to do it are maybe local organisations, community-based organisations, beneficiaries themselves in the community. We can facilitate stuff and in any way and we can help with finance and stuff like that but we cannot find their solutions for them. Every single thing has to be, come from them otherwise it will not work and it's as simple as that really, it will not work. We continued this transition shelter programme for about 100 beneficiaries and we finished that as well but we continued with more funds from the Red Cross. And it's very fortunate in this programme which makes it easier that we're bringing people back to their own plot. So they owned that plot before the earthquake or else they're able to rent it for the next 3 years. So we're not taking them from their original community. So in that sense it is a much easier programme. Haven is also gone into the permanent housing as well where we're working with Fonkoze which is a well-known local agent here. OK and they help people with business development, micro credit training. And so we're working with them building houses in Cabaret as well.

And again we're building in a place called Cabaret and we're building for people who have lost houses already and they have their own plot. And, so then we're not taking from the community so then again it's less trickery. We're looking to the future now and there is a lot of land that's come up and a lot of land donated to Haven which is fantastic but the places we are looking at is in Gressier. But it would mean relocating their communities so it would be definitely challenging because like again what I said before is that people will want community, they've lost their houses they go to the camps and then they go and move again. And it's traumatic, it's difficult and when you're an aid agency doing if you need a preview as a favour coming in to help them and then you just leave again. So it's a very tricky balance that you have to have in that community and again Haven have the experts. We have a partner with local organisations that specialise in this. That is kind of where we are at the moment. Our long-term plan here for Haiti is Haven will be here for the next 10, 15 years. Our ideal solution to shelter would be to be giving the beneficiaries the money so owner

driven. So we could give them a small instalment they go off and build the foundation. They might have to find their own contractors. You know, it's putting the trust back in them to do it themselves because then they get the design right, they, they know what they want better than anybody they just don't have the funds to do it. But what our role with them becomes with them is monitoring and also what it would become is making sure that it is structurally sound and maybe providing training as well. But if we could go to an owner driven model, that they are driving it rather than a donor driven and an NGO driven that's the ideal situation. And we're piloting that in Cabaret at the moment so we're going to give beneficiaries money as instalments. So we give you here's a 1,000 dollars, build your foundations. When you have done that come back to us and you'll get the next. And actually it's improving for tsunami and Pakistan after the earthquake in 2005. That is the most efficient and best way. Yes you will have losses, yes people will refuse funds but the way we do it and NGOs do it, there's a hell of a lot of money involved as well, in administration, in expatriate, in houses in the city centre. So and it's much more sustainable to do it that way. So that is where we would like to get to eventually but we are only polishing our programmes at the moment.

Sharon: Looking back and the aftermath and, looking back we'll say to like any, what kind of plan do you think was in place for an event of this scale?

Anne: Oh none, absolutely zero. I mean, I can't, it seems a plan because people didn't know what to do when it happened which is interesting. We worked in Gonaives where it is constantly hit by hurricanes yet they still know a lot of the community don't have a mitigation plan. And as far as Haven's programme, in every programme we do we would look at disaster mitigation. So all of our programmes especially up in Gonaives and Haven Community Centre so people have somewhere to go to. But I mean in Port au Prince, I mean actually to be honest I don't, who can prepare for a disaster of this scale, you know really who could prepare for it? Like even with an underdeveloped country like, there is no way Ireland could cope with it you know, if something like that happened. So I don't think there was any plan in place but I don't think they could really be blamed for that either.

8. Interview: Dave Sharpe, Head of Products Digicel Haiti

Dave Sharpe (M) (US) is Head of Products and Pricing at Digicel Haiti since October 2007. Prior to this he has held roles with Cypress Communications, Comcel Haiti and Telecel. Digicel is a Pan-Caribbean brand that has been changing communications throughout the region. The interview took place in his office at the Digicel building, Turgeau, Port au Prince.

Dave: Thinking back to the earthquake, I'll start my story with before the earthquake. Though it's, he can't be here to talk about it himself, I'd say that the company was in a very good position at least to deal with the earthquake because of Jean Marc. Jean Marc and his team had taken us, I can't remember, three times, exercises of evacuation of the building, getting out calmly, what happens, when something happens to the building. So we had actually had a fire drill only like a month, the beginning of December I believe it was, that was the last fire drill we had so obviously when the building started to shake and everything started to fall apart and then it stopped. No one got hurt that was in the building. I think there were a couple of people with some minor injuries that we didn't have anything that we could of had in a case of severe panic which would have been the case. I mean there was a lot of panic but I really think he's some kind of un-thanked hero for, we were preparing for a fire, preparing for something else obviously the earthquake wasn't on our agenda. But it was all that preparation that he and his operations team took that really helped us to get out. Now where was I was with Maarten Boute, Tatiana and Sophia on the 9th floor in Maarten's office having a meeting. We thought that the gas station blew up and everybody jumped on the ground and I jumped to the window and saw and actually watched the destruction happen across the country, across Port Au Prince and saw thousands of mushroom clouds coming off the deck were all the buildings were pan-caking to the ground. At this point I knew that it was an earthquake. I was yelling that it was an earthquake probably 5 or 10 seconds after it had started. Maarten was yelling that gas station had blown and everybody was disoriented. I went to Maarten's office door, opened it up, you know probably half way through the earthquake and saw everything shaking around us and saw all the way through to the other side the glass, I saw the same mushroom clouds coming off the deck and basically braced for the end. It

wasn't really Lord please help me make it through this it was I'm dead! This is what it's like to die!

Sharon: Terrible!

Dave: I think the terror was, it wasn't in the end, the terror was in the first 20 seconds. The last 20 seconds was more sheer shock that this is how I was going to die. It stopped and I gave direction to all the screaming people on the ground outside and around to the back elevator, the back shaft, everybody exited to the building I was one of the last people down.

I think it still took us maybe 5 – 10 minutes to really pull our bearings together, understand Jesus this is massive! And then Maarten kind of put everybody together and started firing people off to walk to Acerie to go to these places where we had people, workers went off to their homes to find their family members, to pull people out of rubble etc. I stayed around the building down there to try to help in any way I could until nightfall. That's the real short story of the actual day.

Now, being head of products and in the middle of a disaster I really have not much to do. It sounds like I maybe I have a bunch to do but in fact when the network is not operating and not operating the way it should run I'm not going to create anything new, I'm not going to draw any new service, I'm not going to be doing anything. So I actually had no role. So they asked that all key personnel go home, pack your stuff and you know, you're going to be exiting Haiti. I asked, to stay because I thought that even though I didn't have immediately an essential job that I had two good hands. I'm a contributor and I'm not afraid of being here as long as it is something good. So for the first eleven days, I believe it was I delivered 1,300 meals to the working staff both here in Turgeau and in Acerie excuse me Hexagon, the customer care area up in Petionville and Acerie and I went up to PV every day with a car, picked up an incredible amount of food prepared, so I made sure all the food was right, you know, we always had food etc. And delivered it, 3 meals a day all the way around town and that's pretty much the first 2 weeks after the earthquake, that's everything I did. And everybody enjoyed that and enjoyed eating and the promise of food so I was a hero to a lot of those people. Personally I was more, I

felt like I was out on my own, I was, I wanted to be contributing more in the telecom space instead of food delivery. But I wanted to help the company. In the end people are like Maarten, like big supporters I guess is the right term, you're doing a good job, keep doing it, that's what we need from you right now. And it was only when Colm and those guys came in to try to understand and right the ship commercially that I was feeling like a, I wasn't focusing on my job, I was focusing on food. So I had a hand over session about two weeks after where I handed over to the operations team to manage. And wouldn't you know it, the deliveries slowed, people did eat and things started to happen. It wasn't, not that I had blamed it on not being an expat but there wasn't an expat responsible for that so it kind of took a different direction. So I know there were a lot of complaints after I stopped the food bar. Personally it was my job to start working with the company, the NGO community, the First Responders to get services in place using the technology that we had. So we brought up a couple of services, the 4636 SMS service and we turned that over to the US Government or fractions of. But so people, advertisers as well, people were able to send in a text message with either their names, medicine compact in the rubble and kind of some landmarks of where they were located. And then Haitians or people who speak Creole outside of Haiti, this content was posted on a webpage and lots of volunteers are now being deciphered through it and said OK, these cities on the corner of that street and this street, that's located here on the map. And they would send the coordinates back and they would send all that detail to the first responders in English. And they would go out and we received 80 some thousand requests for support and help. So those kind of things for me were very, was the best part of my job, those were the important things. It's really, all of us are all the same and it's tough to wrap your head around the whole situation and think 110% like you normally would, there's a lot of confusion about what's going on, the number of dead people around. The whole thing adds a cloud over you. So being able to pull a bunch of these services off, and it was one service of several. I think in the end it kind of helped, it helped everybody. My role before the earthquake was more product development. I had a great road map of new things that we were going to do in 2010. And as a result of the earthquake we did almost none of the things that I had planned for 2010. It took us almost half of the year to really get to really get up and running. Another issue back to where we felt like, it was the day before the earthquake and at

that point we were more kind of ready to hold on for the rest of the year and just do things for the people. A lot of the Denis O'Brien projects; you know they're trying to be sensitive.

Well an example might be in May; in our anniversary we will adopt a lot of new services, the free active 3 SMS services. We have, there are a couple of products I guess that we did launch that were slighted to be launched, we just kind of pushed them all back. But we had Telethon for people who felt that they might want to try and raise money for certain awareness programmes. We had to facilitate the Red Cross, well we worked with them to try to distribute their cash for work programmes. We worked with NGOs on developing a message for them to be able to distribute credit out. So in the end it didn't actually come to some fruition. We worked with Goal, we worked with Concern and a couple of people on projects that we felt were going to be good humanitarian projects. There was definitely an emphasis through the summertime, all the way through the summertime on anything that was humanitarian. I worked with a group project to try developing some health products which we are using today. We have, we started working with Columbia University and Caralinski University from Sweden. and on migration tracking of the population based on subscribers. So we gave them a randomised list of subscribers, so we took your phone number, we put a serial number tied to that phone number and then gave all the locations, every single day where your phone was for everybody. And then they were able to data mine and then plot on a map where the population was before the earthquake, where the population was after the earthquake; after the earthquake so you can actually see where the population of movements where. I'll show you an example here. That is the most recent version of that report. So then the analysis, they were able to show where the, this is the population in Port au Prince and this is the big dip, you know the people who left Port au Prince and there were some other charts in earlier versions that actually depicted what cities they all went to. And then when they did an overlay about where the NGO community was putting all their resources it was clear that they got it wrong. That they had put a lot of resources into areas that were only a small number percentagewise that people moved into and that they were huge swamps area that were really weren't getting nearly the number of resources. So big camps and stuff. Later in the year we used the same thing, this was not

in real time, obviously we were delayed from the earthquake. We started working with, I believe it was, I think it was March, I believe it was when we actually delivered our first set of aid accidents. So it couldn't be used in real time but we were the first carrier in the world to do it. It is very sensitive data which is probably why most carriers don't support that kind of thing. Plus, working with the scientific community doesn't happen so often that you get business and scientific community working hand in hand. It does happen but in this case you know it was a very positive result. So after the cholera outbreak in October we immediately went, tied up with these guys again, did the same exercise and literally just days after the cholera outbreak we had a list of all the subscribers that passed through the Saint Marc and gone it that areas. Two weeks prior to the outbreak in, a few days after we sent in messages advising them that they had been passing through a cholera infected zone, take these precautions. We sent them voice messages. We explained the same thing in case they can't read. This report actually on the cholera was tied to the same thing. So where in the country a lot of the people were moving to, out of the cholera region which would imply that those in the next towns that would see the cholera outbreak so that the community can start preparing in advance start shipping off the medicine and supplies to those areas. So this is one of the things, it was a little bit of work on the big scale of things but to me it was a lot. It had a lot of impact. It wasn't a lot of work but it had a lot of impact and it was one of those things I was really proud about last year. I was called out to a number of clients to speak at different conferences and some had sent around the world actually a lot in the United States, talking about text messaging first. There is this group here on the wall, the United States, they have reached a million subscriber this last year and Gail Mansion, the former governor of West Virginia's wife, she's a big sponsor behind it. And the message that I have helped them deliver is that in a disaster situation everybody wants to get on the phone and call your loved ones and find out what is going et. No phone company in the world can take every subscriber at the same time. So it seems like the network doesn't work. It is always busy. It is congested. It's you know whatever happens but text messaging works. I could send you a text message and as soon as my phone finds a resource it will finally get it into the system and then when your phone finds the resource it will finally deliver it to you. It is not real time like a voice call but it's in near real time. It couldn't be even, a couple of minutes are all.

Sharon: It is probably the best form of communication.

Dave: It is the best solution to try to communicate to your loved ones is to text first. We have advised a lot of people in the United States, as a result Denis O'Brien is being, I think he won the award but he is the humanitarian of the year last year and they are supposed to give him some award in February or something from this Safe America Foundation. So there's things like that kind of caught more PR than stuff which isn't normally in my area that, just explaining in the aftermath of the earthquake what are the key lessons that we learned. We learned that sure the voice calls didn't work. They didn't work for weeks. They didn't work because people made credit on their phones that we gave them for free. Too many people trying to make phone calls to too many places congested everywhere. The network actually came back up in a matter of a day and a half and it felt like it was a month before you actually could really make real phone calls. But text messaging and Blackberry messenger were instrumental throughout the whole process which is why there is a large number of Blackberry customers in our network today is that probably NGOs, everybody knows that BBM, to them BBM was the thing that never failed. BBM and SMS are similar in the way it works. Store and forward, wait for the other party is available. And another project is, we had some guys from, graduates from MIT Media Lab. They came down here. They had an idea for a job cataloguing. So that when an NGO goes into a camp they need to know, probably is there any plumbers here, are there babysitters, are there cooks, are there all kinds of the lower end jobs and no one knew. There was no way, you would have to go and systematically interview all these people etc. etc. So the programme that the MIT gentlemen brought was called 'The Con B' and it allows subscribers to dial into an IBR then ask questions about their skills and their backgrounds. People answer, are you a plumber? Are you an electrician? Are you etc.? And then they are able to make this database of people with different job sets, skill sets. And so they are presently in a trial with this. We worked all year together to get them to the point where they are ready to, that they are in service now here in Haiti and hopefully the next world disaster whenever it comes out that these guys will take your platform and deploy it in real time so that the NGO community will be helped by that. We also have a new data centre into this building. We have a full

on professional grade data centre on the ground floor. When you think about business continuity which is your original copy that was one of the services that we knew we needed to definitely develop and rule out so that other businesses had a means of continuing business when the third building crashed to the ground. So this year, 2010 we developed a data centre which is now coming alive and operational and we have banks and different organisations that will be coming through to see how they can host all of their equipment on our facilities. You know, be guaranteed that there is always up time, that there is always the protection of being in a 24 hour monitored space, air conditioner etc. everything that they need. So in case, God forbid something big happens again, whether it's a fire in their place or an earthquake or hurricane or something that if their servers are impacted they will be able to just come over high into their other servers that are replicate here and keep moving, keep going in business. So that's the lot.

Sharon: No that's fine. Maybe the last thing then just in terms of planning, like looking at planning before what happened. You commented earlier that was very well planned. Could you expand on that then a little?

Dave: As far as the staff here in the building?

Sharon: Just generally, yeah whatever effect on the business as regards the organisation in general or any specific area or whatever you think.

Dave: I think that there is no real way that we could have planned for what transpired. Jean Marc clearly, and it was hard to even tell at the time that he was going above and beyond the call of duty because most people thought of it as more of a fire drill. But it is only after you go through everything, (Sharon: The experience) that you realise that shit. The small things that people did as exercises and I know the company we do have in our disaster plan, its well documented, we were well ready to cater for just about anything. Earthquake was not one of the things in our documentation. There's a whole lot of different things you need to consider in an earthquake environment as opposed to in a hurricane or something else that is short lived. You know you need some quick supplies, how to get around that. This is complete devastation. We have, last

year after the earthquake we updated all of our disaster planning and everything tied to earthquake is now included in there in case God forbid again that it happens in the future that we use the experience as a learning experience for the next time, what do we need? We keep now a lot more bottles of water on hand. We keep a number of different things on hand, in close proximity. I think we have a better idea of how to cater for the staff because we have a lot of staff and we really don't want to send them all home to a dangerous environment. And not always do they want to go home to a dangerous environment. So, I think and we met a lot as a management team in the company. We met every day and to be fair even though this would be on the record to me it would be off the record we don't manage the company every day like that. And after the earthquake we, the core group met every day. If we didn't meet in a particular meeting Maarten or somebody

Sharon: It's hard to get everyone there everyday

Dave: In reality yes it's tough.

Sharon: Yeah, every day. Most people would meet once a week.

Dave: Yeah. I can't say enough about the number of people who responded. We have never would have pulled this off had it not been for the work the group did. The work that all of our vendors did. The teams that they sent into help us overcome the disaster. I'd say that that was probably one of the biggest things that I have pulled out of that is the, when you think that it is all you. It's only me here now; the reality is that all these, there was a bigger team on the outside just trying to get here to relieve us so that we could take a break, deal with what happened and as a family, a group family if you will, you know there were a lot of resources for people who were just dying to get in here and a lot of people were just trying to get out. They were just trying to get in here to help and participate. You can't blame them for that. It is easy for me to say "Yeah I'll jump on a grenade for you" but you know if there was a grenade right now would I jump on it that is the real question and a lot of people seemed to jump on it when they needed to and that support you can't plan for that. Business continuity, I guess in the big sense of business continuity it was that support arm, all those vendors and staff and group getting here that allowed us to continue our business. We couldn't have done it just like that.

Sharon: So was it that that made the difference?

Dave: People made all the difference. Ghada, having departed and getting on the outside now, the amount of volume of work that she, because of her political contacts and networking contacts, the amount of work that she was able to get done and cleared stuff out of the airport and stuff for us. You know, how do you put a value on that? All the guys, the groups who volunteered to come down on the technical team to right the ship, those guys were courageous. I'd like to believe that in the same shoes I would have trooped off to the disaster too. But I don't know. So I would say that those guys in the group really had business continuity on their mind maybe more so at least in the beginning than the people on the ground who had just survived. So people made a huge difference. Without our network, if we had of been off air for even another handful of days the image of the company would have been tarnished maybe forever. And so you know to me that's Jean Marc and the technical team that I really hang my hat on to.

Sharon: Thank you.

Dave: You're welcome.

9. Interview: Deanna Durban, Partner Cabinet Pasquet Law Firm

Deanna Durban (F) (Haitian) is a partner in Cabinet Pasquet, a law firm based in Port au Prince. The firm deals with mainly business clients. Deanna took my voice recorder and recorded the interview herself after preparing based on our conversation regarding the topic.

Deanna: My name is Deanna Durban and today's date is December 16th and the time is 12.10. I am talking today person with, to Sharon Doyle's request that I elaborate a bit on the impact on my business of the January 12th earthquake. For the background, I am partner at a law firm in Haiti that generally focuses on international business transactions and a local corporate law. So I am going to be speaking today from two points of view. I'll be speaking about the effect of the earthquake on the business world as I see it through the eyes of the law firm

and then I will go on to speak about the impact of the earthquake as far as the effects on legal world in Haiti.

To begin with, the majority of our clients here are business clients. We've handled very few criminal cases and most of our work with business clients has been with their negotiations and business dealings.

Let me begin a little bit actually before the earthquake. Back in the fall of 2009 Bill Clinton headed an international trade introduction if you will to Haiti in which there were at least 400 foreign participants. There was an international conference held in this business centre of Haiti and it was intended to be an introduction to potential investors. At the time Haiti was beginning to look fairly stable and the Hope Act was just being or had just been passed in the United States and especially manufacturers were interested or showing interest in perhaps beginning operations here and obviously wherever Bill Clinton goes he is the UN special envoy to Haiti. So wherever he goes he draws large crowds. It was a conference organised with the IBB as well. In any event, subsequent to the conference we had a, we saw in the business world a lot of movement, a lot of enquiries from foreigners into the actual business environment in Haiti. At that point we did not actually sign up any new clients. However, there were many potentials on the horizon. And the general atmosphere in Haiti was pretty optimistic going towards December at which point during the Christmas break the holiday season meant a big influx of college students returning to Haiti. And there was a general consensus I would say as to finally the country from what looking forward and moving forward many international artists came to Haiti during that time and many foreigners came to Haiti for vacation actually. So that was a positive. It seemed to be a window of opportunity in Haiti at that time. And then, January 12th hit. It was the earthquake and I would say two to three months after the earthquake, I believe that we had in the business world more of a feeling of panic. First of all there were many business losses, both structural and also in stock and warehousing. So there was a lot of destruction on that part and for the most part business owners in Haiti were not insured for earthquake damage. So this provided a large set back to the local business environment. Also, immediately following the earthquake there were a lot of speculators who came to Haiti and I mean speculators I mean more construction market

speculators. So a lot of construction companies came to Haiti and immediately asked to set up companies and they anticipated; there was an anticipation of the flood of aid money that would be coming to Haiti. I believe right now about 9 billion dollars in aid has been promised but only, has been pledged but only 2.6 or so billion dollars or so has been granted. In any event, the construction companies flooded to Haiti and the local companies were reorganising. This had a fairly big impact also on the real estate industry in Haiti where prices more than doubled. There was a big influx of NGO's and international aid groups and this also led to the acceleration in real estate prices both for land acquisitions also and for rental prices both in the commercial sphere and the residential. I would compare the prices now are equivalent to prices in Manhattan which is unheard of in a developing country such as Haiti, a volatile and developing country such as Haiti. But it is a matter of supply and demand and much of the supply was destroyed and the demand I would say multiplied by ten. Now, once the NGO's settled in, now we are looking at 2 or 3 months later, post-earthquake. Once the NGO's actually settled in Haiti we saw all of a sudden, where business saw all of a sudden an increase in purchasing power. So although immediately after the earthquake it was a disaster. Obviously there was panic and a fear of investment in terms of buying new materials etc. essentially with the thought that the purchasing power in Haiti had been virtually destroyed. So now 2 to 3 months later the engineers have settled and there is a lot of US dollars being spent on the market. At this point, local businesses realise that this could be a money maker and started once again investing in increasing their stock and participating in many of the NGO bids that were being sent out. And for the most part I think local businesses although maybe they not have made up their losses I would say that their sales have increased more than what they would. I think their sales numbers, their quarterly sales numbers have probably increased more than what they have been used to in the past simply because of the NGO, purchasing power and the foreign purchasing power that all of a sudden this earthquake brought to Haiti.

Now, so this is the stage, now, and also as for the speculators now the aid money has been very slow in being released so now the aid money is thought to be geared more towards constructing, reconstructing Haiti. And many of the speculators have in fact left or abandoned shop if you will. Or in looking at, we

are now in December now so it has almost been a year after the earthquake and the speculators have lost their patience's if you will. There is only so long that they can speculate for or wait for businesses to land or contracts to land on their tables. So I haven't seen them around as often as we did earlier this year. As for the earthquake's impact on the legal environment in Haiti, first of all let me speak about its impact on our law firm and then I can speak about the impact in the legal world generally.

First of all, the immediate impact was an immediate drop in business. We had almost no business for the first 2 months aside from local businesses asking us to review their insurance policies and help them with their insurance matters. It was generally a state of; because there was a state of panic in the business world we saw that effect in our legal environment in that we were not being given any, there were no business negotiations or business dealings, any new business dealings that were really happening for our clients. Another impact was that we had difficulty collecting outstanding bills for the work leading up to December the latter quarter of 2009 collections would have normally started in January and once January came along many of those individuals had a negative impact as far as their savings were concerned. So, we had a negative impact, a direct negative impact on our collections. Now as for the legal world itself at that point the Supreme Court was destroyed. The First Instance Court was destroyed. Many of the smaller civil courts and criminal courts were destroyed during the earthquake. So the legal world had really come to a standstill. A few months after the earthquake now, well the Courts only officially opened up again in October of this year so 2, 3 months ago. And as for functioning well it's very slow as you can imagine there is a lot of backup of cases. Many incidents happened during this 10 months that the courts were closed. So there is a lot of catching up to do in that respect. And also, the systems simply haven't got back onto its feet again. So we're still, the legal, any trials are fairly slow in coming around. There is a lot of litigation; a lot of motions and a lot of orders etc. being thrown around but as for actual hearings, court hearings and trials going on they're pretty slow. And as far as the law firm now, how business is going, I would say that things have fairly, have stabilised fairly well. We do see new business dealings going through the law firm. We do see new, there is a lot of I should say in the manufacturing world. We have seen a couple of clients thinking

well the best way to help Haiti out at this point is to give jobs. So we have seen a couple of clients come through here with business plans and actually setting up industry in Haiti, local industry. I think that local based businesses, entrepreneurs have also realised the necessity for local investment and the opportunity. There is an opportunity in Haiti for local investment. Most of our market is imported. Most of our goods and products in Haiti are imported so I think business men are starting to look into actually setting up factories and manufacturing firms for local products and also for export. So this is what we see in the business world where I would think things have gotten fairly back to normal and there is also a hope that the NGO's stay longer obviously because of this purchasing power that they have brought to Haiti all of a sudden. The earthquake had that positive/negative, negative/positive effect if you will in that sense. Although the NGO state is what we call it and also it can be said that Haiti is turning into a welfare state if you will where hand me outs are the only way for the bottom half of the, the bottom three quarters if you will of the population to live. It is providing an opportunity for the business world in that the US dollars are being pumped into the country at an exponential rate. Anyhow, in any event it is much stronger than it has been in the past I would say. And that's all I have to say so I hope this is helpful Sharon and good luck.

10. Interview: Eddy Bijoux, Manager Socojeb SA

Louis-Eddy Jr Bijoux (M) (Haitian) is Import and Stock Manager at Socojeb SA since July 2009. Socojeb SA is a pharmaceutical company operating in Haiti. Eddy was previously a graphic designer for Digicel for three years. He was educated at Full Sail University and Loyola University of Chicago. The interview took place at the Kairbe Hotel in Petionville, Port au Prince.

Eddie: Close enough? So shoot the questions.

Sharon: Just tell me everything, your name and the company and then talk a bit more about the company.

Eddie: My name is Eddy Bijoux. I am working at the Socojeb SA which is a pharmaceutical family owned company. We have been in business in Haiti for the past 65 years or so. It started with my grandfather and on the third generation about to takeover. I'm in charge of the import and the stock. And it is a very big business; it's very difficult at the same time having to deal with daily importing, businesses etc., clearing the papers for customs, a lot of those things. But there is a business that you have to sweat a lot. Not really the heat but Haiti makes it harder. In relation to the earthquake, where I was for the earthquake, I had just left the business downtown. We closed shop at 3.25. I got home about to get ready to go to law school. Getting ready, I had been eating, putting shoes on, shirt on and small rumblings and from there all the shaking. The first thing that came to mind was my dad. He was at the bank. I was at home and called him and nothing, couldn't get through. Call him 7 times. No, called him once but it rang 7 times. Finally he picked up so I think the 7 time it took to ring it took 7 years out of my life when I did not know where he was. So finally he picked up and within 2 minutes he was home hugging each other. Having seen that we could have lost each other so a lot of tears. Called the family, spoke to, I spoke to my Mom.

Sharon: Did you get through on the network?

Eddy: Yes. He was talking to my sister while me I was talking to my Mom. And ah, we switched the phones; I was switching phones to give it to each other. Two minutes into the conversation everything cut off. So the family knew that both of us were fine. But not knowing how the relatives were or the business downtown how it was. We took all the precautionary measures, took out everything of value, paper, birth certificates, everything of value out of the house, put them in my car, we slept in the cars for close to 15 days. So after the earthquake we went downtown. We parked by the police station downtown and near Preval's house and we walked from that police station all the way down to the seaboard. Lots of dead people. A lot of them Lots of people crying on the streets. Yeah, it was tough. We had to walk, walking over dead people, over debris, not seeing any more landmarks that you grew up watching. You could

pinpoint this is where I'm at, this is where this is and see the national college all destroyed.

And we were walking there and as we passed the DGI we were close to, we were getting close to the business. I was not; the first thing that came to mind is how is it because we saw two buildings blocking the streets. So we had to walk over the debris on top of what we were assuming of the building before we were walk on top of it to get behind it. And you see dead arms, you see limbs sticking out and you want to avoid them but there is no way to avoid them. You have to actually brush them aside to walk though. Thankfully our building stayed up but it was cracked all over the place and people started moving. So we lost about 1/3 of our stock. But better that then anything that could have happened then losing the whole thing. So they could lose, listen just leave enough for us to survive.

The same day we took a truck, 2 trucks to get the things out to move back home. We stood shop at home and got a private residence and sat down with the dad and a couple of friends of the family and started doing our strategy which totally switched from what we had before.

Sharon: Were you back where you started?

Eddy: Yes. We had to not only adapt but somewhat scratch a lot of what products we had before. But then it is not only starting from zero, it's not coming from zero, starting to fill your needs. But you have the ability to start walking right away. So it is a rehabilitation time. So from other products we had before having a different....

Sharon: For example?

Eddy: For example we were starting to thinking about having a medical device section in which I would be in charge of, OK?

Sharon: That's your plan?

Eddy: That was our plan and we had to scrap that. That was a bit hard. But that's life! And now it's survival mode. First thing we did is to count how many doctors and pharmacies, because we're an agency we imported some of the pharmacies to see how many doctors and pharmacies did not collapse or did not die in the earthquake. Our reference point, we realised a good 25% of the pharmacies and doctors died. So what would have been businesswise our strategy was not for them to come to us the agency but for us to take whatever medicine we had sell it to them, take it to them, take the business to them and not for them to come to us. So I think that that was a pretty good strategy that we are still using right now. We opened, in the meantime we opened 2 product sales downtown, which the money even and I think that this is, we were going to start hunting new stuff.

Sharon: So that was the earthquake?

Eddy: Yeah.

Sharon: How do you think the earthquake changed your business?

Eddy: It's kind of ironic. It changed it for the better I think. Business has stabilised with the pharmacies coming to us. But business picked up from what I've seen and I really saw that as an advantage. Business picked up and the

pharmacies appreciate that you give them more value by you delivering to them instead of the pharmacy is in Petionville or is in Carrefour or is in Tabarre National number one. They would have to send their messenger 20 kilometres away, 10 kilometres away taking a taxi with a bunch of boxes. They don't have their own cars, sending them for them to walk even back or take a cab back to the pharmacy. And when you take the merchandise to them they have a tendency of ordering more. That is what we realised. So it is kind of ironic that that it's an earthquake that showed us that this is what we are supposed to do from the beginning. Another way it changed our lives, my life because I was more behind the desk, or in the stockroom looking at my stock or out at customs clearing my stuff up. I didn't have interaction with the pharmacies. Now that I go and deliver I know the owner of that pharmacy. I know what kind of merchandise that pharmacy ordered and the rate of the ordering then you have a better appreciation not only for the business but for the people involved in that sector.

Sharon: Looking back and your organisations response to the earthquake, how do you do the planning, what kind of planning did you have for that kind of event in your company? Like for any kind of crisis any kind of planning either for a hurricane, be it an earthquake, be it a flood, be it whatever. What kind of planning did you have?

Eddy: Planning for that, we wouldn't have planning per say crisis-wise. The only crisis that we would have in Haiti is not for earthquake but for hurricane.

Sharon: What kind of crisis?

Eddy: Planning for managing the people we knew that the earthquake was coming in so we send them home 2 days before. Some of them have family living in apartments. So we went to the apartments and boarded up OK. and we take care of the people in the neighbourhood and the business so that they can

have an eye on the business or the people or whatever. So that was how we dealt with the forecasting of crisis. Flooding I would say that the way the building is, we have a good 3 foot. So whenever it rains or whenever flooding we will not be affected. And personally I don't think anyone would have predicted an earthquake in Haiti. So we realised that after that earthquake that the building was not up to it at all, OK. So.....

What happened about that was that the Government offered to level the building. OK, OK to level it. But we thought that if we did that as of any, as of early, as of mid, the middle of last year they had a plan that they were rebuilding the whole of downtown.

Sharon: Like they took the land for other use?

Eddy: Yes because they have a massive plan for the whole downtown. They were going to rebuild the whole lot downtown. So basically they've taken from this point to this point, it is for us now. So we'll give you some money for the land.

Sharon: What's your opinion on planning, about planning for these kinds of events from your own experience?

Eddy: I think that planning is key. In Haiti no matter how good of a plan you have, no matter how good it is, the people that you worked with, the people that you deal with it's a, you have to give a different personality that's the only thing different and education as well. And what I might feel as an incoming earthquake because of the appealing after watching so many earthquake disasters the earthquake forecast right now so basically early move out. My parents would move out right away but other people they would be, I don't know if they would be mystified but they don't heed the warning. I think there was a

problem of no matter how well you could teach someone but education is the key as well. That's it.

Sharon: OK.

11. Interview: Josefa Gauthier, Chairman Digicel Foundation

Josefa Gauthier (F) (Haitian) is the Executive Chairman of Digicel Haiti Foundation since December 2005. Digicel Haiti Foundation is a non-profit organisation that will distribute and utilise funds on a charitable basis for the sole purpose of building communities and the community spirit in Haiti. Its primary interest is in education and working with schools. The interview took place at her office at the Digicel building, Turgeau, Port au Prince.

Josefa: At the beginning of last year I was in Port au Prince you know all Haitians we thought that that would be a fantastic year because you know we were on the way to progress, to make some progress with the Government things like that and the earthquake happened. So it was a terrible thing because you know it was an irregular day and I was at the office and it was like 4.30 in the afternoon and I was like going to my house because I always leave the office about 5/5.50. And when we felt a shake I thought it was maybe the elevator because I saw all the things in my office falling down and on my desk and I said what happened, maybe there is something with the elevator because my office is next to the elevator. And I opened the door to call my assistant and to tell her look at what happened and when we had the second shake. So it was terrible because you know the building moved up, down and you know we felt everything was falling down. And it took like 2 seconds to realise it was an earthquake because at first I said is that an attack. But I said who can attack us because we have not any interest with anybody. And I said earthquake. And when I said, I shouted to my assistant and we saw everything was falling down like this. So everybody you know, I try to imagine in my mind what we used to do in earthquake time. And you know I want to, I look up to the desk and I said no that table is too small. But that is one good place to be under the table. And we just managed to go under the door because they always tell you that you

have to go under the table or under the door and when we were there we fall down. And everyone was screaming and they were saying oh this is the end of the world, what are we doing, we are all going to die here. And you know, so I said OK so let's wait and see. So when I fall down you know my glasses just broke and I said my God I can see nothing. So I managed to find the glasses and I found only with one glass. And I said, and I put the glass only with one of the and eh. So I said lets go and we would always exercise either something happening the building if you know there is a fire or something like that and we knew what to do you know not to go in the elevator. And when we tried to open the door the door was locked. So everybody was you know screaming oh we are prisoners here, we cannot go out. And I said OK lets be calm and I opened the door carefully, very easy because everybody was saying oh Jesus, Jesus please help us, please help us, we are dying, we want to see our mother, we want to see our children and the door opened. So we rushed to the elevator and we were like running, running and everybody got their shoes in their hands you know to go faster. And when we arrived down there we saw already a lot of people down there. And they said lets go to an open place because if it is an earthquake you have to find a place to manage to go to an open place because we were afraid the building could fall down. And you know with experience that. And you know going down the street everybody and we were a big, big like noise, it was from the gas station. And fire and a lot of mud and smoke, smoke, smoke and I say oh my God I have to go to my house to see what happened to my family. Because you know my family they are old and I wanted to know and you know no communication. And I had my son who came to pick me up. And it was like, my son came in I said no and I said where is my son because my son was in the parking. First I received a message from him telling me oh Mum lets go, let's go. I say oh my God and I say OK I have to go and look after my son and I heard people screaming, screaming that somebody died in the yard. And when I met my son it was like the wonderful things that I had ever had because you know he opened his arms and he said oh mum I love you so much. Usually he never says that. But we say OK we are going to our home. And we tried to go by foot because it was impossible to drive a car into those parts. So we head to the mountains because I live in the mountains and you know on all the road I saw the house destroyed and I say oh it's worse than I thought then at the beginning. And I heard people screaming for help. And you know all people in

the streets they were yelling telling oh God help us. And you had people going up and down telling this is the end of the world, you have to pray, you have to pray, you have to call God and you have to repent of your sins. So it was a terrible, terrible situation.

Sharon: So say after that then in the foundation what happened?

Josefa: After that it was the second day it was a terrible day because until, we continued to have the aftershocks. And people, no Government, nobody knew what to do. And they said that the palace collapsed and you know no civil servants in the street to tell the people what to do and no hospital. So everybody, the dead people, the injured people and no place to go. So at the foundation we said that we have to help and it was difficult to find a way to help because we are not in medicine and we heard that 83% of all the schools had been destroyed. And lots of children, lots of young students died in the schools because they were in schools like at this time. And we say that the best thing for us to do is to rebuild the schools. And you know when the chairman of the foundation came and say OK are you going to give us more money to rebuild the schools. So we identified the site and decided to rebuild the school no matter what if the school was private or public or community. So we built all the schools back. And a lot of NGOs came and making with like camps because everybody wanted, everybody was, there was no place to go, no place to be and even in my neighbourhood I having a lot of people coming to my house. Thank God my house was safe. So we had to give them food because a lot of people were without food. But the thing was because the poor people they were very happy because they could have access to food like rice, oil and things like that. But the low medium class they were very shy and they were very like you know they couldn't go in line to wait for the food. And they preferred to stay in their destroyed house and to wait for people to give them inside for, because they are very proud. And they said that some of them, I received a lot of phone calls from people in New York and in United States telling to help the family because of how many was starving inside their house because they couldn't go in line and they had nothing to eat and no water. So it was a very difficult time. But the

foundation, with the member of the foundation we had a lot of volunteers and we prepared a lot of little buckets with rice, peas, oil.

Sharon: How would you think it changed the focus of what the foundation had being doing etc.?

Josefa: I think the focus of the foundation still in the education. We tried to help because we distribute a lot of tents because the people needed a lot of tents. And there was a lot of NGOs we tried to partner with them. But some of them they don't really care about what happening. They want to only really know, in Haiti because this is the place to be, OK. They don't identify with the need of the population. But this is why we prefer to stay in education because we think that education is really key. And that with education, if the people were educated I feel that we would have lot not this whole kind of people dying. Because some people they were in the street when they felt that they entered the houses. So the houses fall down and the engineers also they didn't know how to build secure because they should have in mind that Haiti is an island with specific problems and they should have always tell all the population, all the students, all the new generation that you always have to be careful about the way that you are building because some day there will be a problem. Because the last earthquake that we had it was 100 years before so everybody forgot totally that we were at risk. And until now you can see that they began to rebuild without the new rules. And it's a catastrophe because we don't know if we have another earthquake like the one that we had. Because earthquakes happen everywhere in the world and you never heard that 300,000 people died. You can hear that 500 people died or but now 300,000 it is more than a war.

Sharon: Looking back you know for the type of planning that was in place like for, if crisis happen, other crisis that would other than an earthquake in Haiti, there's hurricane, there's floods, there's all kinds of things. What type of planning is there for, was there in place for the foundation?

Josefa: I think that you know in the foundation we are trying always to have plans, to have food. But we have not really a plan if something happens. If something happens then we have a, we should deliver, we could deliver things but we cannot do everything in the foundation. For that reason we prefer to in what we do in education. Because if you go to everywhere you cannot be focused, we can always have tents, we can deliver tents. And if we can always try to put them on the digital and tell them to send some messages to prevent further communiqué. And also to tell the people where they have to go but we have not really a plan to be very active when those kind of events happen.

Sharon: Forward thinking.

Josefa: It's education. With education because the children they will understand what it is, what is the risk and what they have to do. We built a lot of schools, we build 25 schools and our schools are very strong. So we always ask that the school be the point of departure for the community. So we always ask the children to go in the school if something happens. They can be in the school with the parents and they will be safe.

Sharon: And how many of your schools collapsed?

Josefa: No schools.

Sharon: None?

Josefa: None.

Sharon: Wow.

Josefa: All our schools are great, they are in good shape, everything is OK.

Sharon: That's fantastic.

Josefa: That's fantastic. And now we are building new schools with the new requirements.

Sharon: OK.

Josefa: The plan has been designed by an Irish guy and he shows us in the computer what could happen like in this building. The building will shake like this move from one side to another side but will not collapse like all the buildings did for the earthquake, most of the buildings did. But all our schools are intact.

Sharon: That's great.

Josefa: Oh....

Sharon: Ye did great work.

Josefa: Yes we are very happy.

Sharon: Education is important to people.

Josefa: Yes education is the key.

It changes everything. And education, like I said you can destroy a person but you cannot destroy what the person has in his mind. And I said that all the children who go to school doors will open for them. OK.



12. Interview: Maarten Boute – CEO of Digicel Haiti

Maarten Boute (M) (Belgian) is CEO Digicel Haiti at Digicel since December 2009. Maarten has significant experience in the telecommunication industry with Effortel, Mobistar and Debitel Belgium and Digicel. The interview took place at his office at the Digicel building, Turgeau, Port au Prince.

Maarten: So when I accepted to come to Haiti in 2009 I basically came here with a, knowing that it was a country to expect the unexpected. Other things happen every day. We're living in a very unpredictable environment from a business perspective, from a safety and a security perspective, from a political perspective. And in terms of you know working and living in a country like this is exactly what I expected. One January 12th at about 4.50 we were, I was in a meeting with the commercial team actually and just going through the commercial planning for the next quarter and this earthquake happened. It was by far the most unexpected event I have experienced in my life and I hope to experience in my life forever because first of all none of us really realised what was happening. We didn't realise that it was an earthquake so everything was going through my mind as the building was collapsing or a plane hit us or that sort of thing and.....

Sharon: Explosion?

Maarten: Explosion, yes exactly. Explosion from the petrol station, anything except for an earthquake and it took about 20 seconds when there was a slight break in the 35 seconds to get up, for me to look outside and see the bus driving around Port au Prince because that was on the 9th floor there. And then coming to reason and realising that it was an earthquake that had happened. There was a bit more of a shock and obviously there was massive panic around the building. And the funny thing at that moment that some sort of survivor mechanism steps in and I was actually extremely calm, I personally stayed quite calm. I remember everybody running out of the building and I was just packing my bag and putting my computer in and thinking what would I need if I, when we were to come back into the building you know. All the phones I had from different networks, phones, cash, whatever I could find that would be useful, a knife, you know stuff like that. And then one of the security guards, the body guards, Christian had been sent up to look for me. He arrived at the door and we basically walked out. And then set-up camps just outside to office in the local area going down to the parking and then at night first thing was let's try and get as many people together as I can to try and get out of this mess because the network wasn't working, everybody was running off home or running off to whatever and I needed at least a core team of people there from the dissemblance, from the security team to help out, so let's stick together and go forth. So, you will be prepared as, personally I was prepared for the unexpected. The company was prepared for the unexpected that I think we had here what we call a black swan. We had something that was that unexpected that it went back to basic survival and seeing what happens. So from a, with that the action in mind with what we were doing, the first thing was let's get this network working back. We got a small team together and then worked all night with very little tools and very little, you know with not the right expertise on island because our CTO Bernard was off island. His first line Jacques was off island as well which was an exception actually. And then you know the crisis then that we had foreseen, the next in line who was there and with this stuff and other stuff that they managed together. We got the network back up and by about 3-4 in the morning, by that time obviously on a group level everybody was aware and they were trying to get people in here and we were able to do a more structured

approach to what we were supposed to fixing. I'm not going to go into all the details of what we did in those months. I think...

Sharon: An overview.

Maarten: What?

Sharon: Just an overview.

Maarten: It's more, I mean in terms of the approach we had, we had an emergency intervention. We love playing Simon with imperials. A lot of very urgent things we identified that we needed to fix and on the line that we had a big lesson or exercise where we looked at what are our weaknesses for this type of event going forward and what do we need to do to fix that going forward and that was an effort that has taken a year to do the business. It's, I mean in terms of implementing the corrective action. I mean identifying the issues was in early February that we had identified the full issue and then what we needed to do to avoid going forward and to reduce the risk of going forward and the impacts going forward. There was an effort of rebuilding a switch in the area. That would be much more effort resistant, fixing errors on site such as no longer doing roof top sites unless we were really sure that the building would hold because the antenna would hold by itself, the antenna wouldn't have that much weight to it and reviewing the whole way we do the networks design as well because we had weaknesses in the transmission whereby if one of the sites went down we would lose another site to patch up that site so we reviewed it. So we reviewed, we made reigns basically so that if one of the sites would go down we would keep the other nine, there were ten. We fixed up the 2 switch sites to make sure they were resistant and then we also worked on the more, on the imperial side, every single house was checked out to be sure. So it's more, even though we had a full practice plan and we had, you know we were prepared for the unexpected it wasn't really designed for that. We had designed in around.....

Sharon: I have spoken to some other people in the organisation that have said that you have a very firm plan but yet it wasn't for something that specific.

Maarten: And as specific and as massive as that. So yes the plan is there for hurricanes, it's there for riot, it's there for, you know we have all those procedures in place and the events after the earthquake has shown that it does works. When we had the riots in December, the political riots we were very well prepared. The swot team was here, the whole security team, there wasn't any; there wasn't even any need for coordination meetings cos it was a relatively well-oiled machine. Everybody just jumped into their role and does it. So when the hurricane came we knew exactly what to do. People would go there, left and right. So that's it. The big, big lesson learned for us is that even when you expect the unexpected there is always a bit more. So, and all you can do is adjust whatever you can to reduce your risk for going forward. On that, take that event into account for future planning which is now done. And I can't accept, expect maybe a volcano or a massive tsunami hitting us, I don't....

Yes, we would be much more prepared for that which I don't see happening here. I don't really see any other events but generally in any business, in any walk of life it is a matter of expecting the unexpected and being prepared to face that

So I mean our crisis planning is very well designed. Everybody knows their role in it. Just a second please.

Sharon: Yeah so, OK.

Maarten: Again all the disaster recovery plans which I think exist around the world are made for a certain event. And if I in parallel with a.....

Maarten: Start again! So any disaster recovery plan in a company or in businesses in place around the world precedes for things they expect. So they

look at what are the potential risks that we have and how are we going to address those potential risks. The issue I think some of them have is that there are unexpected events. If I look at 9/11 in New York, I think whatever they could have done in New York's City Council the people owning that building will ever, this is something they haven't put on their list.

Exactly and if you look at that, if you look at the consequences and the ability of the nation, the whole nation to get up and react to that. It took them weeks and it took them months and years and they were very, there were kneejerk reactions in terms of blocking off orders and thing like that. So now based on those lessons the US knows what they would expect if this happens again they would be much more prepared for it because I'm sure there's been loads of consultants around, loads work being done, loads of thought going into it, what will we do next time it will happen. And the next time it happens it will happen. But there are other expected incidents which we don't know of which will happen, you know.

Sharon: Yeah.

Maarten: And so I think what steps then in that case is just a lot of common sense. Whatever leader, whatever person, whatever staff you have around, you know to, it's more how do I reduce the consequences and how can I avoid it because we just cannot avoid everything. The world is full of surprises and there are going to be more surprises coming up so it's really a matter of then having, making sure the people you have in place or in the country for the company have the common sense and the power and the courage to go through that event and to see how we can get out of it and go forward.

Sharon: OK, that's great.



13. Mario Andersol - Director General of the PNH

Mario Andersol (M) (Haitian) is General Director of the National Police of Haiti (PNH). The PNH are officially autonomous civilian force whose activities are overseen by the Minister of Justice and the Secretary of State for Public Security within the Ministry of Justice. Specialised units are dedicated to crime response (SWAT) and presidential security etc. The interview took place in his office in Port au Prince.

Mario: OK so I will start from the beginning because I was in 2005 and obviously I am the General Director of the National Police and when I took office back in 2009, you see what I mean, they had many challenges like security, walking for a tour process and it was quite difficult. Since, you know in 2004 we had the President who left this country and the island it was like, the situation was very chaotic. And when I took office in 2005 the police was a little bit like you know shaky, like even for the uniform. So we had to face kidnapping, robberies, murders, all around politics, especially politics. And we had a plan, a plan to fight against those violent crimes, kidnapping.

And we realised, I realised that there was a problem between the population and the police, lack of confidence in the police force at the time. So we work to be closer to the population. And because we realised that we need permission from them to go after the bad guys. Since the police was never present the bad guys you know took off and the population like was in hostage by those villains. So we worked with the population to get some information. Getting closer to the population and it worked at the time seeing this lack of confidence from the population there was a gap between us from them. I mean the police and the rest of the population. And we stopped seeking cooperation from the population.

And back in 2006 we stopped launching operation in the slopes. And we stopped arresting also the bad guys and at the same time the kidnapping level decreased. And in 2007 til last year, 2010 we fought against bad guys and the kidnapping. In 2010 with the earthquake situation was different and all the bad guys we were hurting them for years, five years they were out again. And we have to go up to them which challenges. Now in 2010.....

Sharon: Were many of them captured?

Mario: Yes.

Sharon: Like most of them?

Mario: Yes. All the big kidnapers today are in here, we get them again, yes. But in 2010 it was a bit challenging; we had a lot of challenges. We had a population living on the streets, in medi and we were not prepared to deal with this kind of situation, the police you know since we did not have enough equipment, enough materials, enough personnel also to fight. It was just us exactly. And we had to go up to the bad guys at the same time. 6 years of the population living in the street. It was quite difficult and since we had a priest dead and 250 badly injured. And we were to personnel the, that was how we had some problems with the personnel. And it was very difficult to go up to the bad guys again because they start to badly injuring people, murdering people, and robbery. And today what I can say is from 2010 to 2011 we did a pretty good job because all the bad guys that lived in that place are in jail now. From the 4,296 people escaped. We have now back in here more than 1,000. It's great so we are glad the fact that we are getting them. But the situation again in summer because it was a very difficult situation for us because the fight against criminality, to fight against you know, the situation took people. So now we are waiting for the new Government to seek what help we could have from the International Community, the Government so that we can increase the

personnel. But you know the International Community had, it has been France, Spain, Germany, they helped us a lot last year and they will keep helping us because we need uniforms, police academy. But today the challenge is for the prevention, prevention, maximise the police presence on the streets in order to prevent crime, kidnappings around Port au Prince, all over the place. But we still have some problems where there was a strong hold for them bad guys who escaped, the rest of the bad guys who escaped from here last year. Not yet.

Yes they are still there because it is very difficult because we are police and our special unit were not trained for this kind of situation so we have to, every time we have to ask help from the military, especially to walk in the mountains in order to get them back in jail. But in some places, we still have gangsters trying to take control but the police every time operate and arrest some of them from time-to-time.

Sharon: Where were you on the day of the earthquake?

Mario: I was in my office.

Sharon: You were in your office.

Mario: Yes but you know I was in the building when the building collapsed. I'm still alive, I survived.

I was, it was very tough as you know the situation. The police authority at the police station, remember collapsed with all the officers dead over there. And now the police also like the other people in Haiti they were who were victims see what I mean? They were to go after the relatives; the police see what I mean? So we had to take them back to work and I realised that there was a problem of food, how to get food for all them and that's where we get them. I ask help from

the United States, the American Embassy and they provide the day after the earthquake. And we managed the population that we were all going to feed, like call them and get some food.

So I put them together and sent them back to the street. And we ran in the street, we ran after the earthquake. The police were in the street at that time. It was really just very difficult for us. But we kept fighting and day by day we had people coming back to work and they didn't even realise that anything was bad, the people and so that we didn't have many like operations to do because people were busy to just find the items all day but they wish after we should, we did face some challenges. The stores to collapse and people trying to get some.

Sharon: What about the things directly in the aftermath, when buildings collapsed, banks, whatever where people had some opportunity, what about those types of circumstances?

Mario: We react, we react, we would have some kind of facts because quite difficult because I realise that to go to see how many people we have. You know it takes 2 or 3 weeks to have all the people working in the and by night it was it was, it was a challenge to go after a bad guys because was quite difficult. Some of them create the situation that create fire on our own business just for insurance. Yes for insurance because it was very difficult.

Sharon: Looking back we talked about the crisis, we talked about afterwards, what happened afterwards over the past year and looking back before the earthquake, looking back to say what was planned I mean did you have some kind of plan possibly for other events like this?, like there has obviously been hurricanes in Haiti and different types of disasters. So how do you think the planning for those types situations worked?

Mario: I think yes, very weak, I mean the country Haiti has a problem situation or other disasters. Because I think it took the earthquake to realise that our weakness in the situation we realised for the citizens. And also we did not have the means and the resources to face and all the other stuff. We need to organise our self and we need to respond to that kind of situation for all the country if they have hurricanes, floods or an earthquake. I think we have offices, training people, give them some education, concentration. It is not up to the police only it is up also to the Government and the State to have this plan or this. I can have one police or the police can be included in the plan for the strategy for these kind of situations. But it is not only up to us so we need that because we still have the...

Yes, But we do have we do have all the necessary means.

Sharon: So ye need to coordinate that.

Mario: Other

Sharon: So ye need to coordinate that.

Mario: Exactly. The intervention every time the police to walk and also to intervene to help the situation. They rely on us. I think that should National restriction to have.

Sharon: maybe the Government agency for disaster, maybe an actual agency where you could have some kind of a committee.

Mario: Yeah

Mario: Every entity should know his job and know what to do in this kind of situation. But now we opened it now last year for and this year we but we are not difficult each department and we are very proactive in each department.

Sharon: Just for this type of thing. Do you think or more funding and the possibility of setting up

Mario: Authority I think they should have an authority, authority because last year that situation and now. And I think it should be a priority for like now even because to a place that is considered like. The capital every time you have you have situation it happens in the department like the earthquake. So help International, do you know what I mean?

Sharon: Yeah.

Mario: So we did to have restrictions, operational restrictions at least to make things because here the current activity OK?

14. Interview : Regine Vital, Customer Care Director Digicel Haiti



Regine Vital (F) (Haitian) is Customer Care Director at Digicel Haiti. Digicel are the largest telecommunications operator in Haiti that launched in May 2006. The interview took place in her office at the Digicel building, Turgeau, Port au Prince.

Sharon: So you are to tell me a bit about your organisation and what you do.

Regine Vital: This is a telecommunication company and I am the customer care director for a company, the name of the company is Digicel.

Sharon: OK and where were you on the day of the earthquake?

Regine Vital: On the day of the earthquake I was sitting right here in my office. I was working on the budgets.

Sharon: OK.

Regine Vital: And ah, do you want me to continue on?

Sharon: Yes.

Regine Vital: OK, I was very much involved in what I am doing and kind of in my subconscious felt a shake. And, I mean I don't even know because we usually feel a little shakier. And eh, and then what attracted my attention and got me off of what I'm doing was screaming, I heard screaming and eh, in my mind what's that is it doing and started to you know looking for where is the scream was coming from. And then that was when I realised that we were really shaking. And it was the moment everything in my office fell down and my desk where I was feeling it going back and forth and I kind of heard a big noise. And for me I didn't realise it was an earthquake. What I thought it was the building falling down because the noise was coming from the upper, from above. And so I hid under my desk. That was my first reaction, to hide under my desk. But then the shaking stopped and then it all of a sudden it started again but I realised a couple of seconds nothing fell. I thought that's not the building falling, that's something else. And I heard screaming and screaming and yelling and people screaming "Jesus" and I tried to walk out of my office. As I was walking, I mean I was running out of the office. By that time there was water all over there because the thing broke, the fire water whatever broke and so I was barefoot and there was glass on the floor. So I ran out of the door. Some one of the employees came after and asked "What should I do?" and I said everybody just run to the back, walk to the back, get out through the back door, back stairs, back stairs everyone and as I was going I was screaming to everyone, walk to this way, follow me. And eh we walked fast and we were further I realised I couldn't see, everything was all white and I realised it was an earthquake. And I started seeing people, blood, bloody people and people screaming and I'm but then I didn't know whether it was only around where we were or if it was something all over and my first instinct was to call my family and found out how they were. And I couldn't get through and that's it. And I heard about Jean Marc, I tried to get back in to see if I could help with Jean Marc and I couldn't get back in. And you know it was hard not to do anything so I just stood there.

Regine answered a phone call here.

Regine Vital: I couldn't call home, I didn't know how my family was doing, they were they trying to see if there were any of our employees that were safe or were hurt apart from Jean Marc which I couldn't get back to outside in the street where we were standing. And so I am walking around and the power lines, stay in the middle of the street and you know going around and trying to say are you OK and organise a travelling group to go up in the employees cars because cars were stuck right there in the middle and this was traffic time. Someone could bring you over your car, you just have to walk. I finally decided I would go back home because I felt my home was OK, it's a pretty sturdy house. And I was thinking that anybody that can't get back to their house, come to my house, it's close by so walk to my house to the few people so when I get there I had no house. So I'm like OK I have no house.

Sharon: That's terrible.

Regine Vital: And my security was hurt, my security guard was hurt. A wall had fell on him and a very big wall. And I was trying, there was no way you could go back down the hill because there was no road anymore. So I said, you know what I'm going to try to get you some help, let me go back down and get things that I can use. And I went back down the hill and proceeded to go to my mother's house because that was the next of kin. And something like an hour on the way up I found two little kids. I know their parents, they were alone out walking and I said where's your father, where's your mom? And they didn't know where they were. And I said I'll come with you. So I took them along and I went back to my mom's house. And when I see all the devastation as I was going to my mom's house, the whole neighbourhood was gone. The only house standing was my Moms and I'm like "Thank you God". So I didn't realise until I got there that half of her house had fallen down too. She was very lucky she was outside.

Sharon: So it was partially damaged?

Regine Vital: Partially damaged. Half of the house, the inside of the house, the structure, stayed up, stayed up, yeah. So then when I got home I found her, she was crying, my niece was crying. And the people that I was raised with, we moved into the house when I was born in 1960s and so my future. The doctor she lived there, she come there often with medical supplies and painkillers. I knew she had a stash but I knew she had stash at my Moms with antibiotics and she always brings things to give. But the last time she came in she never had time to give what she had so I knew she had to go back to work. I went back to the house and took everything I could and I went back up. Instead of going all over the neighbourhood, you know people, because there was a lot of people that were still under the rubble, even my own family. When I got to the house even my own family was 3 houses away from my mom's on my father's side. There was nothing I could do and the house was completely flat and there were 3 people in there I know they were in there and there was nothing I could do. And the way was flattened and like you know and I know we were in the middle of the bar there was life. So I went back to the people that I could because I was hearing people screaming and things to try to see if they needed medical supplies. So I gave medical supplies. And I was up all night.

Yeah. So we stayed all night outside trying to help people. So we stayed outside. We had some iced water thank God for that. So we stayed all night out and helped. And then we were shaking, we felt shaking and sometimes very strong. And structures that were not falling yet were falling by that time, you know all night long and it was a horrible night, never slept. By four o'clock in the morning I was exhausted so I went into one of the quarters of my mom's house and locked the door and went to sleep and slept for about two hours and got up again because I had to get medical help for my security guard. So I got him the help, I mean I got him some surgical things. By that time I could go half of the way required, the rest of the way we would walk up. Once I got there I gave him all the medical help that I could and then got him some clothes, whatever I could find, shoes, clothes, food because I had just gone to the market because in my mom's house there was nothing to eat. So I got all the food that I could,

brought it to my mom's. Some clothes that I could I put in a suitcase so we were going back and forth to my house up on the hill to the crowd, they were together so I could get out my jewellery and you know important things for me. And I did that and then I went to the American Embassy, got my niece out on the first plane from the American Embassy because I needed to get her out. Her mom was going crazy by that time. She had no news so the American Embassy called her and said your daughter is here with us, should we bring her. And she said yes of course, bring me my daughter. So she got out. She was safe in the American Embassy and I simply went back to work to see what I could do there.

Sharon: What happened then say for the next few weeks and months? What happened, what was the main, obviously customer care was difficult so what happened?

Regine Vital: It was difficult so that is why with back up work and mobiles working to date most of the employees didn't show up to work because of personal situations. Some of them were very bad. Most of them their houses were completely gone and so I ran in by that time some people from Jamaica had landed in Ghada with their belongings and again some of these people were here. And so we started working from there to see what parts we could get back up especially personal communication and then I was working on the customer care side of things. I couldn't get back some communications. There was no way I could do it. There was much more important things than that so a person said to me a plane to Jamaica to fly some people from Haiti to Jamaica to answer a call. And so we did that for a couple of days. We got them on the first flight out. We caught the first flight we could find for them. A week to 4 days after we got some people out to Jamaica.

Yes, some of those flights. Most flights were evacuating people. We were not for work. The first flights was to bring people out and bring essential things in and like food and water and medical supplies for the employees and also to bring back the switch which was important so that we could have communication

again in those parts. And then afterwards I could, the only way I could get a flight, I could get arrangements. I could get some people out to Jamaica to work and that is how we reopened customer care and we also give back up to French West Indies so we had to get people straight out there to work for those. So we managed that and then it took us about 2 weeks to 3 weeks to bring back customer care in Port au Prince all the connections and everything and then we've got to bring people back in. We were working every day from the next day after the earthquake, every day from morning to noon. We found I was the only place that you could eat something or drink something because nothing. The food I had at my house was from my mom's and people that she had made. So I was eating there once a day and I was hungry actually which was good, which was very good. And then that's all the days I spent here working at night and every night we had to find a place to go and sleep. I didn't have a place to stay so I'm going around finding OK where do I sleep tonight. I'm tired of mosquitoes so I will go to a friend's house at least I know that her house was fine and I would sleep there. But then of course you wouldn't sleep all night because it was still shaking during the night and you spend the night half asleep and then you felt the shaking and then everybody ran out and then after a reeling back and by the time you. The first time I slept was a month after the earthquake, I went to Jamaica.

Sharon: I can remember you going. I think I remember that.

Regine Vital: Yes.

Sharon: I think I remember that.

Regine Vital: Yes.

Sharon: I think you were on the first floor or something like that.

Regine Vital: Yes. And even then the building, I am going into a building, I'm damn, you know but even when I am in Jamaica, you know but even the first time I went asleep. The first night what I did I wouldn't sleep in the hotel so I went to sleep by the pool because I was afraid to sleep in the hotel. I mean it took me a while. After 2 days I was, I couldn't take it anymore so I slept in the hotel and that was the first time I slept a good night, you know without being afraid. And I just felt do you know what if I need to die I'll die here in Jamaica. So I slept.

Sharon: What do you think in terms of like, what were the thoughts there about getting customer care back up and you know what do you think in terms of plans that you had in place, plans that were in place for maybe not an earthquake but...?

Regine Vital: You mean emergencies? One of the things that we have in customer care which is important is always have a SWOT team, an emergency team that is always ready on the go. And I was very surprised the next day when I came to work they were there. Some of them were there asking "what do we do". Then our short notice system to.....

Sharon: Were they employees or were they an emergency kind of team?

Regine Vital: Employees. An emergency team. So that's the team I work with. They were here every day with my management and we sat there every day and first, one of the things was accounting for everyone. Because I had at that time 500 and something employees and I was trying to account for each 500 employees to find out where they were. We had about 7 employees that were really in bad shape, that were, their, you know, their legs and things like that

and thank God no one died. Oh, I'm sorry, two died. Two of our employees that died I knew about...

They were off that day and they died. Some of them their whole family, most of them lost all that they ever had, house, clothes, everything. Then that Tuesday, we were testing to account for everyone. So we were going around trying to find everyone and then, who could come to work, who could we help, what could we do for some people? Some people were flown to Jamaica for now. Some people were really, we got them from one medical place where they were not getting the proper medical help to another medical place. We had to do that. We were giving food away to employees every day because there was nowhere else that they could eat for the couple of days so we started. They would line up here every day at about lunchtime and come and get their order. We prepared bags for them. We were preparing food. The first few days were really emergencies. We were putting food in boxes and bags and things and other, you know emergency kind of food and we were giving them away to employees so they're supplying home. And of course they would come and get it because there was nowhere else to go. And after that.

Sharon: I remember it.

Regine Vital: Yeah, and then but we were working out of here every day until we couldn't open of course and the second point after the emergency depending on everybody, accounting for everybody and making sure that everybody who to come to work, who was available right now and that was how we started again. But they were eager to work and that's another thing. In all their misery, all their problems they were coming to me every day because they needed their job, which was very, very, I mean I could understand that. I was one of their priorities, you know.

Sharon: So what do you think then, what would you think really that in the end made a difference with getting things, like with coping with crisis and getting things up and running?

Regine Vital: I think it was the people. It was the people and it was my management team and my emergency team. They were there the next day. The next morning I was here and they were right there so what are you going to do? What else do we need to do? How are we going to do this? So the first thing I said was let's account for everyone, let's see who's there. Who's alive, who needs help, let's do that. And then we did that and then afterwards we did that, who is available to work. So let's do that and then so who has papers and can go to Jamaica. Who has a passport? Who knew where their passport was? And we got a list of people that had a passport right there and then in their bags right there and they were available to go. So we told the people you bring your passport out of your bag you are not coming back, you going on a flight today, you know what I mean?

Sharon: Mm.

Regine Vital: Because at that time we wanted everybody to save their lives so that is how we got everybody going. And what made a difference that I always had in place an emergency team. The customer care, the way we function here because of the way the country is we always have a team that is ready to come. And that is the thing that was there first.

15. Interview with Youri Latortue, Senator

Youri Latortue (M) (Haitian) is a Senator and owner of National Security SA. Senator Latortue is a campaigner for Mirlande Manigat in the 2010 Presidential Elections. His party is the L'Artibonite en Action. He has met with Bill Clinton co-chair of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission regarding reconstruction of Haiti. He has served on the parliament's Justice and Security Commission and also

FADH's (army) Anti-Gang Unit. The interview took place in his office at Delma 64, Port au Prince.

Youri: It is more interesting to talk a little before the earthquake than after.

Sharon: Yes.

Youri: OK. Concerning my plan or concerning the.....

Sharon: All, I think. Generally, talk just generally if you want to.

Youri: All?

Sharon: Generally, talk just generally if you want to.

Youri: Generally, OK. I will begin to say that before the earthquake before the earthquake we have a lot of investors coming to Haiti. The population was very happy. But in general I was so happy I was in the University and 15 minutes before the earthquake this because I have a class. And before ah ten minutes I was in front because in all the area everybody cried and we don't know exactly what happened because that sometime since we don't have this is a bad moment for Haiti because we have destroyed and we lose all that we have in Haiti.

Sharon: That University fell right?

Youri: Yeah. The school where I bring my children and then I took my children to go home and when I was home everybody call me. I was asked 3 hours to go in the streets and we have to work. At night when I was in the Senate I was trying to find people in the crowd, we tried to help.

Exactly. I think more than 200,000 died the situation we had help from the international community with the help of the international community we saved a lot of lives. And the Government gave a lot of help but without coordination. It was in the first weeks we had a lot of problems because we do not have the capacity of searching and help in the country. And after the earthquake I think we took a lot of time to coordinate help and to push the country, to pull the county after the earthquake. And I think the best after the earthquake was the international community.....

And then in, in the summer we, the progress, a lot of money about 5 million for 2 years and 10 million for 10 years. But I think that for the population because an earthquake will have a, it's not the end project. And after the meeting the position with foreigners and nationals to try to help the country but also now that the situation is dark. And they made an election. And they were too busy to work after election but we don't have money the population try to work. I think the citizens' society in Haiti makes a lot of reform because Haitians education to help together. We knew that the first time that this is a country; we are the first person the community to help. And the middle is there is a problem and with the militant because we have citizens sharing the island but because of the history we have a lot of difference. But the first time after the earthquake the entire nation came together who found passport, who found anything. And Haitian in the hospital, see the manifestation of, for the first time I think it is very important. But even the people, medical people that for a long time for business meeting to begin again. Because Haitians don't have the capacity to move again their business. Before that we have a lot of products. We have some business with partnership, international partnership. They come from other countries in the beginning. But with the earthquake we have a lot of thousands ministers

from a small business. And you know a lot of people left to go to the United States and to Canada and they left all business, they left schools.

And you know after that we have about 30,000 people with the middle class with the children in the United States and Canada. And these people have their business waiting. And these people give 5 to other person something, something. Before that we

Sharon: Because of that reason?

Youri: Exactly, exactly. It was that after earthquake.

We have less money and we have less taxes. And now I can tell you about the budget from the Government. Before the earthquake we have more money than after for the future and after because of business get out we have less taxes and Government actually have money only to pay people on Government Social but not money for building hospital, for living every day. And really the relation in international community, they have there

Sharon: The infrastructure and things like that; they wouldn't have the money for the project?

Youri: Exactly, exactly. They don't have money for projects now. International community say after election when we have a new Government, you can have money for international community. From October to 2009 we have only money to pay people and if you see that the project the international community, they know themselves their project, they don't get money from the Government because after the transition big money to the Government and election, you know after election. I think Haiti now means to help middle class to have businesses. Middle class they crazy to put again with business. And because I

think there is a thing that people come to help people. I think maybe this that is something that can work. And it is most important.

Sharon: Give them help at a level and then a livelihood?

Youri: Exactly, exactly. For example outside of my city where I come from after the earthquake I came to view that before when the population of 3 hundred thousand people, we have 10 thousand people work or not. Fortunately we have Haitians in Miami in Canada and the money that they receive they use for education and housing. But they don't use the money to invest in because they don't have capital each more they need money to, for their own gain, for their personal gain, for their family. The most important thing is to help people to give, to put people on work with their own business. In Haiti eventually State Government give job to people, Government give 2 hundred thousand jobs to people. Government doesn't have money to pay all these people. And in the country I think the most important is business. It was that after one year and a half, after the earthquake until now you can see that we don't have many people in the streets but we have people in tents. We have a lot of people without housing. I think we stay on, on the first step help people directly after the earthquake. The second thing to help people to begin again with their business so help people to go in their housing. We don't begin with the second step. And I think there is an agent for Haiti because we can't stay on the step. We should have, we should have president, you know job, maybe the job as the job as the president is very tough. Because we have a lot of issues, we have a lot of difficulties. And I think that the president has to put has to put people on work. And if you don't need that we have people on the streets after 6 months, after 8 months. In this time we have a group of everything. But if you don't people who work, people don't have money to give things for them and after 6 months we can have that we have people who eat, 8 thousand people on the streets asking for food, asking everything because they don't have anything. And I think the first step of after earthquake was managed by international community civilian society but we have a lot of work to do and if we don't maybe IT, a bad situation.

Sharon: What do you think that generally I suppose in terms of the type of planning that was in place for this type of event? The type of generally what do you think, what planning was in place for an event of this size or a crisis?

Youri: The first plan is to put Haitians on jobs. We have a lot of people on tents. We have tents but they don't work, they don't work. They are waiting for help from the international community, from Government, from NGO. I think we have from 5pm for the international community. We have to begin with development of housing but we have to put people on jobs. People have to work. Haitians can't work because we have just; we have a small group people, the work. The people are important. If the Government.....

Sharon: It's a work ethic?

Youri: What?

Sharon: The ethic, people having a work ethic and having something that they have pride in.

Youri: Exactly. People have to do something in the morning until the afternoon. It's simple, we take a company, government pay to one of the them to clean for us. And the company use only one of their people. I said if we take the company with machinery, with all equipment but we say to the company please help now we need to put 2,000, 3,000 people to use people with other equipment. Because Government, you can clean office yes but if people don't work people are willing to go to the streets and to put everything on the streets. But I think that we have 2 hundred thousand people that need to work. With the money, we have to use money but with a lot of employment not only the company with

machinery. Haitians need to work. When a Haitian work they can use the money to build their house, they can use the money whether to buy food because actually people in tents wait for only the Government or the international community. Because they wake up the morning, they fill the tent they pass only the, and they sleep waiting international community or NGO or Government bring a lot of food. It is not possible. I knew that in 5 years, in 10 years we can in Haiti. That won't be very long because we may be 25 or 35 years. That means may be 5 plans of 5 years OK? That means stability but now how we can get out of this mess is to put people on work. I can tell you for election people know that this is the moment to find money. We find a group of people; they are the same people we find today. They need only money because they don't go out and they are on the streets, they go to find can they get to have money and they don't go to home because they need money and they save everything, they do everything. It is for that now we have insecurity, we have kidnapping, and we have everything. But the Government has to put in place a plan that the first priority is employment. Our work, big work, work as clean as housing. Now housing and clean is the most important thing. But we have to use people. We have to use less machinery, less equipment. We have to use people because people in working can have jobs. They have a plan as a food for work, cash for work but it is not important because people they don't build anything, they clean only and they use cash for work to give some cash to people. They have to use job to build something and to give cash to people. Because after the international community in Haiti, we have to say something that they use one million not cleaning and give money. Because I think that the first plan now is to put Haitians on job. You know in Haiti Port au Prince is the capital but we have about one third of population in Port au Prince but if you put people in Port-au-Prince that is fascinating people in all the countries because all the countries come to Port au Prince because they don't have work on other countries. They come here. If you begin to put people on work in Port au Prince that is going help and after we have to put jobs on other cities because if not people are all going to come to Port au Prince.

Appendix 2:

Table 4 List of Organisational Crises

Organisation	Nature of Crisis
Johnson & Johnson – Tylenol	Product Contamination
Atofina Fertilizer Plant Toulouse, France	Explosion
Exxon Valdez	Oil spill
Asia, Thailand etc.	Tsunami
Gulf Coast	Hurricane Katrina, Ivan & Rita
South Carolina	Chlorine – derailment/release
New York 911	Terrorist attacks
BP Texas City	Explosion and fire
Haiti	Earthquakes, floods & hurricanes
Enron	Accounting fraud
WorldCom	Accounting fraud
Arthur Andersen	Criminal charges re handling of Enron audit and subsequent bankruptcy
Sears Holding	Accounting fraud and bankruptcy
Marsh	Attorney General initiated a civil action alleging impropriety in the steering of clients to insurers
Coca Cola	Product recall in Belgium (1999)
AIG	Liquidity crisis
TYCO	Accounting fraud and corruption
HealthSouth Corporation	Accounting fraud
Martha Stewart	Stock trading case and conviction
Merrill Lynch	Subprime mortgage financial crisis
Halliburton	Deepwater Horizon Incident/Bonny Island Nigeria
Mitsubishi Motors	Product recall
United Way of America	Made a donation which was contended indirectly funded abortion
Smithbarney	Sale to Morgan Stanley during Financial

	Crisis
Citigroup	Huge losses in global financial crisis and was rescued by the US Government in 2008
Xerox	Overstatement of revenue, Accounting irregularities involving KPMG and SEC Investigation involving the restatement of results 1997 and 2000 and fines
Microsoft	Antitrust settlement
Firestone	Product liability
Sunbeam	Inflated earnings through a "bill and hold" accounting scheme to overstate earnings
Waste Management Co	Overstated earnings
Global Crossing	"Capacity swaps" to inflate earnings
Qwest	Accounting fraud and overcharging customers
Columbia HCA	Filed false Medicare claims and kickbacks to doctors
Adelphia	Founder John Rigas sentenced for fraud and conspiracy
Merck's Vioxx	Side effects from Vioxx
Ford's Explorer	Tread separation causing death and injury, Product Liability
Tide	Currency crisis
Harley Davidson	Charged with restrictive practices, labour strike and reduced quality, financial crisis
General Electric	Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Catastrophe (reactors designed by GE) No tax paid in 2010; GE also reduced their workforce by 1/5 since 2002.
Dell Computer	SEC, lawsuits, criticisms of marketing of laptop security
Berkshire Hathaway	Collateralised debt obligation fraud

	allegations
IBM	Software crisis
FedEx	Campaign against competitors over proposed bailout
Toyota Motor	Product recall
BMW	Financial crisis
Pfizer	Drug development failure
Intel	Flaw in Pentium microprocessor
United Parcel Service	Class action lawsuits by Canadians
Home Depot	Resignation of CEO Robert Nardelli
Nokia	Abuse of Surveillance Systems delivered to the Bahrain government
PepsiCo	Impact on water usage and environmental issues
Singapore Airlines	Hijack, crash and tailstrike
Cisco Systems	Shareholder relations, intellectual property disputes, censorship in China, tax fraud investigation, antitrust lawsuit, intimidation
L'Oreal	Claims of racial discrimination in advertising and other litigation
Honda Motor	Japan tsunami and earthquake
Target	Criticised by the gay and lesbian community, worker's rights organisations etc.
Walt Disney	Anti-Semitism accusations
Royal Dutch Shell Group	2004 overstatement of oil reserves, environmental pollution, criticism of health and safety, human rights violations, controversies over Sakhalin-II project (Russia) and Corrib Gas Field (Ireland), Tom Corbett campaign donations, set-up of whistle-blowers website

Anheuser Busch	Protests due to job cuts
DuPont	Controversy over CFCs, fines and litigation from US Environmental Protection Agency
Volkswagen	Potential 30,000 job losses for Wolfsburg, Germany
Costco Wholesale	Global Food Crisis
Caterpillar	Shedding 20,000 jobs 1/5 of global workforce
Walgreen	Accusations of switching dosage on prescriptions without doctor approval
Unilever	Racism, sexism and child labour allegations, criticism over environmental issues
Lowe's	Class action lawsuits over employee payment system
Boeing	Unethical conduct, industrial espionage, subsidy disputes, environmental issues, political contributions
Michelin	Financial Crisis
SBC Communications	Political contributions, criticism of wireless service, censorship controversy, privacy controversy, discrimination accusations, intellectual property filtering, information security and hacking
Emerson Electric	Financial crisis
General Motors	Chapter 11 reorganisation
Daiwa Bank of Japan	Withdrawal from all overseas banking operations plus 10% pay cut
Archer Daniels Midland	Criticism over price fixing, environmental record and agricultural subsidies
Krispy Kreme	Financial crisis
Qwest	Customer complaints and consumer issues, accounting and insider trading

	irregularities, refusal for NSA spying,
Kmart	Accounting fraud and bankruptcy
TIAA-CREF	Financial Crisis
HSBC Holdings	Subprime mortgage financial crisis
Continental Airlines	Bankruptcy and labour relations problems
Colgate-Palmolive	Criticism for animal testing and hazardous waste
Nestle	Child labour, E coli outbreak, palm oil use, Zimbabwe farms, green washing, repayment of Ethiopian debt to the company, Melamine in Chinese milk, marketing of infant formula in breach of World Health Organisation code
Sony	Hacking of PlayStation 3, theft of personal information of account holders, website hacking
Proctor & Gamble	Price fixing controversy, toxic shock syndrome, controversy that the company logo was a satanic symbol
Wal-Mart	Labour relations problems, gender discrimination lawsuit, false advertising, public image attacked
Bristol Myers Squibb	Accounting scandal
Clearstream	The greatest financial scandal in Luxembourg
Fannie Mae	Underreporting of profit
Northern Rock	Subprime mortgage crisis and nationalisation
Union Carbide	The Bhopal disaster
SocieteGenerale	Derivatives trading scandal
Peregrine Systems	Accounting fraud
Parmalat	Accounting scandal and mutual fund fraud
Nortel	Executives overstate earnings to earn

	bonuses
Barings bank	Derivatives trading scandal
American Airlines	Deferred maintenance of aircraft
Lehman Brothers	Bankruptcy
Siemens	Cases of bribery towards the Greek government
Anglo Irish Bank	Hidden loans controversy
Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster	Crash of Space Shuttle
Chernobyl	Nuclear disaster
Imclone	Insider Trading